

THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE LEAGUE

EUSTACE PERCY

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


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


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BY
EUSTACE PERCY

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
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I am indebted to the *Round Table* for permission to reprint, in Chapter V, several passages which first appeared in its pages. I wish also to record my thanks to my friend Mr. A. E. Zimmern for his kindness in reading the proofs of this essay, and for many valuable suggestions.

E. P.

JX
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P37

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“God, who is the searcher of my heart, knows with what a sad sense I go upon this service and with what a perfect hatred I detest this war; but I look upon it as sent from God, and that is enough to silence all passion in me.”—*Waller.*

TO MY FRIENDS

WHO WENT UPON THEIR SERVICE IN THIS SPIRIT

AND WHO HAVE NOT RETURNED.

INTRODUCTION

' O death that maketh life so sweet,
O fear, with mirth before thy feet,
What have ye yet in store for us,
The conquerors, the glorious ? "

—*Morris.*

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

“To guide . . . mighty states by counsel, to conduct them from institutions of error to a worthier discipline, to extend a provident care to furthest shores, to watch, to foresee, to shrink from no toil, to flee all the empty shows of opulence and power—these indeed are things so arduous that, compared with them, war is but as the play of children.”—*Milton*.

THE purpose of this essay is to examine the responsibilities assumed by Britain and by the British Commonwealth of Nations during the past five years, and to suggest the new spirit in which these responsibilities must be faced. They are not responsibilities to which the British people are accustomed, either by their history or by their institutions. Indeed, in many ways they may be said to run counter to British character and British traditional policy. And yet it may be said with equal truth that we have not merely incurred these responsibilities, but have deliberately assumed them.

The war and the peace treaties are just now bringing their usual aftermath of “disclosures,” but it needs no “expert” knowledge gathered “behind the scenes,” no revelations of the diplomatic steps by which the governments have arrived at the terms of the peace treaties,

and no technical dissection and interpretation of these terms, to read the signs of the times and to realise their significance. We are not here concerned with any obscure or abstruse commitments entered into by statesmen or diplomatists on behalf of the British people. The British people are committed, but by their own act and by their own voice. There are certain broad policies which British public opinion has acclaimed and has, indeed, in a measure, forced upon the national leaders. These policies have received at least the lip service of almost every public man in the country. Some of us may, indeed, doubt how far the masses of our countrymen are really represented by those who have won their applause or voiced their demand for these measures; but that is a doubt which goes to the root of democratic institutions. At least, our main responsibilities in foreign policy have been accepted and endorsed by every test of popular government. It is because we seem often so little conscious of the real nature of the pledges to which we, as a people, thus stand committed in the eyes of the world, that it has seemed worth while to add a few pages to the literature which has recently grown up round the League of Nations.

At the outset, our vision in regard to the problems of international peace has recently been clouded by a fundamental misconception of the phase of transition through which the world is passing. It is a misconception to which human nature, reacting from the strain

of war, is naturally liable, but it has unfortunately been encouraged by our national leaders, especially during the general election at the close of 1918. On November 11th we concluded an armistice, and immediately called it victory. At that moment, and often since, warning voices told us that the war was not yet won. These voices were not heeded, and, in spite of the dangers which still undoubtedly surrounded us, the instinct that ignored them was probably a sound one. The war against the Central Empires was really ended on November 11th. The ordeal by battle had been made and decided. But if those who realised how seriously the future tranquillity of the world is still menaced had given their warnings a somewhat different form, they would not, perhaps, have passed unheeded. The essential feature of the state of Europe from the signature of the armistice to the signature of peace was not the possibility of a renewed state of war, but the certainty of the extreme difficulties and dangers, the troubles, conflicts, and disturbances of peace itself.

On November 11th the world entered upon peace. It was not a formal peace. It was not marked by a final documentary settlement, duly signed, sealed, and delivered. It was not even a complete peace; sporadic war and revolution still smouldered throughout Europe and Asia. But the negotiations of the succeeding months, the labours of statesmen, diplomats and soldiers at Paris since the middle of January, the formal documents at length laid

before the German and Austrian plenipotentiaries, and the seals and signatures affixed to those documents, though they have all combined to produce a formal peace, have been powerless to produce a final one. We were wrong to acclaim the armistice as the end of our troubles and responsibilities. We are as wrong to regard the Peace of Versailles or the Peace of St. Germain as marking an epoch. Paper does not solve problems. The armistice ended, in many respects, the strain of war. Civil and military demobilisation and the relaxation and abolition of Government controls became for the first time possible. In the same way the Peace of Versailles has enabled the belligerent governments, in a very great degree, to restore their countries to normal peace activities. But for four and a half years the civilised world has been torn asunder. Economic ties have been broken beyond repair, commercial systems have been swept away. A wholly new society of nations has arisen in Europe. The minds of men, their feelings towards each other, their outlook on their own future, and their whole scheme of values in life have suffered the profoundest of revolutions. We cannot end such a war by turning off a tap. The treaties of Versailles and St. Germain have not even completed the territorial rearrangement of Europe, nor established in detail the new international institutions essential to her reconstruction. Much less have they defined the methods or aims of international economic co-operation, by which alone

reconstruction can become a reality. Many months of study and negotiation may yet be required before the mere documents embodying the agreements reached on these subjects can be finally drafted and signed. But even when the machinery of settlement is complete, our work will only be begun. When peace has been signed, it has still to be made.

Where to-day can we find any popular realisation of the magnitude of this task? Here, in the natural and inevitable state of public opinion in all countries, but especially—for this is our concern—in Britain, lies the greatest menace to a real peace. Having called the armistice “peace,” English men and women have been, since that moment, intent almost solely on returning as rapidly as possible to the normal course of their lives. This is the temper in which they have rejoiced over the official treaties of peace. They want, indeed, better lives than they led before. The privations and enthusiasms of war have issued in a passionate demand for social justice and social betterment. But their eyes, fixed for five weary years on battle-fields or council chambers abroad, are now withdrawn to their own homes. Their interests are more and more confined within the frontiers of their own country. They are only too ready to believe those who tell them that the “war to end war” is won, and to dismiss with impatience any further talk of foreign policy.

Yet it is at this moment that they themselves have impelled their statesmen to

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revolutionise the whole system of international relations and the whole standpoint of British policy. Their impulse has, indeed, proceeded less from any definite desire formulated in their minds, than from that underlying instinct towards sound reform which has always enabled Englishmen to make revolutions without realising that they were doing more than handling the obvious business of the moment. Yet the word "revolution" is no rhetoric, but an exact definition of the Covenant of the League of Nations and a sober description of the tendency of British policy in Paris. The League of Nations has not been set up; it has only been written down on paper. But it has been written down by Britain and by the United States in partnership. Others have collaborated or acquiesced. Some foreign statesmen, notably Monsieur Venizelos, have, indeed, been enthusiastic advocates of the scheme and contributed powerfully to carry it through. But the creative force behind it has been British and American, and it is Britain and America who will have to shoulder the practical task of establishing its machinery and giving to it as an institution the breath of life. Our original allies in Europe, though at one with us in the general lines of our policy, naturally view the Covenant with dissatisfaction, depreciation, or suspicion. It has not secured to France, to Belgium, to Bohemia, or to Poland all the guarantees that they desired; it has resulted in the imposition upon Jugo-Slavia and Rumania of restrictions obnoxious to their pride, even if not actually

detrimental to their interests. It is distinctly a compromise of the Anglo-Saxon type, and though it is in itself severely practical, the ideas or idealisms which presided at its birth have been used—and, as we think, rightly used—to check some points in the policy of our European allies, as, for instance, in the case of the Italian claim to Fiume. And be it remarked, it is precisely this idealistic side of the League that has received the seal of popular approval in Britain and America. Many of our British idealists, and many, too, of our British “muck-rakers,” have been eager to detect in the peace settlement reached at Paris points which may be attacked as violating the “principles of the League.” They have found this an easy task, for the peace, indeed, falls infinitely short of the hopes we had formed. But it is equally true, and the sooner we recognise it the better, that our friends in Europe will identify—are indeed already identifying—every unsatisfactory feature of the peace with those very “principles.” To the British people the League is the great redeeming feature of a most imperfect settlement; to our friends in Europe it too often appears rather the source of these imperfections. Danzig and Upper Silesia may become a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence between Poland and Geneva. Every irredenta will be nursed as a grudge against the League.

Irresponsibility and ill-nature have brought many charges against the “patched up” peace of Versailles, but sound statesmanship and the

wisdom of moderate men can draw up an indictment against it no less serious. For it is, and must be, a patched up peace. There are many wrongs which are left unredressed; many arrangements which are at best reasonable compromises; many provisions which embody the naked hatreds of war and the shortsighted selfishness which such hatreds engender. In many cases, where the settlement is in our view right, we have denied claims which, though asserted by the ambition of statesmen, represented nevertheless the honest aspirations of peoples. None of these difficulties is, indeed, irremediable or insuperable. They are wounds which can be healed, but only by laborious and concentrated skill, by practical sympathy, and by a steady manifestation of real interest in the gradual working out and progressive modification of the settlement. Until these wounds have been so healed, they are merely patched up. The whole body of Europe is torn and tortured. Our paper treaties are the merest temporary dressings and, if left without attention, their effect can only be first irritation and then poison. In many respects, conditions in Europe have grown worse and not better during the armistice period. No man who knew the state of Europe—the famine, the infant mortality, the steady and insidious growth of disease, rotting whole populations, the horrors of massacre and torture on the fringes of Russia, the proved impotence of the united wisdom of the allied and associated nations to take timely measures against the rapid crumbling of

European society—could stand in the Hall of the Mirrors at Versailles on June 28th with any sense of pride or satisfied achievement.

We might conceivably have washed our hands of Europe, we might have withdrawn within our own frontiers—but we have not done so. We have desired a League of Nations, and we have established one, and thereby we have assumed the imperious responsibility of labouring to the end that this League shall not be a mere irrelevant irritation superimposed upon Europe, but a real expression of her needs; a real instrument towards peace and reform and a real bond between her peoples. If we take our hand from the plough to-day, what will our position be? We have based our policy on a rudimentary co-operation with the United States, and we have thus aroused, at one and the same time, much resentment in Europe and many suspicions in the United States itself. How rudimentary that co-operation is the course of recent discussions in America has proved; it is an aim to be worked for, not an instrument already in our hands. We have to convince America that we invite her partnership in no selfish enterprise of world hegemony, but in a simple effort to contribute the experience and the resources of the English-speaking peoples to the task of European reconstruction and the development of uncivilised and backward races. We must be the bridge between America and Europe if we are not to forfeit the respect and confidence of both.

But this policy of the League of Nations has an even more serious implication at the present moment. The League is designed to provide a central council of the family of nations, established in the midst of Europe. In its earliest stages at any rate, and, indeed, for many years to come, the non-European nations will tend to be listeners in this council. It is obvious enough, and the course of events at Paris points to it, that the Asiatic nations, Japan and China, have little direct interest in Europe and little desire to play a leading part in her affairs. The same is clearly true of South America. But the average Englishman does not, perhaps, realise sufficiently that neither the prominent part apparently played by the United States at Paris, nor President Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations, indicates any immediate intention on the part of our great associate in North America to interest herself steadily or strongly in European politics. The Covenant of the League does not, as a legal document, commit her to do so. We shall examine at a later stage the attitude of the United States towards foreign policy, but it is enough to say here that we cannot, and should not, expect from her any prominent or continuous display of statesmanship in European affairs. Her influence will be great. Her economic resources may supply many of the most urgent needs of Europe in the months to come. But she will not, in the immediate future, take on herself any far-reaching responsibility for European conditions, and the course

of her internal politics may even, for a considerable period, make her little more than a sleeping partner in the practical business of building up the League. Europe will therefore have, in great measure, to rely upon herself, to grow by herself, during the next few years. If a League of Nations is to be established and is to grow and develop into the real peace-making and peace-preserving agency for which it is designed, it must grow out of the needs of Europe and be recognised by her peoples as a safeguard and a protection.

Yet the moment which we have chosen—or rather the inevitable moment which Providence seems to have chosen—for the erection of the League, is the moment at which Eastern Europe has, as it were, broken up under the feet of the family of nations. The revolutionary forces which we call Bolshevism are, to many Americans, merely a collection of philosophic sentiments, or a germ of new social policies, judged to be good or evil or simply interesting, according to the taste of the individual observer. Even to most Englishmen, who can watch the upheaval at closer quarters, the phenomena of Russia and Hungary too often merely excite interest as a curious phase of revolutionary thought, or even applause, as a sign of popular progress and popular idealism. But in the eyes of Europe, Bolshevism looms as nothing less than the end of the world. European society is long past the stage where men ate and drank and made merry in ignorance of the “archangel’s blade of steel” above their

heads. They do not live in the cities of the plain, but already, looking back from Zoar, they see "the smoke of the country go up as the smoke of a furnace." Prinkipo and General Smut's mission to Budapest could only have sprung from the brain of an American or British statesman, representing, in this case, very accurately the public opinion of his country. There is, perhaps, nothing so incomprehensible to European eyes as the irresponsibility with which public opinion in England and in the United States regards the Russian or Hungarian revolutions, or the Spartacist risings in Germany. It is not a question of excommunicating Bolshevism with bell, book and candle, still less of indulging in any of those adventures in eastern Europe disavowed by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech of April 16th. But unless we in England can face facts in regard to the revolutionary movement in Europe the League of Nations which we have created will go down to history as an attempt, perhaps less wicked, but infinitely more futile than the Holy Alliance.

For, whatever may be the merits or demerits of Lenin's philosophy—with whatever pity or sympathy we may look upon the strivings of the millions who do not understand his creed, but are swayed by his promises—the revolutions in Russia and Hungary, the attempted revolutions in Germany, and all the incoherent movements which agitate the "extreme left" in other countries, including our own, are definitely and irreconcilably hostile to the League of Nations. The League of Nations is not an idea

suspended in the air. Its Assembly and its Council are not gatherings of professors charged with the task of working out "the good and beautiful" in international politics. The League represents something. It will develop and become strong only if it continues to represent something. That something is the present international system, the system, that is to say, of national sovereignty—sovereignty which can only be modified or limited by the free action of the nation itself. It is a system inherited from Roman law and from the development of centralised monarchies in the Middle Ages, but, though this is rarely recognised, it has been confirmed and immensely strengthened in our own days by the growth of the modern principles of democracy and nationality. The treaty of peace has given it a final sanction by carrying to a logical conclusion the doctrine of nationality formulated by Mazzini and adopted as a watchword by the liberalism of the nineteenth century. This system has its own grave defects and dangers, and the League of Nations, like other representative bodies, does not seek to fix it for all time. On the contrary, it aims at developing it by a more efficient application and working out of principles and methods already inherent in it. But that means that the League is committed to the task of creating a better system, not by inventing a new and opposite doctrine, but by providing opportunities and means of co-operation. It seeks, first, by regular meetings between statesmen, to work out common policies between nations,

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adapted to common needs, without any surrender by any nation of its own sovereign freedom of action. It seeks, secondly, to promote formal international agreements by which the parties undertake to exercise certain of their sovereign functions, at least for a certain number of years, only in organic concert with other nations, with a view to the joint administration of common interests. The Supreme War Council, which sat at Versailles during the last year of the war, is the type of the first method. A convenient type of the second method—convenient because it is perfect of its kind though its scope is not very great—is the International Joint Commission set up by the United States and Canada for the control of the international waterways between the two countries. This is a semi-judicial commission empowered to issue rulings binding on both governments in regard to such matters as the diversion of the waters of boundary rivers and lakes.

But this League of Nations, representing the international system as it exists, represents a thing to irreconcilable war with which the revolutions in Eastern Europe are definitely and unalterably committed. There can be no true reconciliation between Bolshevism, in so far as Bolshevism remains a coherent philosophy, and the League of Nations. So far as the League is concerned, there must not, indeed, be war with any revolutionary movement in any country. The League must, unlike the Holy Alliance, by the very law of its being, refrain from any interference in the internal affairs either of its own

members or of nations not at present parties to its constitution. But Bolshevism, on its side, is not an internal revolution. It is a militant international creed, pledged to the creation, not of an international society, but of a super-national state, obliterating national boundaries no less than the social and economic boundaries between labour and capital. This conflict between internationalism and super-nationalism has already long been working within the Socialist Internationale, and the creation of the League must precipitate it into open war. No sooner will the League be established at Geneva than its disruption must become the first and dominant aim of Bolshevism. A successful League of Nations would confirm political beliefs on denial of which the whole creed of Lenin and his followers is based. It would, in their view, be the most evil of all possible governmental influences, deluding the people of the world into acquiescence in the fundamental evil and injustice of the state of society under which they live, and the destruction of the League would necessarily become the first point in the secret, if not in the public, programme of the revolutionary leaders.

This throws into even stronger relief the magnitude of the responsibility which the British people have assumed. At the moment when the waves of the revolutionary inundation are thundering on the shores of Central Europe, at the moment when we in England, to whom this thunder is still only a far-off murmur, seem to Europe to be playing idly upon the dykes of

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civilisation, we have taken the lead in establishing an international institution which lies directly in the path of the flood. We have pledged ourselves in honour to support, in fact we have even initiated, a policy which faces inevitable failure unless it enlists in its defence every quality of heart and brain in its advocates for years to come. And indeed it is only Britain which can make this policy a success. Our traditional aloofness from Europe has at least this advantage, that we are not wedded to the doctrine of nationality as a sacred dogma, and we can see clearly, where our neighbours do not see it, the fatal effect of giving to the League the character of a crusade against revolution, or a stonewall defence of national institutions. Our fundamental pacifism, while it makes us little trusted by many of our hard-pressed friends in Europe, leads us at least to rule out of account altogether as practical politics any military adventures against social upheavals, any attempt to suppress social heresies by the sword. But we cannot merely stand aloof and refuse to participate in such adventures. We are committed by the League of Nations actively to guide Europe in another direction, to offer other alternatives, to formulate a policy by which the European family of nations may be saved. We cannot at the outset indulge in philanthropic and intellectual luxuries like so many of our labour friends whose views are expressed in the *Herald*. We cannot proclaim an academic sympathy for the less violent forms of Bolshevism, and at the same time put our

strength behind the League of Nations. Our very appearance in the Council of the League of Nations is a pledge of our unalterable opposition to the anti-nationalism of the social revolutionaries. On the doorstep of the council chamber we have to cast aside even the nobler irresponsibilities of our mid-Victorian ancestors who could remain official friends of Austria, while openly proclaiming their sympathies with Mazzini and Garibaldi. We are not committed to things as they are, even to things as we have agreed they should be by our signature of the Peace of Versailles. On the contrary, we have recognised that that Peace can only be tolerable if it provides machinery for progressive change. But we are committed to the task of changing things as they are only by the methods of international progress which we ourselves have laid down or foreshadowed in connection with the constitution of the League. If we are alike to oppose revolution and to oppose the use of international force armed against it, the alternative to which we must win European adherence must be nothing less exacting than an anti-revolutionary policy and an anti-revolutionary creed. Ours must be a programme of action and a philosophy which we can offer not only to the League of Nations, but to Russia itself. We must know why we support the existing international order, why it corresponds with our desires, why we can put our faith in the methods which it offers for development and reform, what it is we are defending and what it is we hope to gain. We must apply to international relations the

principle which guides us in national affairs, the principle of active reform to remove the causes of unrest. We must show that trade and industry, those great staples of peaceful international intercourse, can be made the agents of social prosperity and cohesion ; that the influx of foreign capital, for instance, into " backward " countries is not an affair of concession-hunting or exploitation, and does not merely serve to create or intensify the lines of social cleavage between wealth and poverty. We must above all show that the guardians of social order have learnt no less, but more, from the disaster which has overwhelmed the world than the apostles of revolution ; that citizenship has a meaning to us newer and more fruitful than the doctrine of the rule of the proletariat ; that the enthusiasms and sufferings of war have affected government policies no less profoundly than they have moved the hearts of men.

Here is a task requiring qualities of ordered thought and calculated action which have never been an outstanding characteristic of the British people, and it is surely a task for which we are showing ourselves peculiarly unready at the present moment. We have created a League of Nations. With America, we are indeed its authors. What has British and American history and character to offer towards the enterprise to which we are thus pledged ?

I.—THE CHILDREN OF GALLIO

“Regni vero dignitas non est proprie honos sed onus, non immunitas sed munus, non vacatio sed vocatio, non licentia sed publica servitus.”—*Languet.*

CHAPTER I

BRITAIN

“ If England persists in maintaining this neutral, passive, selfish part, she will have to expiate it.”—*Mazzini*.

ENGLISHMEN have often been puzzled by their reputation in foreign countries. They have never understood how the national figure of John Bull becomes translated in European language into “ perfide Albion.” And yet British history for more than three hundred years furnishes a fairly obvious explanation. Since history is the schoolmaster to bring us to politics, it may not be out of place for us at this moment to examine our past record. If we forget it, others will not.

In the temper of the present day, it is often difficult to secure an audience for the teaching of history because the popular mind tends to regard everything that happened before the first Reform Bill as the evil agitations and intrigues of the dark ages. Many people feel that it is useless and invidious to draw analogies between the policy of Burleigh, Bolingbroke and Canning and the attitude of the British democracy at the present day. Yet, as a matter of fact, the mistakes of our ancestors proceeded just as largely

from mere common British indolence and selfishness as from ambitions of place or power. One of the best known political writers of the last generation, a liberal, and in many ways an advanced thinker—Walter Bagehot—insisted on more than one occasion that the chief evil of British naval and military budgets was that they were not based on any really sober or detailed estimate of the foreign situation. On April 26, 1862, he intervened in the controversy between Cobden and the government of the day, by an article in the *Economist*, in which he summed up the situation in the following words :

“ At present we are voting these vast sums upon grounds which are inconclusive and irrelevant ; Mr. Cobden is objecting to them for reasons which are equally so. He tells us to disarm, but does not prove that there is no danger ; we continue arming, but we do not ascertain that there is danger. Neither course is wise nor rational . . . Mr. Cobden always objects to armaments ; soldiers, he says, always advocate them. Unless we have a business-like estimate of the danger, who can say which of them is wise and which of them is unwise ? ”

These words might equally well be applied to the controversies which have raged recently over the Government's Military Service Bill, or to nine-tenths of the so-called foreign policy of British statesmen from James I to Sir Edward Grey. British foreign policy has only at rare intervals been based on any careful judgment of the actual situation in Europe, and this judgment has been lacking because we have never cared sufficiently about our neighbours to give

ourselves the trouble of following their affairs consecutively or in detail.

There have been a few short but very great eras when Britain has been looked up to by the continent as a great leader, as the home of statesmanship and the hope of the future. It is a curious commentary on our supposed leadership in the arts of peaceful government that in every case these have been eras of war, and in every case peace has brought with it a sudden abdication of that leadership, a sudden lapse of that statesmanship, a sudden disappointment of those hopes.

It is fair to take the Elizabethan age as the first of these periods in modern history, for though Elizabeth's foreign policy was shifty and selfish, though she refused to identify England officially with the championship of the Reformation cause in Europe, the force of circumstances and the spirit of adventure in her people did push England forward into the position of a bulwark against the designs of European imperialism. But this period was, from the point of view of the continent, only the overture to the great upheaval of the nations. The Armada was for England an Armageddon, but for Europe it was only a prelude to the Thirty Years' War. The death of Elizabeth and the dawn of the seventeenth century was marked by the abdication of British leadership in James I's Treaty of Peace with Spain in 1604. During the whole of the next forty years, British policy was one of shifting negotiations and irresponsible mediation. Europe was in ruins, and in surveying

those ruins, British public men spoke with the same two voices that have always marked and marred our attitude towards Europe. The voice of the balance of power, which in English mouths has always meant something very different from its meaning to continental peoples, counselled Charles I, in the words of one of his ambassadors, to use Gustavus, "the lion of the north and the bulwark of the Protestant faith," as a tool useful for the moment which could always be thrown away when its work was done. "The King of Sweden is not to be considered in his branches and fair plumes of one year's prosperity, but in his root, and so he is not to be feared. . . . It is mere folly to make the seeming care of the future hinder that course of victory which God hath chosen by him, not to set up a new monarchy, but to temper the fury of tyranny and to restore the equality of just government." The voice of humanitarian selfishness sounded in the words of Archbishop Laud to Strafford: "So a war and the mischief which must follow be kept off, I shall care the less."

Now, this policy during these years may perhaps have been fundamentally sound. England indeed lost credit on the continent through a course of diplomacy which could only appear at once selfish, fussy and ineffectual. But it may well have been right, both then and since—it might well be right even to-day—to base British policy on isolation from the troubles and the designs of Europe. The only purpose of this historical sketch is to indicate what in fact

the nature of our historical policy has been, and it is important here to note that the traditional British policy of isolation has always rested upon a quite peculiar interpretation of the principle of the balance of power, which has naturally aroused the distrust and even the contempt of European nations. A German contributor to the "Cambridge Modern History," whose words were greedily caught up by British pacifists in 1914, was wrong in history when he asserted that von Bülow had refused an offer of alliance with England lest he should thereby be made "the sword of England upon the continent," but while he was wrong in history, he faithfully represented a view of British policy which has been ingrained in Europe by a long course of British history. The doctrine of isolation, combined with the doctrine of the balance of power, has tempted England again and again to throw into the balance, not her own sword but the sword of continental allies. English historians have quoted with relish the savage words of Lord Malmesbury during his German mission at the close of the eighteenth century: "If we listened only to our feelings it would be difficult to keep any measure with Prussia. We must regard it as an alliance with the Algerians whom it is no disgrace to pay or any impeachment of good sense to be cheated by." But we cannot complain if Europeans in reply point to the frittering away of British troops and the substitution of subsidies for armed alliance which marred the war policy of Malmesbury's master, the

younger Pitt, or if they remind us that the Prussia against which Malmesbury inveighed so bitterly had been called in, largely as a result of his own efforts, a few years before to redress, in the British interest, the balance of power in Holland against French designs.

To continue our historical survey, we may pass over lightly the temporary, and to a large extent fictitious, restoration of British prestige abroad by Cromwell and the descent of British foreign policy to its nadir under Charles II. We approach perhaps the greatest period of British foreign policy in Europe. The wars of William III and Marlborough against France raised England to a position of supremacy on the continent which might have placed her in the forefront of European progress during the succeeding century, when the seeds of change were working in every European population and in every centre of European thought. We are accustomed to regard the eighteenth century as a dead period in English life, and there is much to support that view. Nevertheless, England was in many respects the source from which the liberal thinkers of Europe, notably Voltaire, drew their original inspiration. More important still, she had attained a measure of experience and skill in the art of government which was calculated to supply exactly that steadying and formative quality to the cause of progress in Europe for lack of which the liberal statesmen of the continent failed to impress their reforms in any enduring way upon the life of their countries. If to-day the

name of Pombal, "one of the most powerful and resolute ministers that has ever held office in Europe," is practically forgotten; if the whole "group of active, wise and truly positive statesmen" who governed Europe between 1760 and 1780 seem now to have laboured in vain; if Turgot is only remembered because his fall heralded the cataclysm of 1789, it is in no small degree because, except during the Seven Years' War, British policy held aloof from Europe. England's influence on the continent might have profoundly altered the course of history, but she preferred an isolation based by the Whigs on an act of treachery perpetrated by the Tories.

The Peace of Utrecht is perhaps the greatest blot on the British record. We broke the most solemn of treaties with Holland binding us not to make a separate peace. We deserted not only our Allies but the subject populations whose insurrection we had encouraged. There must indeed be few Englishmen to-day who realise, as they read of the revolutionary spirit in Catalonia, that they are watching in some measure the effect of a British betrayal of nationalism two hundred years ago. "We had encouraged a brave people to rebel; we had even threatened them if they did not rebel; and when they did rebel we deserted them." The Minister responsible for this act of treachery fell; the dynasty changed. The Peace of Utrecht and the seven years of restless negotiation which succeeded it did, as a matter of fact, result in the establishment of something like a

European system. The Triple Alliance between England, France and Holland, concluded in January 1717, was joined by Austria in 1718, and by Spain in 1720, and an attempt was made in a series of conventions and congresses, not wholly unlike those that followed the Napoleonic wars, to make the alliance of these five great powers the basis of a settled European peace. But British statesmen soon tired of the effort. Again, they were perhaps justified. Walpole was possibly right to withdraw more and more from the quarrels of Europe. Europe was indeed not yet ready for peace. Not only autocratic traditions, but the aftermath of the Reformation upheaval, the incoherent and unsettled condition of large sections of European society and the ferment of ideas working in it combined to render a permanent state of peace difficult if not impossible. But though Walpole's policy may have been wise, it was selfish. Laud's voice sounds again in the words of Walpole to the Queen in 1734: "Madam, there are fifty thousand men slain this year in Europe and not one Englishman." And, moreover, the aloofness of England was artificial. She had not yet learned—as we have even now not yet learned—that she cannot be securely at peace if Europe is at war. The Seven Years' War demonstrated this truth, and once again, under Chatham, she flashed out into European leadership. The flash was a brief one and was succeeded by the old darkness.

Our desertion of Frederick the Great in 1762

is not to be compared with our desertion of Holland half a century before. We may disavow to-day in the light of the subsequent history of Prussia Chatham's rhetorical outburst of December 9th of that year: "The King of Prussia disavowed! given up! sacrificed!" We may be devoutly thankful that we who, as Chatham said, could have allied ourselves with no other Power in Europe than Prussia or Russia, were not involved by any such alliance in the partitions of Poland. Yet in a sense the Peace of Paris marked a still more definite step than previous treaties in the abdication by Britain of leadership in Europe. We deliberately turned our eyes away from the continent to Asia and to the New World. We definitely set our hands, with whatever ill-success at first, to the building of our overseas empire and withdrew from the cockpit of Europe. And we did this at a moment when Europe was emerging from the fictions of personal diplomacy into new policies and new dangers. "It was the entry of Frederick the Great upon the scene that instantly raised international relations into the region of real matter and changed a strife of dynasties, houses, persons, into a vital competition between old forces and principles and new." If the Peace of Paris was marked by a better and more honest statesmanship than the Peace of Utrecht, the years that followed were infinitely darker than the years of Walpole's ministry. For twenty years England sank lower and lower in the scale of nations, and in the eyes of

Europe. The rulers of Prussia and Russia both expressed the belief that, in the words of Bismarck more than a century later: "Respect for the rights of other states . . . in England lasts only so long as English interests are not touched. . . . The English constitution does not admit of alliances of assured permanence." Britain, absorbed in the downfall of her American empire, washed her hands of the conspiracies which partitioned Poland and put a final end to any real balance of power in Europe.

She was, however, to lead Europe once more. Her statesmen were again to dominate the councils of the European nations. But at the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh repeated in one vital respect the policy of the Peace of Paris. He excluded extra-European problems from the scope of the Congress and laboured for little more than to establish in Europe some peace which would permit England again to turn her attention overseas. He did indeed attempt, as Walpole had in a minor way attempted a century before, to participate in a great alliance and a series of congresses designed to guide and regulate the development of European society. We have been accustomed to regard Britain's abandonment of this policy and her return to an attitude of isolation in face of the tendencies of the Holy Alliance as a great stroke of liberal statesmanship, but the democracies of Europe, looking back on the breach between Canning and Metternich, may well ask whether British

statesmanship did indeed struggle long enough or sincerely enough against those tendencies. Napoleon, watching the state of Europe from St. Helena, shewed his genius by a last prophecy :

“ I do not think that after my fall and the disappearance of my system there will be any other great equilibrium possible in Europe than the concentration and federation of great peoples. The first sovereign who in the midst of the first great struggle shall embrace in good faith the cause of the peoples will find himself at the head of all Europe and will be able to accomplish whatever he wishes.”

It was at best the achievement of a meaner statesmanship to call in the New World to redress the balance of the Old and that meaner statesmanship shows clearly in the less often quoted words of Canning in 1823 : “ So things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all. The time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by.”

Until we come to the cataclysm of our own days, no opportunity as great as this has recurred, but we have had other more restricted opportunities which we have missed no less lamentably and for the same reasons. Even Canning could not make British isolation a consistent policy. He dabbled tentatively with Russia in the Greek insurrection, but on his death his successors drew back from those responsibilities in Eastern Europe which were to become the chief material of foreign policy for the remainder of the century. Our faltering course in the Eastern question, thus inaugurated, was to drag its trail across British

statesmanship for nearly a hundred years. The Crimean War did not give Britain any leadership on the continent comparable with that which she had enjoyed in the previous periods at which we have glanced, but the British Foreign Minister, Lord Clarendon, was the dominant figure in the Congress of Paris. In his own words, "the conditions on which peace was made would have been different if England had not been firm." With this dominant position we might have done much in the Turkish Empire which we had fought to defend, but the news of the peace brought nothing but forebodings to our ambassador at Constantinople.

"Here the peace," wrote Stratford Canning to Lord Clarendon, "gives rise to many anxious thoughts. How are the Sultan's reforms to be carried through—the Allied troops all gone, and no power of foreign interference reserved? How is the country to be kept quiet, if hopes and fears, equally excited in adverse quarters, have to find their own level? What means shall we possess of allaying the discordant elements, if our credit is to decline and our influence to be overlaid by the persevering artifices of a jealous and artful ally? How can we hope to supply the usefulness derivable from our command of the Contingents and Irregulars if they are to be given up? In short, when I hear the politicians of the country remark that the troubles of Europe with respect to this Empire are only beginning, I know not how to reply."

Everyone knows how these forebodings were realised, nor can Englishmen deny that the state of Turkey in the last half century has been only too largely due, not, indeed, so much to British imperialism as to British indifference. Our failure has been summed up in a few words

by an author who was, in his day, himself responsible for British policy in the Near East :

“ The only period during which Turkey has enjoyed a real though transient measure of good government and prosperity was the interval of twenty years between the Crimean War and 1878, during which foreign influence was strongest and foreign capital poured into the country. Then was the time when England, supported by the Young Turkish party, might have made use of her unbounded popularity in Turkey to obtain pledges of financial reform as a condition of financial assistance. Instead, the native reformers wasted their energy in futile agitation for popular institutions, and England looked on while vast loans were recklessly squandered, and a period of depression set in, which even the subsequent increase of investments in railways and the reduction of the interest on the public debt after the Russian War proved powerless to arrest.”

We cannot here discuss in detail the history of the Eastern question from 1878 to the outbreak of the present war, but it is a history of indecision, of an internal conflict of opinion in England itself, of a half-hearted and often unreasoning and unprincipled support of the Ottoman Empire, varied by denunciations of Turkey in which real liberalism and democratic feeling were inextricably mixed with the old short-sightedness and the old fear of foreign commitments. Looking back on British policy during the forty years since the European Powers set their signatures to the Treaty of Berlin, the historian may well echo the words of the prophet : “ How long halt ye between two opinions ? ” The vacillations of July, 1914, when British statesmen dared not commit their country to a European war arising out of a

Balkan question, and the subsequent failures of our diplomacy at Constantinople, at Sofia and at Athens, were only the logical consequences of past indecisions and half realised responsibilities.

What is true of the Eastern question is true also of our policy in Western Europe. Throughout the nineteenth century, our attitude towards foreign relations has been marked by the same characteristics, and has produced the same impression in Europe. The rise of Germany hardly stirred our pulse. In 1864, a British ambassador had no answer to the Russian Chancellor who declared that it must henceforth be understood that England would never go to war for an affair of honour. Later, in face of the approaching storm of 1870, British statesmen "were like watchers of a game whose eyes have strayed from the board." The account given by Lord Acton of the attitude of the British Cabinet on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war is characteristic: "The Ministry were divided. Bright would do nothing for Belgium; Lowe did not care what happened to Germany; Lord Granville asked himself what would be the position of England with the French at Berlin; Cardwell, at the War Office, estimated that they would get there in about six weeks. All agreed that the Germans had no chance and that it would be doing them a service to get them out of this scrape. They were taken by surprise."

But at least, it may be urged, there was one exception to these manifold sins of omission.

Surely the attitude of Britain towards the Italian Risorgimento was wholly admirable. It is true that our instinct here was right; it is true, indeed, that our sympathy with Italy in the day of her trial is still a living force in Europe. But no one who has read Cavour's correspondence with his ambassador in London, and who has seen in it the manner in which foreign politicians and diplomatists thought it worth while to play upon the weaknesses of British statesmen and to take advantage of the cross-currents of British politics, can bring himself to look back with special pride even on the policy of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, or on the diplomatic friendship between Cavour and Sir James Hudson. They had not really taken the measure of the foreign situation; they were swayed by sentiments which were none the less unsatisfactory foundations of policy because they were noble and disinterested. Above all, they had not the courage of their convictions. They were content to applaud the patriots of Italy; they were satisfied with the knowledge that English ideas and methods of government had trained Cavour, that Britain had given an asylum to Mazzini and had fêted Garibaldi. They left it to France, and, at the last, to Prussia really to accomplish Italian unity, and when Italy repaid her debt to Bismarck by entry into the Triple Alliance, Gladstone could only lament impotently what he regarded as an evil confederacy with a reactionary Caesarism, while British Conservatives seem actually to have

encouraged, if they did not even promote, the alliance.

In a word, British statesmanship has often been right about Europe. It has often intervened for a moment on the right side, but it has never been willing to hold in its hands or to follow for more than a brief moment the threads of policy which it has taken up and fingered. In the European family of nations our character and our history have made us amateurs and preachers. Even when we have judged and acted rightly we have never been ready to keep in repair the walls that we have built, or to maintain the policies we have inspired.

It is important to go a little deeper into the causes of this traditional British attitude and to note some of its results. One dominant cause has probably been our preoccupation with our overseas possessions. Strategically and politically, our attention has been diverted from Europe by the consideration of the safety and well-being of our Empire. Our policy in the Near East has always been an Asiatic rather than a European policy. Bismarck deliberately played upon this British characteristic with great success. His was the impulse behind the Russian advance in Asia, whereby he reckoned on turning our eyes from Belgium to the frontiers of India. He encouraged our occupation of Egypt, relying on the discord which would thus be sown between us and France. The British Empire, and especially the British route to India, became the charter of a free hand for Germany in Europe.

But this is only half the story. There has always been a great body of sentiment in England which has not been so exclusively concerned with questions of imperial security. British "imperialism" and the basing of British foreign policy on strategic considerations has been for many years the target of liberal criticism in our own country. These critics have seen the defects of the doctrine of the balance of power, but they have failed really to influence British foreign policy because they have ignored the equal weakness of their own sentiment of humanitarian selfishness. They have not, indeed, been conscious of the selfishness, but they have never been prepared to bring British power actively to bear upon the causes they have advocated. They have contributed to British strength because in many European countries, in Italy and in Bulgaria, they have identified British public opinion with an attitude of sympathy towards popular aspirations. But they have not thereby gained the respect or the reliance of European statesmen, even in democratic countries. They have bidden us support the rights of oppressed nationalities, not by intervention, but by standing aside, or at most by guaranteeing a free field and no favour. The Italian people have an instinctive affection for the people of Britain, but Italian statesmen cannot but remember that, if a British government used its negative influence to keep the seas open for the expedition of the Thousand, they had to rely upon imperialism in the persons

of Napoleon III and of Bismarck to lay the real foundations of united Italy in 1859 and 1866. There is a point where this sentimental irresponsibility—for we can call it nothing else—amounts to a betrayal. It leads the weak to mistake verbal sympathy for a promise of active support ; too often it only avails to “ fan the fires of hell, by the claim it makes for a helpless race of the freedom to rebel.” There is a point, moreover, where it leaves British statesmanship in an impasse between conflicting national claims, all theoretically supported by British public opinion in the past, but incompatible with each other in practice. Its highest achievements are in the nature of the Balkan Conference at London in 1913—the patching up of momentary compromises which open no avenues towards a permanent settlement. Our diplomacy at Sofia and Athens in 1915 was not so much wrecked on the rock of Disraeli’s imperialism, as suffocated in the swathes of cotton wool which years of indecision and shirking had wrapped round British diplomacy.

Any writer on such subjects who knows the course of events during the first year or two years of the war must long for a pen capable of conveying some impression of the tragedy of British failure in Eastern Europe. Liberalism—the word is not used in its party sense, but as the best name available for a phase of national thought which has affected the course of all British governments, and has largely determined the character of our Foreign Office—had

contributed one great asset to our policy. Alone, among all the nations of the world, we were regarded by every small state in Europe, and especially in the Balkans, as unselfish and disinterested. It was to us alone that M. Pasic and M. Venizelos looked for leadership among the Allies. It was to us that every independent Bulgarian looked for help in counteracting the tendencies of King Ferdinand's personal diplomacy. Our position in Rumania was hardly less strong. Yet that which they looked for we were powerless to give. Leadership was the one thing that we refused, the one thing for which liberal thought had never fitted us.

The identification of British foreign policy in recent years with liberalism may seem a curious paradox to some critics of secret diplomacy, but it is true. The tradition of our whole civil service, and not least of the Foreign Office, is not Tory but Whig. The mild sympathy with continental liberalism and nationalism which marked the school of Canning, Palmerston, Russell, and Granville still lives in the Foreign Office. British liberalism has left Whig doctrines far behind in domestic politics, but has never advanced much beyond them in judging international relations. It is only very recently that liberal schools of thought in England have begun to desert the cause of nationality, and even now they have not faced the issue between nationality and internationalism which is dividing Europe before their eyes. Even the Labour Party has inherited

the same tradition, and the manifesto of the Inter-Allied Labour Conference at London in 1918 has some claim to be regarded as a final endorsement of the pure doctrine of nationality.

If this was our record during the earlier part of the war, it must be confessed that our recent course during the Peace Conference has not been such as to restore European confidence in our firmness or in our leadership. It is not so much a question of the negotiations of statesmen. The fundamental policy of a country is determined by the instincts of its people. Our prestige in Europe, after our early mistakes in the war, grew with the growth of our military power. Since November, 1918, the overwhelming instinct of the British people has been towards the most rapid possible disbandment of that power, and it is remarkable that the Government which introduced, and the Parliamentary majority which voted, the Military Service Act, have alike in great measure failed to support it by any such survey of our policy, by any such estimate of the European situation, as Bagehot long ago called for in the words already quoted. The arguments in favour of that Act were, indeed, on this basis overwhelming, but they have not been advanced.

If this silence has aroused the suspicions of honest ignorance and played into the hands of faction, the responsibility rests mainly with the statesmen who, armed with an overwhelming case and backed by a willing people, have been

content to leave the field of political controversy free to those who are ever ready to exploit the passing grievances of citizens to the advantage of party or of personal notoriety. A Government which defends its foreign policy in war and peace, on the platforms of a general election and on the benches of the House of Commons, by feats of brilliant impressionism, cannot complain if its own weapons are turned against itself. Once more, indeed, the interests of the British Empire, the peace of the world, and the political future of the human race are being decided between one set of politicians who will not take the trouble to explain and another who will not take the trouble to think. In such cases the greater sin is always that of the Government if it fails in its duty of refining political controversy by the steadying influence of knowledge.

If we wish to see ourselves through the eyes of the European nations at the Peace Conference, if we wish to focus British policy for a moment by the professions that Britain has made at Paris, let us attempt to reconstruct the speech in which a British statesman, fully impressed by the course of events on the continent and by the problems agitating the mind of its peoples, might have been expected to move the second reading of the Military Service Bill in the House of Commons at the end of February. He would not have rattled his sword against Germany, he would not have enlarged on indemnities ; but he might, perhaps, have spoken somewhat as follows :

“ An Allied Commission, representing five Great Powers and nine small nations, has just laid publicly on the table of the Plenary Peace Conference the draft constitution of the League of Nations. Your representatives at Paris have laboured to produce this draft ; public opinion throughout the country has applauded it as the first fruits of a clean and unselfish victory. Its articles impose serious obligations on the people of this country, which I will not touch on now, but before they can come into effect we have other and immediate duties to discharge. The League is not yet in being, and I would ask the House to consider what is the present situation of those who are to be its members and what the state of those regions of the world where it is primarily designed to establish and guarantee peace.

“ Of the nine small nations whose representatives collaborated in the preparation of this draft, three, and those the greatest—‘ small,’ indeed, only by comparison with the Great Powers—Poland, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, are not yet in being. Two of these are still fighting in their debatable lands : the Jugo-Slavs against the Austrians in Carinthia, the Poles against the Ukrainians in Galicia, against the Germans in Posen, and against the Red Army on their eastern frontier. Poles and Czecho-Slovaks are even on the verge of an internecine war in Teschen. To-morrow Fiume, Klagenfurt, or Assling might well become the scene of a collision between Italians and Jugo-

Slavs. More dangerous still is the situation in Hungary, where at any moment the forces of social revolution and of nationalism may combine in an attack on the new Czecho-Slovak Republic and on Rumania—or, conversely, may become the object of an aggressive movement by those States, impelled by fear or ambition. Two of the other smaller Allies represented on the Commission—Rumania and Greece—are about to receive increases of territory and population which must transform their whole character.

“ In all these cases it is vital that the new States, whether now first created or radically transformed, should come into their heritage in an orderly and peaceable manner, carrying over into their future no bitterness and no blood-feuds. How is this transition to be accomplished? The peoples who have been our enemies are in ferment. Their future is uncertain. It is still possible that the terms of peace worked out in Paris may be opposed by organised resistance, and we have to provide against that; but the greater danger is that they may be wiped out by anarchy. If German troops in Silesia and West Prussia, disregarding the orders of the new and struggling Government of Weimar, should determine to defend those territories against annexation by the Poles, whom they despise; if Hungary should lapse into revolutionary risings against Rumanians, Czechs, and Croats; if Bulgarian and Turkish bands should conduct a guerrilla warfare in Thrace against the Greeks and in Macedonia

against the Serbs—what authority is the new-born League of Nations to bring to bear against the disturbers of the peace? One thing we cannot do. We cannot be content to leave the enforcement of the terms of peace to local action; we cannot simply give our interested allies a free hand to take the territories allotted to them. They are our allies, but in many cases their history and character, their course and stage of development are different from ours. They not only have the ambition of youth; they inherit also a long legacy of private and public hatreds, and the territorial claims that they are making even now at Paris exceed what we shall in justice be able to write into the treaty. Our terms of peace may be harsh, but at least their aim is justice; will the British people be content to see justice turned into the vengeance of blood-feuds or the opportunity for aggression? The deep-seated anti-Semitism of Poland, to quote but one example, has already given rise to accusations and counter-accusations, to undoubted acts of violence, and to a general atmosphere of racial antipathy, boycott, and petty persecution, which constitutes a danger to the peace of the world. Britain will be responsible before all other nations for the ordered police work of the settlement, because it is to us that all the peoples affected look unanimously as the only possible provisional administrator and policeman. It is incumbent upon us especially to forestall these dangers in the only way that they can be forestalled—by creating certainty for our Allies, for the

populations to be redeemed by the settlement, and for our enemies themselves—certainty that the law to be given at Paris shall ‘run in fixed and known channels,’ deflected neither by obstacles nor by passions.

“And, if this is true of the problems that face us in central Europe, it is tenfold more true of those that await us farther east, in Russia and in Asiatic Turkey. Russia itself lies beyond the scope of our direct action; we have commitments there, legacies of our war policy, which remain to be liquidated, but no soldier enlisted under this Bill can be used in Russia. The Russian revolution is, however, a flood which knows no political or ethnic frontier, and we cannot, unfortunately, disclaim responsibility for its effects on the Baltic States, on Finland, and on Poland—possibly also on Rumania and on other Central European territories. Whatever may be the final judgment of wise men on Bolshevism, it shares one characteristic with all the social revolutions of history—that it has loosed all passions and sanctioned all hatreds. As men responsible for the peace of the world to-day, there is only one thing that concerns us in all the accusations and counter-accusations of aggressions and atrocities which rage round the history of the last few months in Finland and in the other border populations of the former Russian Empire. Fear and injustice have cut so deep on both sides that on both sides judgment is clouded and power unbridled. Impartial authority embodied in armed force can alone

delimit the provisional frontiers of the new States and provide a breathing space for the establishment of the elements of stable administration. This is not the policy of the 'cordon sanitaire' against Bolshevism, for Bolshevism does not seek to penetrate Central and Western Europe in the knapsacks of the Red Army, and no political frontiers or military police will obstruct the advance of its propaganda and intrigues. All we can or desire to do is to rescue these border States from the aftermath of an anarchy as alien to them, for the most part, as was the Czarist regime.

"In regard to Russia, however, the people of this country may well say that they have never deliberately assumed responsibilities which by the true principle of democratic diplomacy they can be called on now to redeem. Our alliance with the old Russia and our ambiguous relations with the new were not of their choosing. Traditionally the British people sympathise neither with absolutism nor with unbridled revolution. Their instinct is to allow social ferment to work itself out in its own way. They desire to meddle with the Commissaries at Moscow as little as their fathers wished to interfere with the Committee of Public Safety in Paris a century and a quarter ago. But the same cannot be said of Turkey. If there is one thing that the people of this country have grown to desire as an axiom of international politics, if there is one deep-seated instinct among them which has worked steadily athwart the temporary policies of their statesmen, it is

the ending of Turkish rule over non-Mohammedan populations, whether in Europe or in Asia. This is the goal to which the war in the East has led us, even against our will. We cannot draw back now, though now we can count the cost. If the Ottoman Sultan is to be confined to a Turkish State in Western and Central Asia Minor, stripped of his control of the Straits, of his seat at Constantinople, of his possessions in Smyrna and its hinterland, and of his rule over Armenian and Syrian Christians; if, further, as the inevitable result of this break-up of the political power of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Arabs of the Hedjaz, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia demand, and have fought at our side for, independence from Turkish rule; if, finally, we are to redeem the one pledge given by our statesmen in the last five years which has, incomparably more than any other, caught the imagination of the British people—the promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine—how shall we ensure that this sweeping dismemberment of an Empire to which the eyes of all Islam, in our own territories as elsewhere, have been directed for centuries, shall not be the signal for further bloodshed and disaster? Turkey's military power may be gone, but she still retains two weapons—massacre and intrigue. Her people throughout Asia Minor are armed; she still holds in her hands the threads of an Oriental diplomacy which stretch into every corner of the Moslem world. On the day that these decisions are announced from Paris, the instinct of every Turk will be to kill a Christian,

and the call to insurrection in the cause of Islam may well run from Cairo to Bokhara, stir every frontier tribe from Quetta to Gilgit, echo through the mosques of India, and, perhaps, even thrill the ranks of our Indian army. All who know Asia Minor, the American missionary and the European student of Eastern politics alike, warn us that the indispensable preliminary to any announcement of the territorial reconstruction of these regions is a military occupation, strong enough to repress disorder and carry the new states through the days of transition. To fail in this would be a worse betrayal of the subject races over which the Turk has ruled so long than if the Allies had never, in their reply to President Wilson two years ago, solemnly declared their liberation as one of the chief aims of the war.

“ These, then, are our immediate responsibilities ; what are our present resources ? Our armies, reduced but still effective, are on the Rhine ; they still occupy Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, but our white troops there, wearied out by the hard conditions of their service, need and deserve to be replaced and strengthened ; we have a force in Constantinople, fully occupied there and not available for employment beyond the limits of Turkey in Europe ; we have a small force doing police and railway duty in the Caucasus ; a mere handful of British soldiers still show our flag on the Adriatic ; at Archangel and Murmansk British troops are entangled in a defensive war which is merely the legacy of our original

attempt a year ago to recreate the eastern front against Germany. But, with the one exception of the immobile force at Constantinople, in the whole vast stretch of disputed and unsettled territory from Helsingfors to Kavalla and from Fiume to Lake Van there is not a British soldier or a British gun. We cannot move a man in all this region to enforce submission on our enemies or moderation on our Allies. Already Poland laughs at our remonstrances and disregards our advice. Already in a dozen places new wars are smouldering. Through lack of men we have been obliged to leave German troops in the Baltic provinces, and these are even now undermining the independence of the Lettish Government by intrigues in the interests of the Baltic barons. We may at any moment be forced to send undisciplined Greek troops to Smyrna to protect the Christian population from massacre, or to withdraw our handful of men from the Caucasus and abandon the only artery of supplies for Armenia through Batum to the mismanagement or ill-will of the Georgian Republic. These are only three instances out of many. If there is any man in this House who during the last four years has opposed our military policy in the East and who has advised us, as many of our best military authorities advised us, to restrict our commitments, both military and political, to the Western front, I shall not complain if he opposes this Bill. His opposition would at least be logical, for our responsibilities were not of his choosing. But, in fact, this is not

the quarter from which opposition is to be apprehended. It comes, it has already been widely voiced, precisely by those, on the contrary, who have been ever ready to respond to the cry for liberation coming from remote peoples ; who desired, above all other things, to make this war, if it had to be fought at all, a war of revolution in the cause of nationality. It is their policy which has now come to fruition ; a new system of States based on the principle of nationality has been created in Europe ; will they now have the courage to go forth and labour in the fields they have sown till they have garnered the grain of peace, or will they retire to their fireside and leave others to reap a harvest of new bloodshed and misery ? ”

This imaginary speech, if it had been made in February, would have laid a sound basis for our policy, but it would hardly have silenced opposition. It was too late for that. The chance of maintaining the unity of Britain during the period of international reconstruction had already been missed. The atmosphere of the general election had sacrificed essential unity to the imposing façade of an artificial Parliamentary majority. It would perhaps be asking too much of human foresight to complain that such a speech was not delivered in all its details on the hustings at the end of November, but our leaders could at least, even then, have grasped and taught two cardinal truths ; that the task of the Allies was only half accomplished and that in restoring peace even more

than in making war, the touch of statesmanship must be strong and sure. War and peace are both affairs of power, but while, in the one case, the power that seeks to overwhelm must, especially in modern warfare, work by accumulated pressure, blunt, indiscriminate and crushing, in the other case the power that seeks to re-order and resettle must be exerted only where it is needed and its workings must be simple, precise and obvious. For this reason the blockade was of all weapons the worst that we could have used during the making of peace. The opponents of the Government realised this dimly, but they did not discern the sufficiently obvious fact that they were themselves responsible for the use of that weapon. Only the maintenance of our military power could have enabled us to surrender the means of pressure which had played so large a part in the attainment of victory. Public opinion in November demanded "no conscription" and rapid demobilisation. The demand, natural in itself, was sedulously encouraged by politicians to whom even the war could not teach faith in their fellow-citizens. The blockade, now so constantly on the lips of the same men, was hardly mentioned. The Prime Minister and his followers took the easy course. They gave pledges where pledges were demanded and fell back limply on the blockade. The operation of the blockade during the next two months concentrated against them the combined force of commercial and humanitarian opinion, while, on the other side of the balance

sheet, it seemed to have made no definite or demonstrable contribution towards a speedy and satisfactory peace. The weight of starvation and economic dislocation in Central Europe was universal and deadening. The purpose of the policy was too obscure, its effects too indefinite, to convey any warning or teach any lesson. By the time that the Military Service Bill was introduced the country, left without clear guidance by its leaders, was inclined to regard every addition to the Government's powers as a relapse towards war and the Opposition, unconscious of its own responsibility for our failure, used the commercial discontent and humanitarian disgust with the blockade to reinforce its demand for disarmament.

In all this agitation no distinction was ever made between the Government's control over trade in itself, and the use of that control to cut off supplies from Central Europe. The duty of Britain as the leader in allied economic policy during the war was, in reality, not so much passively to raise the blockade as actively to direct allied resources to the points in Europe most gravely threatened by famine and disorder. Economically, supply and demand could be trusted to meet each other in the long run, but politically it was essential that they should be adjusted immediately during the critical period of the armistice, and for this purpose it was necessary that the allied Governments should keep control over sources of supply and means of transportation, or that they should at least retain the power to reinforce such control

when necessary. Above all it was vital that they should maintain adequate machinery for consultation with each other. But none of these things were done.

The shortcomings of our economic policy since the Armistice have formed perhaps the saddest chapter in the history of the last few months. Responsibility for them must be shared between Britain and the United States. Both have alike failed to make the commercial and financial contributions required of them by their professions in regard to the League of Nations. Any attempt to allot the blame between them would be worse than useless, but the reasons for their failure are sufficiently obvious, and some explanation of them is essential to any true understanding of the standards by which Europe has condemned our attitude in the past and will measure it in the future.

During the year 1918 co-operation between the Allies and the United States in economic policy had reached a high level of harmony and efficiency. It was in this department of belligerent activity that Britain showed at its best her ancient capacity for European leadership in war. The United States hung back for some months from full partnership in the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the so-called "programme committees" and the other organs of joint economic action whose purpose it was to control and allocate the ever-diminishing resources of the world; but by the summer of 1918 she had come to realise their necessity

and was giving the closest and most loyal co-operation in their work. She took, indeed, a leading part in the establishment of the Food Council in London and the Munitions Council in Paris. During the last months of the war, all those who, whatever their nationality, had borne their part in these new international departments, became increasingly impressed with the necessity of working out in advance a scheme for adapting them to the requirements of the transition period from war to peace. The British Government was, however, too deeply preoccupied with the immediate problems of war policy to sanction any such scheme and American statesmen were not prepared to commit themselves to any extension of joint action beyond the period of active hostilities. This American attitude was not factious though it rested on a misunderstanding of the intentions of the British Government. The ill-conceived resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference in 1916 had produced a deep impression on American opinion. The suspicions thus aroused cast their shadow over all subsequent proposals for joint economic action between the Allies. Even the rough scheme outlined in the programme of the Inter-Allied Labour Conference in 1918 carried with it, to American palates, a flavour of illiberal designs. As late as September, 1918, President Wilson thought it necessary, in a speech addressed to European statesmen, to purge the idea of the League of Nations from any possible taint of boycott or economic exclusion. The

ingrained desire of nearly all Americans to enter the field of international commerce again on the morning of peace, untrammelled by government commitments or obligations, blinded them to the real economic situation in Europe and the true intention of British public men. There were, no doubt, plenty of mutual commercial jealousies on both sides, which played their part in preventing a full understanding. In these circumstances, all attempts to guard in advance against the economic dangers of peace were doomed to failure. Much thought and much hard work was expended on the problem both in London and Washington, but the governments could not arrive at any agreement for common consultation. The armistice caught us unawares and plunged the whole machinery of inter-allied action into chaos.

Hostilities had hardly ceased when the American War Industries Board declared its policy of abandoning practically all controls over American industry. The American experts on the programme committees began to go home. The British Ministry of Shipping entered upon a policy of rapid decontrol of British ships. An agitation for immediate relaxation of all government controls grew up from all quarters in England. A network of frictions, hesitations and cross purposes tended for the moment to render the Food Council impotent in face of the acknowledged duty of relieving Central and Eastern Europe. Everyone realised the gravity of the economic

problems confronting the Allies; there was no lack of good will and energy; Mr. Hoover hurried over to Europe; many discussions took place; but the governments gave little direction or guidance. Owing to mere lack of preparation the very machinery of consultation dissolved during the first weeks of the armistice before they had time to think out their policy or devise means for its execution. The main organs of inter-allied action had been centred in London, but after the armistice the American representatives were concentrated at Paris and there was much delay and confusion before the corresponding British experts could be transplanted across the Channel. It was not until the middle of February, after three wasted months, that the elements of joint action were reassembled in the Supreme Economic Council, and Mr. Hoover was given a definite mandate as Administrator General of Relief.

The ground thus lost could never be regained. A hundred healing activities which had been possible or at least conceivable in November had become impracticable in February. The German people could not be persuaded that the failure of the Allies to feed them in accordance with the terms of the armistice had, broadly speaking, been due, not to ill will, but to administrative ineptitude—failure to use the existing machinery of the Food Council, in an adapted form, for the purpose of coping with the problem of relief, failure to provide in the original armistice for the surrender of the German mercantile marine, failure to

summon German representatives immediately to discuss financial arrangements for the purchase and distribution of food-stuffs. For the reasons already stated, the Allies hesitated to abandon the blockade, especially as it depended for its efficiency on a complicated system of administration, not only in allied, but also in neutral countries, which, once dissolved, could hardly be reconstructed. They preferred to open channels through the blockade for purposes of necessary relief and economic assistance. That policy was in itself a perfectly reasonable one, but it presupposed the existence of an inter-allied authority armed with the necessary powers over shipping, finance, and supply and actively engaged in the work of directing relief. Until February no such authority existed; and there was no one to indicate to the Allied Blockade Council what doors it must throw open. As a matter of fact the Supreme Economic Council and the Relief Administration were able to get to work in time to save Austria and Rumania from a famine revolution, but they were too late—probably just a few days too late—to save Hungary from the same fate.

There is much in the work associated with the names of Mr. Hoover and Lord Robert Cecil which has compelled the gratitude and admiration of Europe and Asia Minor. Much was accomplished, and if the machinery created could but be kept in being it might well become the symbol of that spirit of practical and benevolent co-operation which can alone give

life to the League. But the same forces in England and America which led to the great tragedy of the three wasted months now threaten to lead us back into our old inaction and irresponsibility.

It is impossible, within the limits of an essay like the present, to give more than this rough indication of the causes of our failure to inaugurate the League of Nations by an adequate display of genuine and skilful co-operation in an urgent work of healing. But this sketch will not have been wholly inadequate if it serves to bring out the utter failure of British opinion, represented in this case only too faithfully by the British Government, to grasp the true nature of the problem which confronted it. It is easy to blame our own statesmen, but what has been the almost unanimous demand during the past few months alike of business interests, small tradesmen, the average consumer and the daily press? Decontrol, disbandment of the bureaucracy, restriction of government action, repeal of Dora—these have been our watch-words. It is easy to change our statesmen; it is more difficult to convert our own hearts. Let us Englishmen realise the truth about ourselves—high and low, rich and poor, industrialist and workman, tradesman, merchant and consumer. We did not want to concentrate our resources for the healing of Europe; we did not want our government to assume direct responsibility for the feeding of Armenians in the Caucasus or Letts and Esthonians in the Baltic provinces; we could not or would not

realise that last winter even the raising of the blockade could not alone have availed to feed those who had neither money nor means of transportation. Our Government and the Government of the United States bear the gravest of responsibilities; but have we held up their hands or have we not rather encouraged them in weakness and impelled them to neglect?

At least the results of our policy are plain. Demobilisation and decontrol rendered us impotent to attain a true peace at Paris. For the sure movement of troops on police duty we substituted the obscure cruelties of the blockade; for active consultation between powerful governments, we substituted hesitating discussions between statesmen torn by our clamour for the abolition of "restrictions"; in face of the infinite variety and complexity of the European chaos on the morning of peace our policy has had all the dullness and immobility of trench warfare. The responsibility for these things must be borne by the whole people of Britain, as well as by their leaders, but that responsibility, shared between Government and Opposition, falls on none more heavily than on those who have used their tongues and their pens to sour the war-weariness of fighting men and waiting women into impatience, irritability, and suspicion.

We have in this chapter been concerned with the ability of Britain to supply help and leadership to the world in the tasks of peace. It is one of the gravest signs of British weakness

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that it should be possible, and from the immediate practical point of view logical, to treat this question without reference to perhaps one-tenth of the whole English-speaking race—the people of the Dominions. In spite of Imperial War Cabinets and British Empire Delegations, in spite of the considerable influence exerted upon the conduct of the war and upon the terms of peace by Dominion statesmen, the only place officially occupied by the Dominions in the League of Nations is that of separate small states. Represented, as they undoubtedly will be in strict constitutional theory, by the British Prime Minister or his nominee in the Council of the League, that representation is expressed in no tangible form in the organisation of the British Commonwealth, and that which has no local habitation will soon cease to have a name. The Dominions have thus not yet taken up their share of the burden which inevitably falls on Britain and America, or have at least not fitted themselves to bear it in practice. Yet it is not on them that the chief blame for this must fall. They have borne more than their share of the burden of war—immeasurably more than the United States; their Parliaments have shown no such hesitation as the American Congress to assume the burdens of peace in principle. But the Britain that was once the focus and standard of British society overseas, no longer presents herself in clear-cut outlines to the eyes of her distant children. The Britain of the trenches they know, but it is hard for us to realise in what degree our political life has

become blurred and incoherent to them, how doubtful appears to them any partnership with us, how little reliance they feel that they can place on the uncertainties of our future. It is here, within the British Commonwealth, that the effect of any discord or disunion in our islands is soonest and most clearly seen, but any such effect will quickly be reproduced in the family of nations at large. In the progress or postponement of an organic settlement of the relations between the partners in the British Commonwealth we shall find the acid test of our strength or weakness, both at home and in the family of nations. So long as the "British Empire" remains little more than a "geographical expression," so long will our power for good in the League be dangerously limited—and may pass into other hands.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES

“ Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belaboured, contrivances such as . . . a policy of ‘ don’t care ’ on a question about which all true men do care.”

—*Lincoln.*

UNLIKE Britain, the United States has no long history behind her in the light of which her present policy can be explained. But during her brief independent life of one hundred and forty years she has been always a Simon Stylites among the nations. She has proclaimed her isolation from the housetops. Nevertheless European and British observers, and even Americans themselves, have understood the real causes of this isolation too little to be able to estimate her future course. They are in constant danger of being deceived by appearances. America’s participation in the war and President Wilson’s leadership in the preparation of peace have aroused expectations which it is neither in the power of her statesmen nor in the mind of her people to fulfil.

British relations with the United States have probably suffered from a kind of easy belief,

current among all Englishmen, that everyone knows all the little that there is to know about American history and the American character. As a matter of fact there is no country in the world whose moral and mental origins and tendencies are so difficult to trace. Now that the British and American peoples have in a peculiar way assumed a joint responsibility for international reform it is worth while to examine more closely the forces that have determined America's position among the nations.

The United States has only really assumed the position of a world power since the beginning of the twentieth century. The nineteenth century was a period of preparation during which her future course in foreign policy was being predetermined by the circumstances of her internal growth. An understanding of the influences brought to bear on her during this preparatory period is therefore essential to a proper estimate of her present character.

There is a general tendency to ascribe the whole foreign policy of the United States to what is called the "Monroe Doctrine." As a matter of fact the Monroe Doctrine was only a stage, and is now only a factor, in the foreign policy of the United States. It is indeed only one facet of her earliest and most engrossing problem in foreign affairs—her relations with the other states of the American continents. It is the facet which is turned to the outer world, but the inner facets, hardly suspected or examined by Europe or Asia, are probably

of much greater and more enduring importance. Inside the American continents the United States has, from her earliest days, had to face the most difficult and intricate of all the problems that confront progressive and powerful nations, the problem of her relations to other states and races, inferior to her in civilisation and political capacity. This is, in the modern world, the very stuff and crux of foreign policy, and in this most important respect the attitude of the United States has been determined rather by the history of the two race problems which have confronted her within her own borders than by the fear of European aggression which called forth the famous message of President Monroe.

The first of these race problems—the Indian—is perhaps the less important, but it was in dealing with it that America had her first lesson in the clash of civilisations. If we look behind the familiar history of the Indian wars, we shall see that her handling of the problem affords a remarkable index of the development of American democratic thought. Americans began by believing, in the words of the Assembly of Virginia in 1702, that “no Indian could hold office, be a capable witness or hunt over patented land.” In those days Indians “like slaves were liable to be taken on execution for the payment of debt.” But the theories on which the Union was founded required that these races should be brought into some definite relation to democratic government. Owing to the legalistic character of American

institutions, the solution of this problem was not, as in the British Empire, confided to administrators and worked out empirically, step by step, according to common-sense ideas of justice and policy. Instead, it fell to the Supreme Court to settle the status of the Indian tribes by a series of decisions embodying, at least ostensibly, not the counsels of expediency but the application of predetermined constitutional theories. The decision in the case of the Cherokee Nation *v.* the State of Georgia defined their status as that, not of aliens, but of "domestic dependent nations," and democratic theory could in the long run recognise no "domestic" status but that of citizenship, and no citizenship not after the American model. The United States could not, therefore, continue for ever to deal with the Indian problem, as was her first opportunist practice, by the conclusion of "treaties" with the tribes. So by 1886 the United States Commissioner of Education reported proudly of the Five Civilised Tribes of the Indian Territory that: "Each tribe manages its own affairs under a constitution modelled upon that of the United States."

If a democratic organisation of the tribe was the first ideal, the break-up of the tribe and the "ultimate absorption (of the Indian) into the body of our people" was recognised as the next step. After the Indian wars had almost died out, the United States took up the task of administration somewhat more after the English model on the reservations, but this stage of

segregation was, and is, admittedly only a temporary expedient. The Federal Government has held, and still holds, as trustee for the Indian tribes thus segregated, lands and wealth such as perhaps no other nation has ever placed at the disposal of the savage races whose country it has occupied; but from the passage of the Land Severalty Act by Congress in 1887, it has been the recognised policy of the United States to allot this heritage among the individual Indians as soon as possible, and the Supreme Court has recognised the right of the Indian who is "detrivalised" to full citizenship of the United States. There is a continual pressure for the opening up of the remaining reservations; the Indian territory of the Five Civilised Tribes has now been absorbed into the State of Oklahoma, and Mr. Roosevelt's first Presidential Message in 1901 sums up what may be roughly taken as the fixed policy of the country: "The time has arrived when we should definitely make up our minds to recognise the Indian as an individual and not as a member of a tribe. The General Allotment Act is a mighty pulverising engine to break up the tribal mass. It acts directly upon the family and the individual. Under its provisions some 60,000 Indians have already become citizens of the United States. We should now break up the tribal funds, doing for them what allotment does for the tribal lands; that is, they should be divided into individual holdings."

Now, be it remarked, the policy thus outlined is a policy, not so much of assimilation,

as of abdication. As the Indians lose their tribal status and attain individual ownership and citizenship they pass *pro tanto* from the sphere of the Federal into that of the State Governments, and the Federal Government lays down its responsibilities with a sigh of relief. This indicates the root feeling of the American people about the Indian problem. The Indian policy of the United States has not been without its generosity and its greatness; but, inevitably perhaps, it has accustomed the American people to regard the governing of alien societies and subject peoples as an intolerable burden, incongruous in a democracy and to be laid aside at the first opportunity by such a policy of assimilation as involves the abdication of all special responsibilities. At the same time, the bitter experience of the difficulties and dangers of such assimilation, the exploitation of the Indian by land sharks and unscrupulous lawyers, the consequent necessity of imposing restrictions on the right of Indians to lease or alienate their allotments, and the continual attempt of the encroaching interests to corrupt the administration of Indian affairs—all this had tended to awaken in the American people the strongest possible distaste for any contact whatever with primitive peoples.

But this distaste, though to some extent attributable to the history of her dealings with the Indian, has been stamped deep on the character of America by the memories of the other race problem which she has had to face.

The well-known history of the negro problem need not be recapitulated here, but Europeans seldom sufficiently recognise how the consciousness of failure to solve it by the application of the fundamental theories of the constitution has poisoned and darkened the whole outlook of Americans on colonial questions. When the Vice-President of the Confederacy voiced the opinion of the South that "the corner-stone of our new government rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his nature and normal condition," the whole conscience of the democracy rose in revolt. In one of Charles Eliot Norton's letters, dated October 2nd, 1865, there is expressed the proud confidence in the universal application of the democratic theory, not only as a means of government but as a means of education towards government, which inspired the North both during and after the war: "The reasons for giving the right of suffrage to the freedmen are as strong as they are numerous, are reasons based upon policy as well as upon principle. I think Negro suffrage could have been easily secured at the end of the war by wise and far-seeing statesmanship . . . and that it would have been found the most powerful instrument for elevating and educating the blacks, for making them helpful and advancing citizens of the republic, and for introducing a better civilisation and a truer social order than has hitherto existed at the South." Americans could not realise how utterly incomprehensible such a

view appeared at the time outside America—so incomprehensible that the only construction which *The Times* could put on Lincoln's Emancipation proclamation was that it was an incitement to all the barbarities of a servile war. The negro might be recognised as an auxiliary, but only madmen could regard him as a potential citizen. And, as a matter of fact, the bitter disillusionment of the reconstruction period largely destroyed the confidence expressed by Norton and has never been forgotten by the American people. After fifty years the vastly greater part of the negro population of the country remains disfranchised, and the sons of the men who died to abolish slavery could in many instances barely be persuaded to use even their votes to-day to reverse the ingenious disfranchisement clauses of the constitutions of the Southern States. The continual preoccupation created for American statesmen until recently by the chronic anarchy in Hayti and San Domingo, the reports of a state of anarchy hardly less intolerable in Martinique, the unsatisfactory character of the Liberian experiment set on foot by an American society in 1821, have all gone to strengthen this feeling. Thinking men in the United States recognise with something like shame that, after all, they must subscribe to the spirit, if not to the letter, of Stephen's dictum already quoted, and that what peace and hope there is in the negro question at the present moment is due to the renunciation by a large section of the negroes themselves of those aspirations for full

citizenship which were held out to them fifty years ago.

The Indian and negro problems thus illustrate both the uncompromising nature of the experiment to which the United States was committed by its constitution in dealing with alien societies, and also the disgust and weariness excited by the initial failure of that experiment. But the constitutional difficulty has had other effects. There has been a continual controversy as to the power of the United States under the constitution to annex new territory, and as to the constitutional status of such territory after annexation. It would take too long here to go into this complicated question of constitutional law. Jefferson wished for the passage of a constitutional amendment authorising the annexation of Louisiana in 1803, and though he eventually carried out the annexation without such an amendment, he considered his action as being a straining of the constitution. In every subsequent case of annexation the same controversy has arisen. Though the Supreme Court early decided that "the Government of the Union . . . possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty," doubts as to the wisdom or constitutionality of new annexations delayed alike the incorporation of the Republic of Texas in the middle of the nineteenth century and the annexation of Hawaii at its close, while the acquisition of the Philippines and Porto Rico after the Spanish war gave rise to years of bitter controversy. It was practically decided by

the Supreme Court in the so-called "Insular Cases" in 1901 that the United States has power to annex territories without necessarily extending to them the constitution and laws of the United States, and that Congress in legislating for those territories is not bound by all the provisions of the constitution. But the incompatibility of this doctrine with the original theory of the constitution was keenly felt, and public discussion on the subject was still a live issue, especially in the Middle West, when "liberalism"—to use a phrase only lately imported into American politics—came into power with Mr. Wilson in 1913. It was always suspected by liberals that the Supreme Court had been moved in the matter, less by strict adherence to the principles of the constitution than by considerations of policy and even by the pressure of powerful business interests. The doctrine that, to quote the words of the Philippine Commission in 1900, the Filipinos were "disqualified, in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues, to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time," involved consequences against which liberal opinion in the United States has always been disposed to protest most violently. The Democratic platform of 1900 stated that "we hold that the constitution follows the flag, and denounce the doctrine that an executive or Congress, deriving their existence and their powers from the constitution, can exercise lawful authority beyond it, or in violation of it." Both this platform and every pronouncement of

Democratic policy up to the outbreak of the European War advocated the early restoration of Philippine independence. The address of the present Governor-General of the Islands on his landing at Manila in 1913 reaffirmed those pronouncements by the statement that "every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the islands and as a preparation for their independence." The legislation passed by Congress since that time has committed the United States to that policy.

If, then, the Government of the United States has practically accepted the doctrine of inferior races; if it has shown by a century of annexations covering Louisiana, Florida, the Mexican cession of 1848, the Gadsden Purchase of 1853, the Alaska purchase of 1867, the Hawaiian annexation of 1898, the annexation of the Philippines and Porto Rico, the establishment of naval bases in Cuba and Nicaraguan territory, and the acquisition, under one form or another, of the Panama Canal Zone, Hayti, and San Domingo, that it has no objection to expansion for strategic, commercial, or humanitarian objects; if from time to time, and especially at such moments as the fall of Maximilian's Empire and the Huerta revolution, important sections of American opinion have urged the annexation of the north-western provinces of Mexico down to the Gulf of California, and if some Americans, like General Beale in the sixties, have not scrupled to render active aid to Mexican revolutionists with this end in view; if, in short, the United States has often acted as all other

governments have acted in the expansion of its territory—yet, in spite of all this, there remains even now a strong feeling in the country that the creation of anything in the nature of a permanent dependency is incompatible with constitutional theory. Both Hawaii and Porto Rico have been commonly thought capable of developing into full statehood in time; Hawaii is already a territory on the same footing as Alaska, falling under the Department of the Interior and sending delegates to party conventions, while the formal grant of United States citizenship to the inhabitants of Porto Rico, after having long been advocated, has been finally carried out by the law of 1915. The Philippines are thus, according to this view, the only grave offenders against the spirit of the constitution, and consequently the annexation of these islands is still to the “strict constructionists” of the United States constitution what even such a conservative as Senator Spooner confessed it to be in 1899—“one of the bitter fruits of the war.” Here there has been practically no question of assimilation or abdication by the grant of full United States citizenship, and independence has therefore been regarded as the only escape from irksome and anomalous responsibilities.

But if the early experience and constitutional principles of the United States have thus predisposed her against expansion, there was a third influence during the preparatory period of the nineteenth century which has prevented her from adopting a “little American” policy and

has eventually brought her face to face with the very responsibilities she is so unwilling to assume. The Monroe Doctrine was originally adopted for purposes of defence. It aimed at perpetuating the *status quo*, and it therefore not only protected the emancipated states of South America, but also acted as a guarantee of the remaining European colonies in the western hemisphere. When it seemed possible that Cuba might pass into the hands of some other European country, American statesmen repeatedly interposed their veto on such a scheme, and in 1843 Webster, as Secretary of State, assured the Spanish Government that, in any attempt to wrest Cuba from her, "she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving or recovering it." The originators of the Doctrine would, indeed, probably have desired that it should remain a policy of pure strategic expediency, but their successors expanded its meaning and changed its application. Even as originally promulgated it contained the germ of a lofty democratic principle in that it mentioned the "system" of the European Powers. This germ grew rapidly. It was but a step to the point where Americans assumed that this "system," quite apart from its momentary embodiment in the Holy Alliance, was radically, permanently, and on grounds of principle incompatible with the "American system," and that it was therefore incumbent on all good Americans to oppose it wherever it might be found. This growth of the Doctrine came

insensibly. Polk expanded it to meet the exigencies of the Oregon boundary dispute, and by 1895, when Cleveland appealed to it in the case of the Venezuelan frontier, it had come to imply a claim on the part of the United States to a kind of "primacy" in the affairs, both domestic and external, of the two American continents. But this very expansion of the Doctrine tended to merge it in another policy. The advanced position thus taken up was untenable by the United States alone. The appeal to an "American system" necessitated the creation of such a system. The United States could not uphold a series of South American dictatorships as constituting a system so much better than that of Europe as to be worth defending on grounds of principle. Hence, after earlier rudimentary efforts, came the initiation of the "Pan-American" movement, dating roughly from the meeting of the first International American Congress at Washington in 1889-90.

Such were, in brief, the motives and feelings with which the United States entered the field of world policy after the Spanish War. Her course since then has followed closely enough the lines laid down for her by the circumstances of her own growth.

Her first problem was Cuba. She had proclaimed that she would not annex the island; she repeated that undertaking at the close of the war, and she carried it out. She took over Cuba from the Spaniards for the purpose of creating "a stable government administered by the Cuban people, republican in form, and

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competent to discharge the obligations of international relationship and to be entitled to a place in the family of nations." Her method of gaining that end was, in outline, as follows: She appointed an American military administration and fixed a suffrage in consultation with leading Cubans. She placed the arrangements for a municipal election on the basis of that suffrage in the hands of the Cubans themselves. She then held a general election on the same basis for the nomination of a constitutional convention, leaving that convention to draw up a constitution and a definitive electoral law under the chairmanship of the American governor. She waited till the constitution had been set in motion by the holding of a general election for the President and Legislature, and then withdrew completely from the island (on May 20th, 1902) leaving the Cuban Government definitely established.

It will be seen that the instinct of the United States was to confine her activities to advice, influence, and encouragement. Ostensibly the only function she discharged directly in Cuba was that of transitional administrator. She devoted herself to sanitation, to the construction of public works, to police duties, and to the relief of distress in an island just emerging from a state of chronic disorder. But, as a matter of fact, she really went further. The constitution was indeed drawn up by Cubans, but it was drawn up after the American model and under the influence of American ideas. Moreover, after the constitution had been drawn up in February,

1901, more than a year before the evacuation, the United States refused to approve it except upon conditions which she presented to the constitutional convention through the American Governor. The convention at first demurred to them, but after protracted negotiations it at last consented to embody them in the constitution. These conditions were the eight clauses commonly known as the "Platt amendment." They forbade the Government of Cuba to conclude any arrangement with a foreign Power to the detriment of the independence of the island or to contract any debt, the interest and sinking fund on which exceeded the ordinary revenues of the island after defraying current expenses. They gave the United States the right of intervention to preserve the independence of Cuba, and to maintain "a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba" contained in the Treaty of Paris. They validated all acts of the United States administration, pledged Cuba to continue the work of sanitation, excluded the Isle of Pines from her boundaries, and pledged her to sell or lease to the United States naval and coaling stations to be subsequently agreed on. Finally, Cuba undertook to embody these provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States, and this treaty was duly concluded.

The United States has therefore responsibilities for Cuba. Foreign nations can call on her to secure their just rights in the island. Cuba

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is made a sort of dependency of the United States, and the United States has shown that she is fully alive to considerations of what may be called strategic imperialism, by acquiring naval stations on the shores of Cuba at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda.

Moreover, the Platt amendment has not remained a dead letter. In 1906, the United States made use of her powers under Clause 3 by occupying the island and she remained there for three years. During this second occupation she went considerably deeper in laying the foundations of government than she had at first attempted to do. The whole of Cuban law underwent a radical revision, and when the second evacuation took place in 1909 Americans had become much more keenly conscious how serious was the task of securing good government for the people they had freed. Many people conversant with Cuban conditions thought the evacuation premature, and experience has more or less borne out their apprehensions. Till 1913 the government of Cuba remained thoroughly bad. Public opinion in the United States became increasingly convinced, especially during the negro risings of 1912, that a third occupation would be necessary. An improvement has taken place since the election of President Monocal in 1913, but a serious doubt has grown up in the mind of thoughtful Americans whether their policy is really adequate. Cuba is a ward, she is not wholly and solely responsible for her own actions, she has recognised the United States

as her guardian. But this guardianship is only potential. In ordinary times it is in abeyance and takes no stronger reform than that of diplomatic lectures.

Nevertheless, the United States has appealed and still appeals to her record in Cuba as an illustration and earnest of her policy in dealing with backward countries and with her neighbours in Latin America generally. In the words of President Roosevelt, in 1902, just before the first evacuation: "As a nation we have an especial right to take honest pride in what we have done for Cuba. Our critics, abroad and at home, have insisted that we never intended to leave the island. But on the 20th of next month Cuba becomes a free republic, and we turn over to the islands the control of their own government. It would be very difficult to find a parallel in the conduct of any other great state that has occupied such a position as ours." Cuba thus represents to the average American a new policy, different from that of the older nations. He does not feel the same with regard to Porto Rico or the Philippines. In Porto Rico the United States has, indeed, pursued a most liberal and progressive policy. She began by giving an increasing share in government to the inhabitants of the islands. While she reserved the executive machinery almost wholly to herself, she gave to Porto Ricans five out of eleven places on the executive council and three out of five places on the bench of the Supreme Court, as well as a House of Delegates of thirty-five members

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elected on a franchise as popular as the conditions of the island permitted. The law of 1915 went beyond this by setting up an elective Senate in addition to the House of Delegates, and transferring from the President to the Governor the appointment of four out of the six executive officers—the Attorney-General and the Director of Education being now the only offices held by Americans. But this, coupled with the grant of United States citizenship, is a step not towards independence but towards statehood, and the expansion of the Union, while it may solve the question of Porto Rico and Hawaii, cannot be applied indefinitely to new territories. The United States is therefore precluded from appealing to Porto Rico as a typical example of her colonial policy. She is even more precluded from appealing in this way to her record in the Philippines. She not only avowedly desires the ultimate independence of the archipelago and professes to regard her government there as exceptional and transitional; she also feels uncomfortably that the history of her dealing with the Filipinos, beneficial as they have been, savours too much of the "white man's burden" to commend itself wholly to a nation which has proclaimed a colonial policy different from that of the rest of the world. She has, indeed, gone even further in the Philippines than in Porto Rico. With the single exception of the Governor-General, practically the whole administration of the islands is in native hands, and Congress has solemnly declared that the United States

will retire from the islands as soon as the native government is fully capable of standing alone. But it is already evident that this declaration has not solved the Philippine problem, since native politicians, while anxious to disprove the criticism of their present competence which it implies, do not really wish to stand alone in the world, or to renounce their claim to the protection of the American army and navy.

The appeal has thus been to Cuba. In his message of December 3rd, 1901, President Roosevelt pointed to Cuba as an illustration of the Monroe Doctrine: "Our attitude in Cuba is a sufficient guarantee of our own good faith." In 1905 he again appealed in a message to the Cuban example as the justification for the next step in American "colonial" policy—the taking over by the United States of the customs administration of San Domingo. The objects of that step were twofold—first, to secure the payment of just debts to the subjects of European Powers, and thus to avert European intervention; and, secondly, by an honest administration of the revenues, to take away the main incentive to revolutionary outbreaks. The success of this experiment was at least sufficient to enable Mr. Roosevelt, in 1910, in his address at Christiania on "The Colonial Policy of the United States," to couple San Domingo with Cuba as the two examples of that policy.

But the two cases were really dissimilar, and American opinion has never been quite reconciled to "financial" protectorates of the

San Domingo type. The Senate disliked Mr. Roosevelt's San Domingo treaty and refused to accept similar agreements concluded by Mr. Taft with Honduras and Nicaragua. Opposition to this policy has proceeded mainly from the Democratic party, on the ground that, "if it be taken as a precedent that the United States will in every case assume responsibility for the payment of the debts of American states, the bankers of Europe will find it profitable to buy up all doubtful claims against American states and urge their governments to press for payment. Our navy would then be converted into a debt-collecting agency for the Powers of Europe, and the only escape from such a predicament would be the establishment of a protectorate over the weaker Latin American States." Where the collection of debts alone is concerned, as in the case of Venezuela in 1902-3 and the minor Guatemalan incident of 1912, American opinion, on the whole, prefers to leave European Powers to act for themselves, on the ground that the Monroe Doctrine does not "guarantee any State against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American Power." The return of the Republican party to power might, indeed, lead to a revival of Mr. Taft's "dollar diplomacy," but this is doubtful. In the last few years the United States has been driven into a policy of expansion in Nicaragua, in Hayti, and in San Domingo; but her motives have been, not

financial, but strategic and humanitarian. From the strategic point of view she cannot tolerate chronic misgovernment in any of the states lying within and on the flank of the "south coast line" to which she has now pushed forward her strategic frontier—the line through the Caribbean from Cuba to Colon and Panama. And even if it had been possible on grounds of expediency to ignore such misgovernment, the humanitarian attitude which has been her boast would have made inaction impossible.

The Nicaraguan policy of the United States displays the same features as her Cuban record. She has exerted her influence, has intervened, has withdrawn—has, in short, done everything but assume direct and permanent responsibilities. She aided and abetted the expulsion from Nicaragua of the dictator Zelaya; she then, in 1910, went very near intervention for the overthrow of Madriz, whom she regarded as Zelaya's legatee, and when the expulsion of that gentleman failed to lead to a restoration of stable government, she actually intervened in 1912, and sent marines to Managua. The opposition of the Senate defeated President Taft's first attempt to deal with Nicaragua as his predecessor had dealt with San Domingo, and President Wilson found at the outset of his administration that he was responsible for a Nicaraguan government placed in power by American bayonets, but with no means of controlling or maintaining it. This is, indeed, still the position at the present day. The United States has recently gone so far as to conclude an

agreement with the Nicaraguan Government by which she acquires a naval base in the Bay of Fonseca, an option on the construction of any inter-oceanic canal across Nicaraguan territory, and a measure of control over Nicaraguan finances. There, however, she has stopped. She has not taken over the foreign relations of Nicaragua and has done little to regularise the relations of this small republic either with the outside world or with its Central American neighbours.

In Hayti and in San Domingo she has been driven into far more reaching responsibilities. The chronic revolutionary outbreaks to which the island had been long inured ended finally in hopeless anarchy. Military occupation became necessary, and the United States has now taken over the government of both countries. Without formal annexation and practically unnoticed by the great bulk of her people, she has acquired, in effect, another colony in the Caribbean; but, owing to lack of popular interest or definite legislative sanction, the island seems at the present moment to be little more than an appanage of the War Department at Washington. It has not yet been realised by the American people as a new responsibility.

Thus haltingly, with groping hands and almost averted eyes, America has entered upon the field of national expansion. The measure of her reluctance is the history of her Mexican policy since the early spring of 1913. In her handling of this problem she has reproduced on a wider canvas all the characteristics which

we have tried to sketch above. As previously in Venezuela and Nicaragua, and more recently in Costa Rica, she has tried the effect of her moral influence in discountenancing violent revolution, but she has refrained from serious intervention. As in Panama, Cuba, and Nicaragua, she has shown herself alive to national interests and strategic considerations, but has been unwilling to secure these by direct military action.

Most people would expect an examination of the roots of American foreign policy to concern itself with broader issues than these. The "open door" in China, the problem of Oriental immigration, the policy of the Pan-American Conferences, the "freedom of the seas," the Hague Conventions and the Root and Bryan arbitration treaties, the successive extensions of the theory of the Monroe Doctrine down to Senator Lodge's Magdalena Bay resolution of 1912 and Mr. Wilson's Mobile speech of 1913, the long record of wars and controversies with Great Britain and the slow development of international relations with Canada—these are the factors which, in common estimation, go to make up American foreign policy. We have, however, deliberately left on one side these broader issues, already sufficiently explored by many British and American writers, and have concentrated our attention on the more immediate preoccupations of American statesmen, past and present, because it is only here that we can reach the real core of the foreign policy of the United States. Franklin, the creator of the

Franco-American alliance, Monroe, the author of the doctrine that bears his name, Commodore Perry, the political discoverer of the Far East, were, in a sense, but early theorists or opportunists, experimenting with the future interests of a people not yet come to the birth. The real character and tendencies of that people among the nations have been formed slowly by its pioneering work in its own West, by the painful process of union between North and South, and, more recently, by its immediate preoccupations in the narrow field of the Caribbean. The Monroe Doctrine is still a mighty power in the land as a classic phrase, but even modern Pan-Americanism lies, to a surprising extent, outside the sphere of interest of the average American. Washington's warning against "entangling alliances" is remembered and quoted, not as a pendant to Pan-Americanism, but because citizens of the United States share with Englishmen the instinct of political isolation, just as they have inherited from England the social idea of life in small communities and the family idea of the home. All these embryonic theories of past statesmen now serve only to dress up in political language the stark policy of national security and freedom from dangerous external commitments which really sways the mind of the American people.

Nevertheless the United States plunged into Armageddon. She entered into an association with Western Europe which has been an alliance in all but the name. She has played a leading part, economically, politically, and on the field

of battle itself, in the final stages of the war ; she has taken an equal share in the making of peace at Paris where she has shown herself capable of contributing to the detailed work of the allied technical and territorial commissions a knowledge and a judgment hardly, if at all, inferior to those possessed by British and European experts. How far does this surprising development denote a fundamentally new departure or a radically modified attitude in American sentiment and policy ?

Many Americans last year—perhaps, indeed, most Americans—were disposed to answer this question with an enthusiasm and a generosity which aroused the highest hopes in Europe. Their answer has been well expressed by a recent writer, whose American birth and English ties qualify him in a peculiar degree to express a considered opinion. “ Before the war,” writes Mr. Lapsley, “ the invisible barrier of the Monroe Doctrine still stretched across the Atlantic, effectually hiding from American eyes the political movement in Western Europe. School histories dwelt on British tyranny, children remembered George III and Lord North after they had forgotten their dates, and Irish-American opinion helped to give something contemporary to an ancient evil. A large Jewish element in the population spread a horror of Russian autocracy. Americans tended to confound all kinds of monarchy, to regard the House of Lords as the instrument of an ancient and exclusive aristocracy and to interpret the English Establishment in terms of the

Holy Synod. Then in August, 1914, the world came to an end. The catastrophe found America bewildered and uninformed, clutching with desperate resolve at the high purpose to which it had long ago committed itself, and for which it had suffered and fought. Only quite gradually it came to see what the Atlantic barrier had hidden so long, and understand that isolation was no longer necessary because England and France and Italy had long been working, each according to its own genius, for the same end as America. Once that was grasped it became clear that the country had reached another great turning point. And so the dominant idea that turned America towards isolation in 1823 and cast it into civil strife in 1861, led it back in 1917 into the community of free peoples fighting for a common end."

It would be well for the world if this answer were the correct one. There is much truth in it, but it can unfortunately only be accepted with qualifications. It is true, for instance, that American thought has now, for the most part, passed the stage where it regarded British colonial rule as an insult to the principles of liberty. It knows, indeed, that British relations with backward races are a model to the world. But we have already pointed out that the American's distaste for colonial expansion arises not so much from any old belief that all men and all races are equal, as from the bitter experience that they are not so. This feeling of distaste has been perhaps intensified rather than diminished by recent developments in

American life. To the old problems of the Indian and the negro has succeeded the problem of the immigrant from Eastern Europe. It is only comparatively recently that the American people have awakened to a full consciousness of the alien character of the half-submerged masses in their great cities. Many leaders of opinion who, like Miss Addams, have laboured personally among these orphans of European civilisation have indeed sought to teach their countrymen what important moral contributions the Slav, the Italian and the Jew are capable of making to American life, but the instinct of the American people has been towards an impatient policy of assimilation. Recent industrial troubles both before and during the war have contributed to this, from the Lawrence strike of 1911 to the Arizona strike of 1917. The racial hostilities, propaganda and disloyalties which disturbed the United States during the two-and-a-half years of her neutrality and many sporadic "Bolshevist" disturbances since that time, have served to intensify this instinct and have led not only to a veritable crusade for the "Americanisation" of the immigrant, but to various proposals, most vehemently advocated by American labour, for the drastic restriction of immigration in the future. The United States is to-day perhaps less rather than more likely to take an active share with Britain or France in the solution of the problem of backward races, and this aloofness must remain a serious drag upon her progress towards a real participation in world

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policy at a moment when the main task which lies before Europe and Asia is a new synthesis of nationalities.

This judgment will not, indeed, be passed by many Americans without contradiction. They will, on the contrary, urge that the extraordinary range of nationalist aspirations, racial feuds and social ferments, derived from the old soils of Europe, which the student can, as it were, isolate and study in American cities at the present day, qualifies Americans in a peculiar degree to take an intelligent and active interest in the resettlement of Europe. They will, further, adduce in support of their contention the remarkable work actually performed by American teachers and missionaries at Constantinople, Beirut or Van, and the influence of American culture on many obscure corners of the Balkan peninsula. All this is true, and it explains the influence exerted by American specialists on many details of the Paris settlement and the respect with which American opinion has on many occasions been regarded by European experts at the Conference. We can discern here the germs which justify our hope in eventual American participation in the labours of the League of Nations, but it would nevertheless be folly to expect from them immediate blossom or fruit. On the whole, America's tendency is, after all, the other way. It is difficult for anyone who has not lived intimately in American political society to measure the discomfort and friction, deepening into resentment and open hostility, produced

in it by the intrusion of these alien elements. American politics are not, like English politics, a struggle concentrated mainly in one great arena of discussion and legislation under the growing pressure of insistent and organised popular demands. They are, on the contrary, an affair of a hundred forums, federal, state, and municipal, where good or bad administration, radical experiments or conservative policies, are determined by few limiting factors of past experience or expert knowledge, but mainly by the free and public competition of party prejudices and party oratory. Into this easy play of loose generalisations, ranging at large over the open spaces of American life, the narrow beliefs and passions of the immigrant, hardened by centuries of ruthless history, thrust themselves like an alien growth. The Irish element is alone peculiar, because it has, in a measure, grown up with the country, and has, indeed, done much to form the character of the national politics, but the very success of Irish nationalism has put the American on his guard for the future. It is probably not too rash to say that, in calm moments, the natural feeling of the American to-day, when confronted with these concrete evidences of the deep-seated ills with which the old world struggles, is: "Well, if this is foreign policy, let us pull out." And it is probably not untrue to say that the experience of the Paris Conference has intensified this feeling in almost every American who has participated in it or observed it closely.

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The intervention of the United States in the war did, however, undoubtedly indicate a profound modification in the general outlook of the country, and it has led to further changes, no less significant. These changes may perhaps be traced to three main factors: an instinct for idealism, strong nationalist feeling, and a growing impulse towards commercial expansion.

American idealism has been often described and often misunderstood. Perhaps the popularity of President Wilson's speeches has recently led to special misconceptions about it. Those speeches have been applauded in America less because they faithfully represented the mind of the average citizen than because they were considerably in advance of it. Their popularity is a testimonial to American taste rather than a faithful index of American feeling. It indicates the American's reverence for intellectual attainments and his appreciation of good literary style in a society where good style is extraordinarily rare. As a matter of fact, American idealism is naturally cruder and more vigorous. It is more at home in a crusade than at a prayer meeting. It loves oratory, but it loves action more. Mr. Bryan's history shows that a man cannot talk himself into the presidency though he may be preaching a winning cause with all the fervour of sincere eloquence. What is really remarkable about American idealism is that it is to-day almost wholly and exclusively political. No nation has ever come so near to the complete belief that the voice of

the people at the polls is the voice of God, but the phrase itself is little known in America because even its last word would seem to most Americans an irrelevant excursion into mysticism. American idealism has often been traced to Puritan sources—but it is a Puritanism without the Bible. Democracy has been substituted for the reign of the saints. Religion has taught Americans a morality which is the bed-rock foundation of their individual character, and a simple humanitarianism which sways their political feelings, finding expression in the common phrase of “the man against the dollar,” but the wider horizons which it still opens to European thought and hope have faded from American eyes. Hardly less than the German, though in quite a different way, the American regards the State as the only means of progress and the only way of salvation. His is, indeed, an intensely moral State, but, like all purely political conceptions, it is necessarily concerned mainly with material ends. It is only in this sense that the common talk about American materialism is true. Americans have no peculiar love for money or money-getting, but their idealism, bounded by the limits of political action, tends naturally to express itself in terms of the two main instruments of progress in a modern republic—publicity and wealth. It is, moreover, for this reason that, from the days of the “Federalist” to our own times, American idealism has been closely linked with American patriotism. The ideals of the modern American still centre, in the words of Hamilton, round the

“ numerous innovations displayed in the American theatre in favour of private rights and public happiness.”

American nationalism has been so often misjudged that it is difficult to write of it coherently. Born in a struggle with Britain, it still bears the marks of its origin, but, in spite of Fourth of July orations, Irish influences, vindications of the Monroe Doctrine, and all the other common phenomena of American public life, it cannot be too emphatically stated that “ twisting the lion’s tail ” is now as little representative of the real roots of American nationalism as the recent cult of “ Anglo-Saxonism ” which grew up as a protest against it. Both these sentiments have been, after all, derived mainly from the Eastern states, and behind the speeches, the banquets, the debates and the press editorials of Boston, New York or Washington, there has been steadily growing in the Middle West, the real centre of the country, a stronger and a simpler nationalism. It is, to begin with, a nationalism of the home and the soil, a little more sweeping and less contented than the intimate affection that lingers round English country-sides, but still centred in the life of small communities and in its essence a defensive nationalism, demanding security and not expansion. Further, however, there is behind this nationalism a great military tradition, as great as that enjoyed by any country in the world—the memory of the most intense and romantic war since Napoleon. Last, and most important, this Middle Western sentiment is

characterised by a devouring curiosity, a passion for knowledge and facts all the more intense from a dim consciousness of the crudity of traditional American judgments about foreigners and foreign things. This nationalism may be, and of course is, tinged by school-books and such-like, though probably no more so than is the case in such European countries as Holland, where historic antipathies are still fed by defective education; but anxious foreign commentators attempt vainly to see through a millstone when they seek to account for its character or anticipate its tendencies on such grounds as these. The Middle Westerner, the backbone of America, lives in the present, is proud of the America of to-day, is intent on progress, demands security, is determined to uphold the national honour and desires to do business chiefly with those whose character, methods and language are like his own. He has an instinctively high moral standard and an un-failing grasp on realities, at least as soon as he is fairly up against them. His dominant feeling in May, 1917, was probably that, for good or ill, reluctantly and in spite of Washington's warning, he had got into an "entangling alliance" with Great Britain, and that now he was out to understand what kind of a partner he had got and to make the best of it. But—and this must always be remembered—his consciousness of ignorance and inexpertness in international affairs renders him intensely suspicious of being "got at," and negotiations with the United States consequently partake not a

little of the character of negotiations between capital or government departments and labour—the American, like the labour man, being always prone to believe that, whatever the arrangement arrived at, his negotiators have given their case away through being unversed in the wiles of the great world.

It would, then, not be far from the truth to say that America plunged into war with Germany because German tendencies were intolerably repugnant to the rough conceptions of humanity and free government round which all American idealism centres and, more strongly and immediately, because Germany threatened American security, jarred every suspicious nerve by her diplomatic methods, outraged the national pride, shocked the national conscience, and awoke every chord of military memory. There was in all these motives no hint of any craving for new responsibilities, still less for territorial expansion, and the League of Nations has remained to the mind of the average American a sovereign specific against battle, murder and sudden death—a means, indeed, of restoring and guaranteeing for all time the national isolation, now so rudely disturbed, not the germ of a new method of conducting international relations and sharing international responsibilities.

Indeed, while Americans started the movement in favour of a "League to Enforce Peace," the idea of such a League is probably less representative of popular feeling in the United States than in any other country. The American society of that name was to a great extent

formed by the same men who had led the movement for compulsory arbitration during the previous two decades. It is important to realise what the fate of that movement was. It began with the rejection by the Senate of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty before the first Hague Conference. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Root and Mr. Taft tried to place America in the forefront of the "peace" movement, and Mr. Bryan accustomed the Middle West, and indeed the bulk of the American people, to regard the United States as the apostle of peaceful arbitration. But about the year 1911 a violent reaction set in. In that year the Senate rejected the arbitration treaties with France and Great Britain, and in 1912-13 the bitter controversy in regard to the Panama Canal tolls further weakened the arbitration movement. This reaction was largely the product of the suspicions already referred to, and just before the war it had gone the length of something very like a revolt in Congress against all long-term treaties, especially commercial treaties, as being intolerable, if not positively unconstitutional, limitations on American sovereignty. America's instinct is still to avoid, as far as possible, any restriction on the freedom of action of her legislature or her executive. It was inevitable that what appeared to American negotiators at Paris as nothing more than cordial and helpful co-operation on the part of the British Delegation should be construed at Washington as British pressure skilfully applied in furtherance of

ulterior diplomatic designs. It was inevitable that the League of Nations should awake in the American mind many of the same suspicions excited by Bernstorff's diplomacy. American idealism and American nationalism alike bid the American strike hard and do his job when it is forced upon him, but they do not encourage him to undertake protracted labours or to incur the obligations inherent in common action.

There remains, however, the third factor to which we have alluded as influencing America's entry into the war—the impulse towards commercial expansion. Let one thing be clearly stated at the outset; economic motives or ambitions had nothing whatever to do with America's great choice in 1917. By remaining neutral she could have continued to make money out of the war and could have tightened her hold on Asiatic and South American markets, which Britain and the other Allies could no longer serve. At most, if she had been moved by such selfish considerations, she would have severed diplomatic relations with Germany and held herself free to support the financial credit of the Allies in the American money market by government influence. Instead, her entry into the war forced her, slowly indeed and reluctantly, but nevertheless in a substantial degree, to sacrifice the commercial advantages she had already won in order to concentrate her whole strength, especially in the anxious days of March to June, 1918, on the western front. But while no motive of economic ambition threw American troops into the fighting line,

the knowledge of world affairs acquired through commercial dealings was a considerable factor in making plain to the American people the face of the battle. British naval action may have endangered our relations with the United States during the first two years of the war, and censorship and black list may have gone far to strain those relations to a breaking point on the very eve of her rupture with Germany, but it may well be doubted whether, but for the far-reaching economic activities which were so rudely disturbed by these blockade measures, America would ever have been sufficiently conscious of her fundamental dependence on world conditions to have realised the full implications for herself of the struggle in Europe. As a matter of fact, she has recently developed a stronger school of economic science than perhaps any other nation, and economic statesmanship bids fair to become her speciality. Her foreign commerce has been extraordinarily inexpert and unadaptable in comparison with her manufacturing efficiency, but one of the main features of her life to-day is a keen realisation of her shortcomings in this respect and an anxiety to imitate and emulate British and German achievements in the foreign field. This ambition has its darker side. As we saw in the last chapter, it has made her reluctant to co-operate fully in allied war policy, and was largely responsible for the fatal break in allied consultations from November, 1918, to January, 1919. It has also marred American policy in one or two important respects during

the Peace Conference. Indeed, there is no greater danger to the future peace of the world than the possibility that Americans may ignore, or fail actively to remedy, the grave weakness of their country's present position as a universal creditor in a world of debtors. There is indeed in Europe at this moment a somewhat bitter distrust of American economic statesmanship. The world, especially a world in debt, looks inevitably for deeds, and does not appreciate at its true value the growth of economic opinion in the United States, as evidenced by speeches, books and periodical literature. But American action on the Supreme Economic Council, and especially Mr. Hoover's management of relief work, has done much to redeem these shortcomings. America has, on the whole, shown herself keenly alive to the fatal consequences of continued economic dislocation in Central Europe, and to the interdependence of the whole world as an economic unit, and history may perhaps judge that her representatives in Paris have, on the whole, shown themselves in some respects more far-sighted than their associates in estimating the economic needs of the world. These tendencies may carry her far in the future towards helpful co-operation in the affairs of a League of Nations.

To these factors an Englishman must add, for very gratitude, one observation almost too delicate for treatment in writing. On the one hand, the fervours of Pilgrim Dinners and the cult of Anglo-Saxonism are not reliable indications of the state of feeling between Great

Britain and America. They have tended to give birth to a watery sentiment of friendship too fragile to survive the touch of rough realities. On the other hand, the relations between the two countries are disturbed by many serious divergencies of aim and method, and by many intangible jealousies. The proceedings at Paris have often strained our co-operation and produced frictions and regrets. Nevertheless it remains true that during the past three years Englishmen have been met on all hands in the United States with evidences of a real affection and admiration for their country which they can never remember without emotion. In a sense, shyly and half expecting a rebuff, a great mass of American sentiment, never hitherto touched by the ephemeral fraternisations of Eastern cities, has been making advances to Britain which have been too often ignored or accepted off-hand, good-humouredly, as a matter of course. Britain, living as of use and wont in a world society, has troubled herself little about international friendships, and tends to accept them merely as the ordinary evidences of neighbourly feelings on which the everyday machinery of international intercourse is naturally based. She has hardly discerned in these new approaches from America the first beginnings of a desire to take an equal share in world affairs in association with a people already supposed to be well versed in them. That desire is as yet too tentative and fragile to bring America into the front line of leadership in a new system of international relations. It

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may, indeed, at any moment give place to suspicion and hostility, in face of any hasty attempt on our part to force our views and policies on American statesmen or the American public. But it is nevertheless a real force and Englishmen will incur a grave responsibility if they ignore it or allow it to fade into disappointment and resentment.

II.—HALF-PEACE

“ No more of comfort shall ye get
Than that the sky grows darker yet,
And the sea rises higher.”—*Chesterton.*

CHAPTER III

THE NEW EUROPE

“Hush! ’tis the gap between two lightnings. Room
Is none for peace in this thou callest peace,
This breathing-while wherein the breathings cease

• • • • •
Can’st thou endure, if the pent flood o’erflows?”

—*Francis Thompson.*

IN the preceding chapters we have attempted to bring out certain features in the past policy of Britain and America, but the name we have given them must not be misunderstood. As Mr. Kipling has pointed out, Gallio has been too often maligned. His children are wise in their generation. Britain and America have been wise in skirting the European abyss, in holding themselves aloof from “words and names” and “the strife they bring,” in caring first for the development of their own corporate life through Commonwealth and Union, and in limiting their foreign policy to more or less mechanical conceptions of stability, law and balance. There is much misconception as to the doctrine of the “balance of power.” Wars and revolutions have been freely traced to it, but it may be argued with at least equal force that such

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upheavals are rather due to long periods of slackness in adjusting the scales. If on the one hand the doctrine involves a non-moral attitude towards political life it involves also a tolerant attitude towards conflicting aims and faiths. If it assumes conflict to be an inevitable condition of the family of nations as a whole, it frequently, for that very reason, leads to a real effort towards the reconciliation of minor conflicts in certain groups of that family. For example, Sir Edward Grey, in whom the attitude of the British Gallio was in some respects seen at its best, insisted throughout the first year of the war on the ideal of a Balkan union as a practical policy, and met the national aspirations of Greece and Bulgaria with an almost impartial discouragement. The "balance of power" is, indeed, in itself nothing but the elementary principle on which all great systems of government have been based—the maintenance of a general equality between citizens, the reduction of too powerful elements in the State, the co-ordination of constitutional organs, and the enforcement of an impartial and even-handed justice. As a state develops towards full democracy the nature of the balance changes—the equilibrium between King, Lords and Commons or between executive, legislature and judiciary is destroyed and the field of adjustment shifts to jarring economic interests and the conflict of classes, but the principle of balance still operates and political communities forget or ignore it at their peril. Herein, perhaps, lies one secret of the comparative

failure of Athens and the success of Rome. Rome, less intent on the "good life," less inspired by the ideal of corporate citizenship growing out of a union of hearts, realised to the last how painful are the continually shifting processes whereby alone human society attains stability, and she kept the sense of political proportion, the view of government as an arduous art and an end in itself, which that realisation brings. The true charge against Gallio is not that the Roman model of matter-of-fact administration and reasonable tolerance, the conscious restriction of the field of government and the elimination of imponderable factors, is wrong in ordinary times and as a general standard. The charge is that at rare intervals, in great crises, once perhaps in a thousand years, such a system fails to detect or adjust itself to the emergence of a new force of first class magnitude. It matters little that such an error entails at the time disorders, injustices and even persecutions and violence; it matters much that the system itself, after years of immobility, is at last swept away bodily on the current of the new force. The new is subjected to no healthy restraint, the old loses balance and proportion. The tragedy is not in Paul beaten before the judgment seat, but in the Church enthroned with Constantine—in the eventual emergence of a strange society compounded of the decay of the old and the corruption of the new.

To some extent the new Europe is in danger of this very fate. Britain and America, long

unresponsive to the forces unloosed by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era, have at last been swept away by the current. Having taken up arms for security, for a standard of international morality and the "sanctity of treaties," they have found themselves plunged into the vortex of European nationalism. Their friends and their enemies have changed like Proteus before their eyes. The map of Europe has sprung into a hundred colours undreamt of in their philosophy. Every month of the war contributed surprises to disturb their calculations. The Russia they had thought to know as an autocracy at grips with the enlightened liberalism of Miliukoff and the Duma has proved a dynamo of international revolution fringed by a mottle of unsuspected nationalities. The Austrian Empire, which they despised, has passed like a shadow, and half its population emerges into light as their allies. They are asked to fraternise with at least two-thirds of the Ottoman Empire, and to look on the Turkey they have fought as an obscure people in the highlands of Anatolia. Central Europe has become a new medley of Pole, Ukrainian and Czech. Mr. Seton Watson and his group in the "New Europe," have laboured for three years to instruct their compatriots in the elementary problems of European nationalism, but with little success. Politicians are still found on election platforms demanding self-determination for Fiume in the interests of the Jugo-Slavs, while the daily press recalls a forcible German colonisation of Upper Silesia.

hitherto unknown to the historians who have exposed the policy of expropriations in West Prussia and Posen.

Faced by this accumulation of unfamiliar facts, British and American statesmen at Paris had two alternatives. They might have applied to the settlement the broad conceptions of balance, economic coherence and territorial compactness, which, on the whole, appeal to the common sense of the average Englishman or American. In that case, while respecting nationalist aspirations, they would have regarded them in the light of Mr. Fisher's judgment on the republican tradition in Europe three years before the war. "The republican movement has done its work. Its ideals have been appropriated and fused with more or less of completeness into the political system of Europe." They would have seen that, in the absence of sufficient material for the creation of new constitutional monarchies, and in view of the extent to which the monarchical idea had become discredited during the war, the only way of carrying out the national principle to the full under present conditions must lie through the erection of a number of new republics, established at a moment when republicanism had long ceased to satisfy the most advanced thought of Europe. They would have realised that such a return to nineteenth century political ideals might but prepare a breeding ground for social revolution—that in yoking orthodox socialism to the chariot of nationality, in making Czech and Slovak socialists, for

instance, responsible for the government of a new Republic, they would hasten the split between the older social democracy and the revolutionaries of the Left and would increase the power of the latter. They would especially have hesitated to create new republics not economically self-supporting, and would have preferred, in spite of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the dissolution of Russia and the apparently indefinite postponement of any Balkan Union, to aim at a broader synthesis of races, languages and interests than a strict adherence to the principle of nationality would render possible.

They did not take this course and probably could not have taken it. They were forced away from such moorings as these by the current they had so long ignored. They adopted almost wholesale the doctrines of nineteenth century Europe, and used their leadership at Paris merely to give these doctrines the most reasonable interpretation possible. In this they may be said to have had their peoples behind them. Uncomprehending but credulous, public opinion in both countries has caught up easily the language of European liberalism. Phrases like "self-determination" have passed quickly into the language of our politics. Being new to us we have failed to realise how old they are, and we have credited ourselves with an originality to which we certainly have no claim. There has been nothing novel or daring in the treaty provisions worked out by our statesmen in Paris. On the whole, they

have been content to remake the map of Europe, as Mazzini wished it remade, on the basis of nationality, and to fix on ethnic considerations as the criterion of nationality. In face of all the charges now being brought against the peace of Versailles, it is important to emphasise this fact. Economic factors have here and there determined frontiers in defiance of ethnology, but even in these instances the decision has usually been due, either to a consideration of the obvious interests of small frontier populations, as in the case of the Bohemian frontier in the Grosse Schutt, or to geographical necessity, as in the case of the German districts in Upper Silesia and Bohemia. There are many more cases where economic considerations have been deliberately disregarded. Ethnology has overruled economic coherence on the Polish-German frontier, and on nearly all the frontiers of Hungary. Strategy has been repeatedly ignored, notably in the case of Schleswig. The whole Danubian settlement may be regarded as one vast crime against economic policy, so vast that it can only be remedied by a new coalescence between the Danubian states.

The main importance of the League of Nations lies, indeed, in the fact that it is the one novel contribution made to the settlement by the Conference at Paris. Historically the League was the product of a somewhat vague idealism, but logically, as the chequer of nationalities was painted into the new map of Europe, it became the indispensable corollary to an otherwise impossible partition of the

continent. Mazzini's "great European federation, whose task it is to unite in one association all the political families of the old world," his "General Council" of the nations, proved, indeed, to be an even more essential complement to the principle of nationality than he perhaps had ever realised. Without the creation of new forms of international co-operation and control, no such settlement could stand, even for a few years. It is from this point of view that the present chapter is written. Its purpose is to sketch the character of the members of the League of Nations, other than Britain and America, as they will meet in the Assembly and Council of the League, and to indicate the range of problems which already call for continuous action by those bodies.

The starting point of such a sketch must be the Peace Conference itself. The League is not an artificial product of the Conference, but rather an extension of it. Neutrals and enemies will be added, the new States will acquire a greater influence than they enjoyed at Paris, the five Great Powers will be associated with smaller nations in the Executive Council, but the essential features of the Conference must necessarily pass over into the League. We can look for no sudden change of heart, no far-reaching new combination of forces.

The Conference was, however, more fortunate than the League in one respect. The Council of Four—or Five—had a freer hand than the Executive Council can ever hope to have. Over a very wide field the Great Powers were

absolved from the necessity of securing general agreement to their decisions. They were in a position to dictate peace, not only to their enemies, but to their friends. The new States might make claims which demanded careful sifting, but they were hardly yet in being and were obliged to acquiesce in decisions to which their representatives could never have taken the responsibility of agreeing of their own motion. There was no question of Polish assent to the Danzig settlement or the plebiscite in Upper Silesia ; Jugo-Slavia might argue its claims to Klagenfurt but was hardly allowed to participate in their adjudication. The task of the Conference would have been even easier if the Great Powers had been able to settle this field, in which they were the absolute arbiters, six months before they did. The delay was due partly to the capital error of the December elections in England, but partly also to the preoccupations created by those few, but commanding, questions touching the Great Powers themselves in which a settlement could only be reached by general agreement. It is this department of the business transacted at Paris that we have to consider first if we are to grasp the problems of the future.

There were four main questions of this class and in each case the settlement has taken the form of a highly unsatisfactory compromise. When the full records of the Conference are disinterred, the Franco-German frontier, Syria, the Adriatic and Shantung will be found written on their heart. France, Italy and Japan

emerged from these negotiations with clearly marked characteristics which foreshadowed their future course in the family of nations.

Forty-eight years have passed since Lord Acton wrote that "the most intense desire of all Frenchmen has been for the acquisition of territory not their own," but his judgment remains true—with modifications. It is important to distinguish the territorial ambition of France from that of Italy and Japan. It has frequently been pointed out that French patriotism is peculiarly a patriotism of the soil. On its defensive side this sentiment is enshrined in the idea of "la belle France," in the feeling for the lost provinces of 1871 as an almost physical mutilation of a beloved body. But it has also its aggressive side. Territory—one might almost say, landscape—seems often to present itself to the French mind as a thing inherently desirable, apart from ulterior motives of security or commercial development. It has been this sentiment, reinforced by military memories and the romance of far-flung wars, far more than any strategic or economic considerations, that has turned the eyes of Frenchmen towards the Rhine, and in a different form this curious land hunger perhaps plays a larger part in the French claim to Syria than the historic tradition or the capitalist calculations to which it is usually ascribed. The result in the case of the Franco-German frontier has been almost bizarre. The Saar Valley settlement, nominally determined by economic considerations, is an economic

absurdity. France can get no appreciable return in profit from the direct control of its coal-fields; she has, indeed, preferred to incur the very heavy costs of operation where she might have obtained a safe lien on the product. The League of Nations has been burdened with an experiment in government under the most adverse conditions possible, and France does not even obtain a permanent increase of territory. The true significance of the settlement lies in the fact that the exclusion of German rule from a frontier tract and the possibility, however remote, that this tract may after fifteen years become an integral portion of France by a vote of its inhabitants, is a ransom paid to French sentiment for the freedom of Luxemburg and Landau.

A final settlement of the Syrian problem has hardly yet been reached, but some similar compromise appears inevitable. Such anomalies are the measure of French territorial ambition, as it survives to-day. France is no longer what she was in Europe before 1870, what she has shown herself since then in Indo-China and Morocco; the decay of her population, her uncertain economic future and the listlessness which increasingly underlies the rapid shifts of her politics, have robbed her ancient ambition of much of its fire. There remains little but a roving eye and a certain restlessness of mind, finding constant expression in many superficial intrigues of the bureaux or the Bourse, but having no real root in French political life and threatening

nothing worse than a few passing annoyances to the chancelleries. Already before the war the youth of France was turning its back on such childish things. The ghost of Louis Quatorze still glimmers in the Quai D'Orsay, but his influence is passing from the life of the nation. The younger generation of Frenchmen are conscious of the vast task of internal reconstruction that awaits them and their energies can only be deflected into that restless policy-mongering abroad which is the seamy side of French political genius, if Britain and America, by lack of sympathy and understanding, contrive to keep alive the jealousy, pride and fear which linger in the heart of an ancient nation prostrated by the sacrifices of war. France to-day fails to understand the new Anglo-American co-operation, seeks equivalents for the extension of British and American control in the Middle East, is suspicious of British and American prestige at Warsaw, Constantinople, Prague and Athens, and demands practical guarantees for her frontiers. We have gone some way to satisfy this last demand, for the proposed British and American treaties of defensive alliance with France, so far from conflicting with the League, are the first and essential steps towards enlisting the wholehearted co-operation of France in its work. For the French mind, with its ingrained rationalism, is traditionally sceptical of all schemes for international union; it still tends to use the idea of nationality, as Napoleon used it, as a move in the ancient game of "*divide*

et impera”; and she can only be won over to the policy of union by a tangible proof that in such union she can find a real guarantee of her security. But if we have done something to eliminate the motive of fear, pride and jealousy still remain; and we have done not a little at Paris to intensify them. Especially in working out the idea of “mandates,” the special claims of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, put forward at the very outset of the Conference and allowed practically without modification, were not calculated to facilitate the acceptance by France of greater restrictions on her sovereignty in the Cameroons or Togoland; while in regard to Syria, Britain and America have realised too little that they were in the highly invidious position of advocating principles nicely, even if unintentionally, calculated to favour their own interests and to check those of France. It is vital that we should work out the conception of mandates honestly and logically, for any failure to give that conception real meaning in German East Africa or in Mesopotamia will rankle dangerously in French memory. France has lost ground with both British and American opinion at Paris, but the fault lies largely with us. If by lack of understanding we fail to evoke French genius and French political imagination in building up the new Europe, no other gains that we may make can compensate us for that supreme loss.

The cases of Italy and Japan are very different. Japan has definite economic aims, easily

pardonable in a nation with only some fifty years' experience in Western civilisation, which, at the moment of its birth, learnt its earliest and most enduring lessons in policy from the Bismarckian school of European statecraft. According to the principles of that school conquest, extension of territory, is the only possible cure for an increasing population in a country lacking mineral wealth. Japanese expansion may be condemned, but it cannot be checked by preaching and paper. Remote in its origins and character from the European family of nations, the Japanese state is the great uncertain quantity of the League. The wrong actually done to China in the Shantung settlement has been greatly exaggerated, though the Chinese representatives at Paris have perhaps been wise, in the interest of their country, in forcing the issue between Japan and the Western democracies by making it the test case of "Wilsonian" principles; but these clauses in the Treaty are intensely significant as a warning of European and American failure, not only in regard to Japan, but in regard to the Far East generally. That failure extends from the Volga to Manila and it is one of the first duties of the League to place its relations with the two great Asiatic Powers on some coherent basis.

Italian claims, on the other hand, are more definitely strategic. Suffering from the same economic disabilities as Japan, perhaps to an even greater degree, her actual claims to territory have nevertheless been based on

considerations of defence rather than of wealth. In Africa her ambitions have indeed lacked even this basis and have resembled rather the sentimental or jealous land hunger of France; but in the Adriatic and in the Southern Tyrol her aims have been frankly military. Italy has, indeed, succeeded France as the exponent of the Latin policy of "*divide et impera*" and the spur given to France by the German danger is supplied to Italy by the rise of the new Slav states. British and American opinion does wrong to deride this fear as wholly imaginary. However dangerous may be Italy's idea of herself as the outpost and the bulwark of Latin civilisation; however retrograde may be the Balkan and Danubian intrigues by which she too often seeks to carry out this imaginary mission; however impatient we may feel with the lingering tradition which identifies the Jugo-Slavia of to-day with the memories of Radetzky's Croat soldiery seventy years ago; however mad we may think the attempt to repeat on the Danube and in Macedonia the crime of Frederick the Great and Bismarck in Poland—the attempt to ward off future conflicts by ingenious partitions and the creation of artificial frontiers; yet we should be foolish to ignore racial incompatibilities and the very real weakness of Italy in face of the ferment of new nationalities across the narrow strip of the Adriatic. There is no task of foreign policy more pressing than the reconciliation of Italy with the other members of the European family, and there is none more

difficult. We have already referred to the ingrained particularism of France, but this description is even more applicable to Italy. There is a certain aloofness, a hardness of texture, in the Latin character, traceable equally in Spain, in France and in Italy, which, as America has found, resists fusion, assimilation, or even co-operation to a far greater degree than either the Anglo-Saxon, the German or the Slav. France escapes from many of the consequences of these disabilities by her prestige and her experience in, at least, military leadership, and she has proved during the war and the armistice period that she can win acceptance and exact respect and gratitude from Serb and Czech where Italy finds only suspicion or contempt. Italy has no such bridge by which she can cross the racial gap. She is a problem in the European family largely because she is weak. It still remains for some sympathetic student of international politics to explain why twentieth century Italy has buried so many historic talents in a napkin. Somewhere along the road of liberation and union, perhaps in the sloughs of a parliamentary system hardly suited to her genius, she appears to have lost so much of her heritage—the leadership in political philosophy once attained by Beccaria and Filangieri, the idealism of Gioberti, the statesmanship of Cavour and Manin, the capacity for strong government shown by Tanucci and Rossi, all the glamour of great possibilities which dazzled English liberals in the Risorgimento. Mazzini's glittering vision of the

"*Roma del popolo, Italia dell'avenire*" and Rossi's humbler conception of a "*governo forte sulle leggi*" have alike faded. The European family will know no settled system until these qualities are evoked again in its service.

There is in all this little enough to encourage those who hope for peace and stability in Europe. If the war has done so little to convert the chief allies to wiser statesmanship, what can be expected from our enemies? Without attaching too much importance to the outbursts of political pietists, there is no doubt that the attitude of the French and Italian representatives at Paris, and the general character of the proceedings there, have prepared the ground for a revulsion of feeling both in Britain and America in regard to Germany. The present German Government seems to have realised this and to count upon it. The change that took place in the European situation in the month of June has not perhaps been sufficiently appreciated. At the beginning of that month German troops and the Baltic Landwehr, under the direct control of German generals, had to all intents and purposes conquered Esthonia and Livonia. Libau and Riga were practically German ports. The German army of the East seemed to be preparing for a collision with Poland in Lithuania, West Prussia, Poland and Silesia. The Magyar army was pressing up through Slovakia towards Cracow, and a working alliance between Budapest and Weimar seemed an imminent possibility. The resources

of the Entente were utterly inadequate to cope with the danger. No situation could have been better suited to revive the gambling spirit in Germany. It did revive it in Brockdorff-Rantzau, in many of his colleagues and in the generals of the eastern armies. That, after all, Germany resisted this temptation is perhaps due to Erzberger, more than to any one man. Whatever his motives, his action saved Eastern Europe from complete chaos, and while it could not avert an upheaval in Upper Silesia or secure the complete withdrawal of German troops from Livonia, it has placed Germany in a fair position to take advantage of the unsettled condition of Western public opinion. The cardinal sin of the Peace Conference has been its failure to impress any clear-cut picture of the new order on the mind of the peoples. This failure must be of special interest to Mr. Graham Wallas and his disciples in the science of political psychology. From the medley of decisions reached at Paris no definite pattern or colour has emerged. To a world passionately anxious for peace, settlement, certainty, order, the new Europe appears as a tangle of loose ends, ravelled and ambiguous. It is by no means improbable that by strict observance of the letter of the Peace Treaty, by open abdication, for the moment, of any fine-drawn schemes of foreign policy and by a steady attention to the problems of internal consolidation and reconstruction, Germany may succeed, over the next five years, in wiping many war memories from the mind of their

neighbours and may come to be recognised as the chief stabilising factor in a fluid and troubled Europe.

So far as the territorial settlement is concerned, Germany comes out of the war not seriously weakened, certainly not incapacitated, for the task of recovery. The loss of the Saar coal-fields, even if permanent, is not of the first importance. The loss of the Silesian fields would be more serious, but not irretrievable. The passing of the Lorraine iron basin to France is the only real economic disaster which, in this respect, she has to face. Outside the territorial settlement, the terms imposed on her are crushing and we shall refer to this point at greater length in connection with the general economic condition of the new Europe; but the net effect of these terms is likely to be less than might be supposed at first sight. Her disabilities under the economic chapter of the Treaty are, for the most part, temporary, and open the way for a comprehensive rearrangement of economic relations after the lapse of a few years. The financial chapter may result in the destruction of her assets in the principal allied countries, but after nearly four years of black lists and enemy trading regulations, her commercial and financial connections in Italy, South America, and perhaps even in the Far East, have not been broken beyond repair. Only in the reparation chapter have the Allies devised an engine which, if utilised to the full, will indefinitely postpone her recovery. In practice, however,

the provisions of this chapter must inevitably undergo considerable modification. Their strict application would destroy German private credit completely for two years and would cripple it, perhaps, for a quarter of a century. The allied governments would be forced themselves to furnish the capital to restart the industries on whose production they have established so complete a lien, and to recreate the Central European market for their own manufacturers and traders. Germany can, by a judicious course of negotiation during the coming months, almost compel the Reparation Commission to escape from this dilemma by definitely fixing her obligations. The very vastness of her disaster is already consolidating all classes in a determined effort to stimulate production. The loss of her merchant marine may be sufficiently compensated before long by a surplus of American and neutral shipping. On the whole, it is probable that the rapidity of her recovery will astonish the world.

A revived Germany, stable and progressive, will be by far the most powerful factor in Europe. And she will remain a menace. We do wrong to suppose that her ambition arose solely from the vices of her Government. Her people have a natural fund of self-satisfaction and self-reliance which marks them out among the nations. Their feeling towards their Polish neighbours is one of ingrained hatred and contempt, not unmingled with fear. Can the despised Polacken rule themselves? To the German mind there can be only one answer to

such a question, and it extends in greater or less degree to the whole Slav race—to the Czech, the Russian, and the Croat. The whole of Central and Eastern Europe presents itself to the German eye as a malleable medley of incompetents. France is at last what Bismarck hoped to make her—bled white and listless. Italy can be conquered economically and tempted politically by promises of prosperity and protection, by sops to her sentimental ambitions as a colonial power. Can any one expect that Germans, whether they be statesmen of the old school absorbed in problems of power, social democrats intent on the moulding of the Internationale to their will, or revolutionaries lured by the dream of a great coalition of the European proletariat, will cease to regard their country as the centre of the family of nations, marked out to control its destinies? Britain and America are the only obstacles to that dream, and Germany, relying upon their traditional policy of aloofness, may well count on using the League of Nations as the focus of a continental system in which even they will be unable to dispute Germany's predominance. To the mind of an Erzberger it would, indeed, have been folly to miss so certain a future by any premature and petty aggression on the shores of the Baltic.

This is the main problem which the League has to face, and we must not commit the mistake of mere railing against German ambition. Such designs as these might well take an attractive form, and even a noble one, for the

Europe created at Versailles, outside the eastern and southern frontiers of Germany, is formless and distraught. Before all things, it needs consolidation and conciliation. The new nations are not incompetent, as Germany may think them, but they are burdened with a hundred disabilities and uncertainties, and if we do not help them ourselves Germany may be able to claim just recognition as the healer of her neighbours.

Immediately to the south of Germany, Bohemia is almost as much a mongrel state as was the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. German, Czech, Slovak, and Ruthenian are combined in a union which may prove all too loose. The future relations between Czech and Slovak are somewhat uncertain, and may prove a fertile field for the intrigues of a German element hankering after union with Germany and Austria, or of a Hungary intent on regaining its old frontiers. Bela Kun has already been able to use the Magyars, who form the small official class in Slovakia, to assist his designs. The Ruthenians, included, for lack of a better solution, in the new state as an autonomous province, may in the future combine with their brethren under Polish rule to the north of the Carpathians, to form an Ukrainian irredenta, and though this possibility is perhaps remote, its mere existence offers material for Bolshevist intrigue. The relations between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia are already disturbed by the Teschen dispute. At least, however, Czecho-Slovakia has wealth and great economic opportunities ; her outlet to the sea through Germany

has been safeguarded, as far as possible, by the international regime established on the Oder, by guaranteed rights of railway transit and by concessions in the port of Hamburg. The same cannot be said of her two neighbours in the Danubian region. Austria, never an economic entity, is now reduced to impotence and penury, even losing on the Bohemian frontier some of the agricultural districts which had supplied her capital with food. It is difficult to foresee any possibility of separate existence for this fragment of territory, and, with the rankling memory of Italian annexations in the Southern Tyrol, Jugo-Slav aggressions in Carinthia, Bela Kun's repeated attempts to overthrow her government, and the harshness of the Allies' economic terms, she can hardly be expected to turn in any other direction but to Germany for sympathy and assistance. Hungary, an almost perfect economic unit before the war, has lost much of her best agricultural land and most of her mineral wealth. By herself, she must be almost derelict.

Jugo-Slavia and Rumania alone emerge from the war with territories reasonably well-rounded and economically sound, though with lingering frontier jealousies between them in the Banat. But in Jugo-Slavia the enmities between Italian and Croat, German and Slovene, have now been added on her northern frontiers to the old Macedonian feud in the south between Serb and Bulgar—a feud which may well be complicated by Italy's presence in Albania even if her authority there should be confined to

Vallona ; while in Rumania political corruption, agrarian unrest, the perennial Jewish problem, and direct exposure to the menace of Bolshevism, combine to make the government at Bucharest a somewhat uncertain factor in the Balkan problem of the future.

For that problem is not solved by the Treaty. The Conference was faced with two alternatives. It could either attempt to work out an equitable balance of power between the four chief Balkan states without regard to the part they had played in the war, or it could treat Bulgaria definitely as a disturber of the peace, granting to her neighbours, and especially to Greece, at her expense and that of Turkey, the utmost possible extension of territory compatible with ethnic considerations, and relying upon the combination of the three powerful states thus established to repress her ambition and reconcile her perforce to a subordinate rôle in the future Balkan union. It appears to have chosen the latter course, and was, perhaps, forced to choose it. The new Bulgaria, excluded from Macedonia and probably also from the Ægean, forfeits every ambition which she has cherished since the Treaty of San Stefano. She cannot, indeed, urge that the settlement is inherently unjust, for her ethnic claim to "Bulgarian" and Turkish Thrace is, on the whole, less than that of Greece, if we except certain districts to the north of Drama and Seres, and in the vicinity of Adrianople ; to Macedonia she can only lay claim on grounds of doubtful racial and linguistic analogy ; and, perhaps,

her only unanswerable complaint is that the Allies have not demanded from Rumania the restoration of the old Dobrudja frontier. She is not even subjected to excessive economic disabilities, since, in exchange for her sovereignty over the third-rate port of Dedeagatch and the doubtful possibilities of a new port at Porto Lagos, she will secure rights of transit through Salonika of far more practical value to her economic life. Yet a rankling sense of injustice must long electrify the atmosphere at Sofia ; and it is impossible to regard the Balkan future without misgiving. Bulgaria has only to look across Macedonia to find at Vallona, if not also at Scutari and Durazzo, another unsatisfied member of the family of nations. Were Italy to be given "mandatory" duties in Albania—a solution which is perhaps the best that can be devised for that well-nigh insoluble problem—she would, in her present temper, have every motive to make common cause with Bulgaria against Jugo-Slavia. Sources of friction will abound ; Scutari, as the natural commercial outlet of Serbia, will be a bone of contention ; railway construction in northern Albania may cause endless disputes ; Albania still has her irredenta in Serbian territory at Ipek, Djakova, and Dibra ; there is no assurance that Jugo-Slavia will be able to effect immediate reforms in the methods of Serbian administration in Macedonia. Greece, the chief beneficiary in Europe of the collapse of Bulgaria and Turkey, owes her present prestige and position solely to the genius of M. Venizelos.

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As a nation she has shown no aptitude for great affairs and no skill in administration. With no great resources in men or money, she is apparently to be burdened simultaneously with new and far-reaching responsibilities both at Smyrna and in Thrace. Indeed, in none of the states from the Erzgebirge to the Morea and the mouths of the Danube is there any political tradition or school of statesmanship capable of bringing forth the wisdom and foresight which can alone build a new order out of the moraine of past misgovernment and ancient hatreds. At the extreme points of this region two commanding figures stand out for a moment, Mazaryk and Venizelos; but the future lies with their successors, and their isolation is, perhaps, hardly less complete than that of Diaz or Yuan-shi-kai.

If this is the prospect which meets Germany's eyes across her southern frontier, she has as her eastern neighbour another new nation no less poor in the quality of her statesmanship and, perhaps, even poorer in the elements necessary to a stable political society. Poland has mineral wealth and a secure outlet to the sea at Danzig, directly controlled by the League, but, dominated as she has been politically by Russia and economically by Germany, she has neither the political nor the industrial experience required to enable her to exploit these advantages. The Jews still form her only middle class, and they are as yet unreconciled to the new state—are, indeed, in many cases, almost at open war with it. The Allies have been at some pains to narrow Polish frontiers so as to exclude non-Polish

populations, but it is probable that the new State will embrace sufficient German, Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian elements to make its task of administration delicate and arduous. To those tasks Poland brings an imperialistic temper, confirmed rather than softened by the years of her servitude. This temper may thaw as the National Democratic Party loses its predominance. She has been fortunate to find in Pilsudski and Paderewski leaders of considerable ability and liberality of mind, and she may discover in Korfanty and the members of the former German Polish Party parliamentary talents which may do much to strengthen her political life. Nevertheless, the present government has as yet no deep roots in the country; the foundations of the new republic are not yet dug in the masses of the people; and none of the new states suffers more acutely from the devastation of the war and from the lack of capital, raw material, and economic guidance. Such as she is, however, Poland lends the only touch of stability to the ill-defined and troubled borderland between Russia and Central Europe. In the extreme north Finland does, indeed, show signs of political coherence, but, with this exception, a belt of debatable populations, with some national consciousness but lacking almost completely the elements of independent life, runs from the Baltic to the Black Sea, through Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia, Galicia, and Bessarabia. The future of these territories has been left open pending the

re-establishment of settled government in Russia, and till then they remain a trouble to their neighbours, a bait to German, Polish, and Rumanian ambition, a disturbing factor in the new order. Beyond them lies the Russian problem, but before touching on this we may well pause to ask ourselves whether, as matters at present stand, the Allies or the Germans are the more likely to bring order and coherence to the Europe thus rudely sketched by the Peace Conference.

For what has hitherto been the achievement of the Allies during the long months between November and July, when they were solely responsible for carrying over a still unsettled Europe from war to peace? Have they dealt strongly, steadily, or sympathetically with the thousand problems which offered themselves for solution during these months? The Conference has shown much detailed knowledge and much expert ability, if little statesmanlike imagination, in the laborious drawing of frontiers and in the other technical departments of the actual Treaty, but how far has it applied these talents to the current work of diplomacy and international administration forced upon it by the cessation of hostilities and the rudimentary beginnings of the new states? Much has certainly been accomplished; there has been much busy investigation and multifarious activity, many military and quasi-political missions have been sent to various quarters, and a variety of peremptory instructions have been issued to Poles, Rumanians, Jugo-Slavs, and Czechs. But the hard fact is that the Conference,

with limitless opportunities for focussing at Paris all the needs, interests, and aspirations of the family of nations, began by delaying its own meeting for two months, and then, during its earlier sittings, forgot the present needs and dangers of the new States, the accrued result of this delay, in a protracted and somewhat elementary discussion of their territorial claims. The plenipotentiaries of the principal Allies had hardly settled down to systematic work when the two main issues dividing the Great Powers themselves—the question of the Franco-German frontier and the Italian claims in the Adriatic—forced their way into the foreground of the Conference. In these circumstances their decisions on current developments—Prinkipo, the Teschen *modus vivendi*, the armistice between Poles and Ukrainians, the various ultimata to Bela Kun, the Greek landing at Smyrna—were thrown off hurriedly in the midst of other business. If in all this Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had shown any special marks of hesitation or carelessness, such errors might be easily retrieved in the future, but this is not the fact. Throughout, they were in a very real sense the faithful representatives of their peoples. The failures of the Conference were not due to personal weakness; they were inherent in the past life and system of the Western democracies; and only a change in national outlook will prevent their continual repetition in the future in the Council of the League of Nations.

It is impossible within the limits of this essay to give detailed facts in support of this summary

view of allied policy, but it is important to trace the course of events in one great region of disturbance—the basin of the Danube. Politically, the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire made this region the supreme test of allied statesmanship. Economically, the Danube was the key to the relief work of the Supreme Economic Council in the whole south-eastern area. Trouble began with the conclusion of the armistices and the demarcation of the limits of military occupation. This task seems to have been undertaken, not like the armistice with Germany, by the Supreme War Council, but by the Italian High Command in the west and by General Franchet d'Esperey in the east, as commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Balkans. The Supreme War Council doubtless formally ratified these decisions, but in the case of the armistice arrangements between Czechs and Magyars it seems uncertain whether even this formality was complied with. The lines fixed in Transylvania, in the Pressburg region and in Carinthia, were faulty and ill-defined. It is difficult to say who, if anyone, was from the first responsible for the enforcement of the armistice terms. The Italian High Commission at Vienna interfered spasmodically in the internal affairs of Austria; in Bohemia Italian officers were in command of the Czecho-Slovak army; in Hungary there was an Italian mission at Budapest, while General Franchet d'Esperey commanded Serbian and French troops in the Banat, and exercised some ill-defined authority over the Rumanian army of occupation in

Transylvania. Hungary had no government. The old aristocratic clique was discredited; Count Karolyi was a makeshift without influence or ability; food shortage was preparing the way for revolution, while, beneath the ruins of the oligarchy, Magyar nationalism was still alive, still ready for one last gamble for ascendancy. Hind-sight is easy, and it is perhaps frivolous at this distance of time to say that the Allies should have recognised Hungary as the key to the Danubian settlement. Yet there is little doubt that the Hungarian revolution might easily have been averted. British troops would have been welcomed in Budapest in February, but there were none to send. Demobilisation had disarmed the one Great Power whom Magyar and Czech would alike have trusted. The situation was allowed to develop unheeded; Czechs and Rumanians were subjected to no restraint, no remedial measures were taken in Hungary, the blockade was not raised till too late. When the explosion came, the Conference began by a miscalculation in General Smuts' mission, and then allowed the whole of May to pass without making any further move. It was not till June, seven months after the armistice, that the Allies began to devote real attention to the problem. The action they then took has been criticised, and it certainly bore many marks of haste and defective knowledge, but on the whole it was not ill-judged. Critics too often miss the point when they accuse the Council of Four of snubbing their friends and letting their enemies down easily. Britain's prestige in

Europe is based on her reputation for impartiality. The new states, who put their trust in Britain more than in any other Great Power, do not look to her for active support against their neighbours nor expect from her a policy based on accurate knowledge, dovetailing with nicety into their needs. They ask only for a steady manifestation of her interest in their affairs, and it is only by carelessness and inertia, not by the stumbling honesty of her intervention when she is at last aroused, that she will forfeit their respect and confidence. The real sin of the Council of Four is not that they have issued ill-judged commands which have been disobeyed, but that their fiats have been spasmodic, interspersed with long periods of inaction. Their negligence in Hungary was duplicated in Austria. While, encouraged by the hope of German resistance, Magyar nationalism and Jewish Bolshevism combined to threaten the whole Danubian settlement, the Allies did little to strengthen Austria against the advances of Germany or the subversive efforts of Bela Kun. Italy's traditional sympathies were with Hungary against Austria, and she seems to have been not too scrupulous in her manner of showing them. Austria sank from depth to depth of perplexity and despair. Renner, seeking some alternative to Kun's Sovietism on the one hand and Bauer's union with Germany on the other, looked in vain for any sign of help from the Allies. The terms of peace originally handed to him at St. Germain seemed to be drawn on stereotyped lines, with little reference to the special issues

involved. At first, the bankruptcy of Austria, her complete dependence on outside assistance for the very rudiments of her economic life, the consequent impossibility of preventing her union with Germany by mere paper prohibitions, and even her just claim to the western counties of Hungary, seemed alike to be ignored. In Carinthia and at Vienna the policy of the Italian Government seemed for weeks to be conducted independently of the Conference at Paris. If Bela Kun and Boehm were deliberately aiming at a junction with Germany through Slovakia and Austria, the inaction of the Allies seemed excellently calculated to further their designs. In the final issue, it was Germany's decision to sign, rather than the Allies' ultimatum to the Magyar government, that saved Bohemia and Austria from extinction. But here also it is important to recognise that when the Conference awoke to the situation, it did show itself anxious to retrieve its mistakes. Fighting in Carinthia was stopped; frontier rectifications in Austria's favour were granted at Gmund and Presburg, and Austria's claims in western Hungary were recognised.

The faults of the Conference can be easily explained and as easily remedied in its successor, the Council of the League. Lack of organisation at the centre, an imperfect and incoherent intelligence service in the troubled areas, and the rapid demobilisation of military and economic power—these were the sources of inefficiency. The old problem of unity of command is still imperfectly solved, and Germany thus retains an

immense advantage if the revolution has left her the power to use it. Political unity was nominally achieved in the Council of Four, but, except in the case of Poland and the Baltic provinces, no subordinate inter-allied commissions were established at Paris to co-ordinate information as to current events and to evolve recommendations. The armistice regime placed responsibility for the whole Berlin-Bagdad region in military hands, but, except in the case of the armistice commission at Spa, there was little co-ordination between the Allied military representatives appointed for this purpose. The Italian High Commissioner at Vienna, General Franchet d'Esperey in the Balkans, Admiral Calthorpe at Constantinople, General Milne and General Allenby in Asia Minor and the Levant, each acted according to his own lights, controlled only by the instructions of his own government. On the purely military side, the Allied Military Committee at Versailles had never succeeded in creating a real joint General Staff. Marshal Foch remained in his own person the only symbol of military unity. Economic unity, lost from November to February, was never completely recaptured by the Supreme Economic Council, and its activities were imperfectly co-ordinated with political policy. The same criticism applies to the system of economic, political and military intelligence. Each department had its own representatives, each studying the situation from different angles and all conscious of a lack of central direction and guidance. The first

problem that faces the League is one of pure humdrum organisation, if it is not to become a mere official garment for the policy of the most powerful state, the most commanding statesman, in the new Europe. It is surely not too bold a forecast to say that unless the League comes to represent a real, and not a merely nominal, unity of deliberation and policy, it will become the cloak and mouthpiece of Germany.

This danger is enhanced by what must be pronounced the greatest failure of the Conference. We have already touched on the weakness of allied economic policy since the armistice from the point of view mainly of relief work and *ravitaillement*. But to these sins of omission has been added a sin of commission in the reparation provisions of the German and Austrian treaties. The problem which now faces the Reparation Commission, as well as the Supreme Economic Council and the League of Nations itself, is that Germany finds herself not only the geographic, but also the economic, centre of a Europe bound together by the common calamity of a depreciated currency and a dilapidated credit. The condition of the dollar and, to a less but very real degree, the sterling exchanges is forcing Europe into an economic *bloc*, a group of impoverished nations whose only alternative to bankruptcy is the limitation of their commercial dealings to transactions among themselves, to the exclusion of their more fortunate neighbours. In such a *bloc*, Germany, with all her disadvantages, cannot fail to secure an

almost unchallenged leadership, and, as always, political power will follow economic.

There are, however, two problems of the new Europe which it is beyond the power of any single great nation to control, and at these we must glance before we close this survey of half-established order and half-won peace. For the reasons just stated, Russia may well fall under the economic spell of Germany, but our alarmists are at a loss when they prophesy German control of the future Russian state. There is an amorphous unity in that vast body and a growing power of national imagination, the germ of national ambition, which bids fair to defy mere economic penetration. Bolshevism has not destroyed these qualities; it has strengthened them. Even before the war German bureaucrats and German commercial travellers were swallowed up in Russia like Napoleon's armies. British and American mine-owners and capitalists rode precariously on the surface of Russian life. If Bolshevism fails to work an international revolution, it must either pass before the armies of Kolchak and Denikin or preserve itself by alliance with Russian nationalism. It is probably already far advanced along this road—not by any purely opportunist confederacy with reaction such as linked the Soviet at Budapest with the old Magyar army, but by a slower and more fundamental process of assimilation, by offering to Russian national consciousness, in place of the glamour of the Empire of Constantinople, the prouder ambition to be the standard-bearer of

“the Revolution.” In this direction may lie even compromise and reconciliation with the forces on which Kolchak and Denikin rely for their success. But whatever may be the future of Russia, even when, under some future settled constitution, she is admitted to membership of the League of Nations, she will long remain outside it in spirit and in aims. It is chimerical to imagine that her future government will be directed by the Sazonows, the Miliukoffs, and the Lvoffs. The dye of revolution has eaten too deeply into her political life. Lenin may be alien to her but he has set in motion forces which forbid a mere relapse into Western liberalism. No Orleanist Thiers will return to direct the destinies of the new republic. She will overshadow the new Europe, but her roots are outside it. Thoughtless readers of history are in the habit of deriding the bugbears that have successively scared Europe since the Reformation—the Spain that Bacon classed with the empires of Rome and Charlemagne, the France that maddened Chatham, the Russia that disturbed the sleep of Granville and Salisbury. Recently it has been pointed out with great justice that the Russian bugbear blinded British statesmanship to the German menace, almost until too late. Yet the mistake of our forefathers was not that they feared these forces but that they underestimated them. The Armada, the persecutions in the Low Countries, were but the by-products of Spain’s destiny; she passed like a dream, but not before she had poisoned for all future centuries the life of half

the New World. France did her appointed work by no petty conquests on the Rhine, in the Netherlands or in Canada; she settled down within her own frontiers, but not before her revolution had changed the face of Europe. It may yet be the same with Russia. Persia, the Indian frontier, China and Poland may now be preserved from her old ambitions of expansion, but her revolution has been no passing freak of Jewish fury and the belt of Slav nations which, with independence gained, stretches to the gates of Bavaria, to the Adriatic and to Adrianople, is no mere figment of ethnology. Absurd as the enthusiasms of our Western sovietmongers may be, Russia is to-day a field of political invention and a source of inspiration to millions outside her frontiers, and the future may well depend on the extent to which the imagination of the Western democracies can keep pace with hers.

The other great problem of the future is the Jewish. America, Britain, France and Italy stand pledged to an experiment which, judged by ordinary political standards, is little short of visionary. In Palestine, a country peopled for the most part by an Arab race, whose independence they are equally pledged to recognise and guarantee, a "national home" is to be created for a people whose only connection with that country for 1800 years was one of historic sentiment and religious tradition. This pledge violates all the current ideas of self-determination. It stands isolated and unique among the various phases of the settlement. A

superficial explanation of it is easy and has often been given. The Gentile world has failed utterly to assimilate Jewry. Up to the end of the eighteenth century it had indeed made no attempt to do so. Until the French Revolution gave the final touch of inexorable logic to the idea of the national state, sovereign, supreme and united, based on complete uniformity of life and laws and tolerating no separatism within its borders, the bulk of European Jewry lived its own life, made its own laws, taught its own culture, built up indeed and consolidated within the body of Europe its own federal empire with its centre in Poland, undisturbed by the ebb and flow of the European struggle round it. With the French Revolution came, however, the most curious development recorded in all modern history. Liberalism and nationalism, with a flourish of trumpets, threw open the doors of the ghetto and offered equal citizenship to the Jew. The Jew passed out into the Western world, saw the power and the glory of it, used it and enjoyed it, laid his hand indeed on the nerve centres of its civilisation, guided, directed and exploited it, and then—refused the offer. Every country has benefited by his economic talents, his philosophy, his artistic genius—nay, by his political allegiance and his patriotic devotion. But, broadly speaking—and all generalisations are only approximately true—he has refused assimilation. Moreover—and this is the remarkable thing—the Europe of nationalism and liberalism, of scientific government and democratic equality, is

more intolerable to him than the old oppressions and persecutions of despotism. This may appear a paradox to those who see around them in Western Europe contented Jewish populations taking full part in the processes of modern democracy, and who know that the future colonists of Palestine will be drawn, not from these populations, but from the oppressed orphans of the Diaspora in Eastern Europe. This is true, but it is also true, first, that the persecutors of Eastern Europe are the nationalists, and secondly, that it is in the settled and contented Jewry of the west that Zionism has won its signal victory over anti-Zionism during these last few years. This victory was won by no mere sympathy for the oppressed Jew in other lands; it arose also from a growing conviction that, in the increasing consolidation of the Western nations, it is no longer possible to reckon on complete toleration—that there is a steady tendency to present the alternative between assimilation and exclusion in a more and more inexorable form. Startling though the idea may be, it is in a sense true that the ghetto has been more a real home to the Jew than forums and parliaments. During the darkness of the Middle Ages, during the wars of the Reformation and of national monarchies, he made shift to live and work in the midst of Europe; now, in the dawn of what we are proud to call the enlightenment of a new era, he makes haste to be gone. The horrors of the war just ended turned his eyes more than ever to his traditional home; but it is the

conditions of the peace, the nationalism of the new Europe, that seem to give the final signal for his exodus. In a world of completely organised territorial sovereignties he has only two possible cities of refuge: he must either pull down the pillars of the whole national state system or he must create a territorial sovereignty of his own. In this perhaps lies the explanation both of Jewish Bolshevism and of Zionism, for at this moment Eastern Jewry seems to hover uncertainly between the two. European statesmanship, partly conscious at least of these things, sees in Zionism the only method of giving to these alien elements in its system the poise, the contentment and the sense of responsibility which the Western world believes it has itself derived from the modern nationalist movement. Hence the "Balfour declaration" and the strange burden laid on the shoulders of Britain by the mandate for Palestine which the final peace with Turkey will almost certainly confer upon us.

This explanation covers the facts, but it does not go very deep. What untameable qualities have confirmed Jewry in its isolation, keeping it distinct for all these centuries? Is it likely that a people which, while often so powerfully aiding the development of European political thought, has resisted all its conclusions, should now, in the evening of time, be content simply to borrow a political idea from Western democracy and devote itself to the creation of a "national state" after the Gentile model? At any rate, is it conceivable that such a people,

characterised hitherto by a faculty of clear thought and relentless logic, should accept a mere instalment of such an idea and linger contentedly, not at the goal of the national state, but in the half-way house of the "national home"? In Eastern Europe Bolshevism and Zionism often seem to grow side by side, just as Jewish influence moulded republican and socialist thought throughout the nineteenth century, down to the Young Turk revolution in Constantinople hardly more than a decade ago—not because the Jew cares for the positive side of radical philosophy, not because he desires to be a partaker in Gentile nationalism or Gentile democracy, but because no existing Gentile system of government is ever anything but distasteful to him. Will such a spirit of revolt be extinguished, such recurring alliances with the rebels be dissolved, by some comfortable Palestinian compromise, by a University of Jerusalem, by the focusing of Jewish culture and the Hebrew language in a few hundred square miles of Levant coastline? We might almost dismiss the "national home" as irrelevant were it not for the tremendous forces which the Balfour declaration has already set in motion—the stirring of all Jewry in Eastern Europe, the growing pressure of whole communities anxious to migrate immediately, the influence which is being brought to bear from all quarters of the world on the Conference at Paris. But the explanation of these things is not far to seek. As so often, the moderate policy of the statesmen of Europe and the

leaders of Zionism is accepted with enthusiasm because it means infinitely more to the masses of Jewry than to its originators. It matters little by what name statesmen distinguish their policy; it matters a great deal whether or not they offer that policy as a full satisfaction of a popular aspiration. They have so offered "the national home," and the aspiration is not modified thereby, it is merely labelled. Zionism formed no part of the practical programme of any European statesman in 1914; it has had the appearance of forcing itself upon the world almost without conscious agency or volition; and its leaders to-day are still hardly capable of controlling their own movement or estimating its possible development. The only thing that can be predicted with certainty is that it will dominate the whole family of nations for many years to come.

Such are the rough outlines of the new Europe. This is not the place to consider in detail those other problems of the new order in Asiatic Turkey and Africa, committed by Article 22 of the Covenant to the care and regulation of the League. The whole question of the government of backward races requires separate treatment. It is enough to point out here that the mandatory system enshrined in the treaty accomplishes nothing of itself and is but the germ of an idea whose fruits the Conference has had no time to ripen or gather. In Africa no comprehensive system of international obligations or co-operative action has replaced the obsolete Berlin and Brussels Acts, and the

terms of the mandates can do little more than apply to a few territories the recognised principles of British colonial rule. Until the new Europe itself takes on definite form and colour, no reshaping of its relations to its dependencies in other continents can be looked for. The new Europe is launched ; but Age, not Youth, is at the prow, Age and Experience uncertain to what disciples they can hand down the heavy responsibilities of the voyage ; and at the helm, not Pleasure, but bitter memories and disillusionment. There is in the voyage, perhaps, the hope of great discoveries, and we have at least the guiding star of sacrifices which surely can not have been wholly vain, but only the untiring efforts of a generation can prevent the ship from foundering in uncharted seas.

CHAPTER IV

THE SEEKERS AND THE REBELS

“There was an undoubted softening of the Roman character. . . . The labours of the great stoic lawyers were giving expression to cultivated moral feeling, in a more liberal recognition of the rights of the weak and oppressed. Yet a society may be humane and kindly while it is also worldly and materialised. . . . With all its humanitarian sentiment and all its material glories the Roman world had entered on that fatal incline which, by an unperceived yet irresistible movement, led on to the . . . petrification of Roman society.”—*Dill*.

WE have considered the new Europe, with its outskirts in Asia, country by country, as a family of nations, a system of separate state sovereignties, slowly and painfully evolved out of the ruins of the Roman Empire and the chaotic elements of mediæval Christendom. From this development, the drama of European political civilisation, we have seen that Britain and America have stood curiously aloof; yet in the society which is its product they are now pledged to take a leading and responsible part.

But this society is something more than the sum of its political parts. In this family of nations there have always been forces that

knew no boundaries of sovereignty, moving Britain herself no less than her neighbours in Europe. The most remarkable feature of Britain's aloofness has been that, even where these international forces have revolutionised her internal life, they have affected her foreign policy very little. Like her neighbours in Europe she owed the birth of her life and thought to Roman Christianity and like them she resisted the political encroachments of the Church, but throughout the Middle Ages she took little part in the struggle between Guelf and Ghibelline, between the claims of the Vicar of Christ and the divine right of kings. At the Reformation she led the revolt from Rome but, except during the few years of Cromwell's power and possibly, in a sense, during the Seven Years' War, she refused to throw in her political lot with the Protestant cause in Europe. To-day in common with Europe, she is shaken by movements no less powerful than these. Like the earlier revolutions of religion, they transcend political boundaries. They care nothing for the historical and racial foundations of the new political Europe but tend to mould the future of civilisation as a whole with little reference to national life or the machinery of national legislation and administration. Everyone knows the history of their growth from the new commercial system inaugurated by the industrial revolution, yet, profoundly as Britain has been moved by these forces, she has been remarkably slow to realise their effects in moulding international life and policy.

She has been the leader of the industrial revolution, the pioneer in the field of foreign commerce and, in a sense, the inventor of modern trade unionism. Yet she awoke with a shock in 1914 to realise how Germany had turned international finance and commerce to the account of her world policy in ways undreamed of by the City or Whitehall, and not only British labour but even British socialist thought has remained extraordinarily untouched by the struggles and controversies of the continent. For the most part, Englishmen have remained soberly content, even in their most radical moods, with the general idea of democracy and the popular will. They have hardly been aware of the growth of the deadly struggle, within the ranks of European democracy, between the impulses of nationalism and of social revolution. That struggle was openly declared half a century ago in the controversy between Mazzini and Bakunin, and it hardly stirred our interest. To-day we see it incarnated in Mazaryk and Lenin and our whole attitude towards the affairs of Europe shows that it has taken us by surprise.

Yet it is with these fundamental movements in the modern world that we, as members of the League of Nations, have to deal. In surveying the state of Europe the personalities of statesmen and the complexion of parliaments matter comparatively little. The old "liberal" thermometers and yardsticks no longer suffice to measure the temperature or the growth of political communities. The old issues between

clerical and anti-clerical, trade unions and employers, landlords' rights and agrarian reform, are often little but incidental skirmishes on the flanks of political life. Plebiscites and constituent assemblies, universal suffrage and responsible ministries, are no longer the admitted tests of the popular will. We cannot begin to understand the political world of which, as members of the League of Nations, we have constituted ourselves the guardians, unless we grasp the deeper philosophies which are dividing Europe before our eyes. We ourselves may perhaps, after our traditional British habit, succeed for many years in reconciling contradictory faiths in an illogical but workable system of government. We may still continue to use our British apostles of the international revolution as municipal ædiles, to combine Tory democracy with syndicalism, to eke out our parliament with soviets and to enlist Larkin and the *Daily Herald* in the service of Irish nationalism. Our political genius, hovering always between the lukewarmness of Loadicea and the charity that covers a multitude of sins, may so cloud the issues by compromise that we shall forget their existence. But in Europe, in the world at large, the swords which have been drawn cannot be sheathed so easily. At moments of crisis, truces may be made or temporary bargains struck. Marx may applaud Bismarck, and Red and White in Hungary may ally themselves for national defence or aggression. Lenin may be astute enough to adopt the doctrine of

national self-determination, for the avowed purpose of still further disintegrating the state system of Europe. But, fundamentally there is an irrepressible conflict. That conflict is beyond our power or the power of any political League of Nations to heal ; but, by understanding it, we and America, who are somewhat, for the moment, above the battle, can in a measure moderate it and influence its elements towards at least some temporary fusion. How long we shall ourselves be able to blunt the edge of these opposing faiths in our own countries may well be doubted, but by labouring to understand the desperate danger of European society to-day we may perhaps be better armed to meet our own hour of trial to-morrow.

It is no part of our purpose to trace the steps by which the power of international commerce or the doctrine of the class war has laid hold on the civilised world. The League of Nations has much to do in softening or adjusting competition for the control of markets and sources of wealth ; but for our purpose it is sufficient, on this point, to express the opinion that the power of " capital " and " finance " as independent international forces has been greatly exaggerated. On the whole wealth has remained national, for it is dependent on national laws and national conditions far more than on international relations. It has aimed at influencing the domestic programmes of governments far more than their foreign policy. International aggregations of capital are engines of power which national statesmen have often, as in the

case of Germany, sought to control for political ends—not independent authorities moulding statesmen to their will. The “yellow internationale”—to use a current cant phrase—has been used as a tool by ambitious governments, but it has not, generally speaking, had either the inclination or the political sense to control international relations for economic purposes. It might easily become dangerous, but it is not dominant.

It is very different with the complex forces which are commonly lumped together under the rough definition of the “class war.” On this, the main subject of the present chapter, a multitude of historians and controversialists have scrutinised the growth of modern revolutionary movements from the explosions of 1789 and 1848 and the development of modern industrialism, though socialism and syndicalism, to the rule of the proletariat in the soviet republic. We shall not attempt to cover the same ground and we may be forgiven for believing that historical criticism and doctrinal exposition have alike failed to probe the roots of the revolt or read the hearts of those who have preached it and followed it as a holy war.

For those—and they have been the teachers of the present generation—who hold the accepted orthodoxies of the later nineteenth century, who believe in “law and order” and “progress,” in “nationality” and “representative democracy,” are prone to self-complacent assumptions too little warranted by history. Anyone who passed through university or high school in

England or Scotland during the decade preceding the war is familiar with these assumptions. The feet of democracy were firmly set on the path of progress; the true machinery for the registration of the popular will had been ascertained and fixed; we were the heirs of the ages, ordained to our ministry by the hierarchies of reform; all that remained for us was to labour in well-marked fields of social policy, spreading material comfort and the discoveries of modern science, sure that in due time we should reap if we fainted not. True, the school of philosophic radicalism had lost its authority; its serenity had given place to a more passionate temper; the miseries and wrongs of the "submerged tenth" were impressed vividly on our imaginations and we were bidden to gird our sword upon our thigh to remedy them without too close a scrutiny of constitutional or economic maxims. But these newer influences, while they blurred the principles of orthodox liberalism, in nowise lessened its self-assurance. We still lived under the spell cast over political thought by the scientific theory of evolution. The idea of cataclysm was inconceivable to us. The warmth of Mr. Lloyd George's oratory, Professor Hobhouse's ingenious reasoning and Mr. Massingham's pontifical pharisaism widened the banks of individualism till its waters, mingling with the turbulent floods of Christian socialism, spread themselves impartially over the whole field of human needs and aspirations, but no breath of doubt was allowed to enter

our mind that "the remedy for the faults of democracy was more democracy," that here and here alone was the true stream of freedom and progress, bearing the human race irresistibly from the mists of primitive mountains to the sea of perfect liberty and limitless opportunity.

It is hardly surprising that any man, nurtured in such comfortable certainties, should even to-day cling to his philosophy amid the ruins of a world, beckoning us to "turn from these explorations of 'crossways'—the sectional path of labour, the class path of socialism, the anti-political path of syndicalism, and the fatal mule-track of anarchism—to survey the straight path along which the community-as-a-whole may advance through self-government to peace and prosperity." It is less surprising because, since August, 1914, every allied statesman in Europe and America has preached but one view of the war, has raised but one standard for us to follow, has filled the press and the forums with but one chorused explanation of our aims and our ideals—that our cause was the cause of democracy and that cause, by itself and of itself, was worth every sacrifice of life and happiness that men and women could offer. With so easy a confidence in their premises have our leaders been filled that, as the trials of war deepened and the horizon grew ever darker, their forecasts become more brilliant and more sweeping, and the careful student of their utterances, including those many millions of simple people who could not quote them but who remember vaguely their reiterated

purport, may stand assured to-day not only in M. Bourgeois' phrase, of a "regime of organised law for the world" and a guarantee of full rights of self-determination for all peoples, but even of "a new heaven and a new earth," wherein shall dwell, if not righteousness, at least universal comfort and prosperity. Never have we been assured more loudly than at the present moment that "the one great danger of democracy—the only danger that it need ultimately fear—is that it may fail to be true to itself, that it may forget its own ideals." Never have we been more confidently bidden to believe that "the fortunes of self-government are bound up with the fortunes of nationalism, since it is only in communities unified by national feeling that genuine self-government is possible."

Even before the war some of us who read history found our belief in these assumptions seriously shaken. If there is one well-marked characteristic of the last days of an era, when community life is ebbing, when political thought has lost its freshness, when innate life and faith are giving place to the paler hopes of reason and tradition and when the judgment of violent death and dissolution is about to be pronounced upon a society, like Laodicea of old, too blind to realise, amid its claims that it is "rich and increased with goods and has need of nothing," that it is "wretched and miserable and poor and blind and naked"—if there is one sure sign of such times as these it is the growth of a humanitarian philosophy

springing from a keen realisation of the ills and injustices of human life, but preaching a calm belief in the power of a liberalised system of government, softened by benevolence and enlightened by education, to right wrongs and eradicate evils. History never exactly repeats itself and these features of decay have varied almost infinitely from age to age, but they can be recognised again and again on the eve of revolution and disaster. These are the times when the Utopias are written and the noonday genius of statesmanship is reconstructed and codified into encyclopædias of government and philosophies of politics to guide the careful reformers of the twilight. It was in such days that the stoicism of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius laboured to "translate the stubbornness of fortune into so quiet and so sweet a style"—that "Rome had its touching charity sermons on occasions of great public distress; its charity children in long file, in memory of the elder Empress Faustina; its prototype, under patronage of Aesculapius, of the modern hospital for the sick." May it not be, after all, that the "era of social reform" in which we were all so proud to live before the war and which, we are now so often told, has but been interrupted by the irrelevant upheaval of the last five years, will be recorded in future history in the same category with that other era of active and enlightened benevolence, little more than a century earlier, when Pombal and d'Aranda, Turgot and Joseph II, Leopold of Tuscany and Tanucci, laboured painfully

to heal the festering sores of pre-revolutionary Europe? Is it not at least worthy of remark that the only country left untouched by violent revolution after 1789 was our own where, alone among all the states of Europe, social reform had played no prominent part in the programmes of eighteenth century statesmanship?

Whether or not there be any truth in such misgivings we should do well to formulate them to ourselves, for, long before the war, they were already haunting men's minds. The fact is that many of the assumptions, easily made by thinkers and politicians, never gained real currency with the masses of the people. Democracy as a catchword, a vague ideal, can rouse the emotions of millions, as this war has proved; but as a form of government, a constitutional system, the consecrated medium for the progressive reform and improvement of the race, its claims have never sunk deeply into the hearts of men. Economists were wont, a few years ago, to relate to their pupils with kindly tolerance the wild and abortive attacks made on their science by Carlyle and Ruskin, yet they are mistaken if they believe that they enjoy a secure and acknowledged victory. The spirit of those attacks still lives and works. Idealist and malcontent, decadent and philistine, quietist and rebel, alike find in the orthodox teaching of history, economics or political science a refinement, a narrow selection of material and a tendency to stereotyped explanations which satisfy neither their reason nor their desires. And it is, we venture to think, in

this direction and not in any laborious scrutiny of modern history and commerce that we must look for the real anatomy of unrest.

Perhaps the time is past when it is necessary to insist on this. Even such confident defenders of the old economic orthodoxies as Mr. Mallock no longer think that they have dealt with socialism when they have refuted Marx's logic, or that they can draw the sting of syndicalism by demonstrating the ill-success of the general strike. But this discovery has hardly led to any serious attempt to reach a better understanding of beliefs so powerful and yet so illusory—so little dependent on the intellectual vehicles by which they have been propagated. Instead, when argument fails, when Sorel falls frankly back upon his "myth," our orthodox thinkers tend to take refuge in the methods of a former generation; the heretic is condemned as contumacious and handed over to the secular arm. It is indeed curious how exactly we follow to-day the course of the hierarchy of the Church four hundred years ago. In both cases there is a real dilemma: what are you to do when reason and authority alike fail? There is one obvious course to take: remedy the known and notorious abuses which taint your system. Ecclesiastical Rome grasped at this policy. In sixteenth century Italy Pole and Caraffa laboured on Church reform—and awoke to find their work irrelevant. They met such charges as Colet's famous invective against the clergy: "They give themselves to feasts and banquetings. They spend themselves in

vain babbling. They give themselves to sports and plays. They apply themselves to hunting and hawking. They drown themselves in the delights of the world." Surely the cleansing of such an Augean stable would satisfy the reformers. The Conference of Regensburg supplied the answer. These things were, after all, beside the point as, at such moments, all mere reform is beside the point. The one thing that the Papacy could not do, the one thing that, apparently, we cannot do, was to search its inmost heart and analyse its most cherished principles, asking itself whether it had failed, through lack of courage or through lack of faith, to preach the full truth committed to its charge.

Of course, we have had plenty of justification for fixing our mind on a detailed reform of conditions of life and labour in industry. The intellectual leaders of unrest had for so many years rested their case upon the doctrine of economic determinism that we were but following them when, before the war, we saw in material evils the centre of the social problem. But this, too, is a characteristic feature of all great revolts. They grow dangerous under the sting of intolerable material conditions and their leaders and followers begin by regarding those conditions as the very foundation of all the deeper evils and shortcomings of society. So before the Reformation. Men traced at first "the universal corruption of the Church of God" to Colet's drunken clergy, to Dunbar's nobleman who, none knew how or why, had "climbed to be a cardinal," and his illiterate

priests who could not even read the Psalms and the Testament, to the monster in the bishop's chair growing fat on the fines paid by poor priests for the women in their houses. They ended in a deeper interpretation of their discontent, finding, as they believed, that these things were the fruits of spiritual decay, not its cause. So again to-day. Having begun by regarding capitalism as the source of the social system of the modern State, the rebels of this generation are now becoming daily more convinced that it is the modern State that is the source of capitalism. And, this stage reached, their revolt is more dangerous than at first, because the object of their attack is more intangible, a pervading atmosphere rather than a definite set of concrete abuses. The thing against which they revolt becomes the whole political society in which they live and move and have their being—the very matrix in which their own mind has been formed. If we find their discontents impossible to meet by argument, it is largely because they themselves find it impossible to grasp the object of their hatred; like Peer Gynt they struggle with a Boyg which eludes their blows, envelops and stifles them. "Tout est grand, tout est beau—mais on meurt dans votre air."

It is not then from the rebels that we can look for a formulation of grievances; it is for us to probe our own beliefs. Surely, before the war, an honest self-examination would have shaken our intellectual self-satisfaction. Surely, indeed, only a blindness as tragic as that of

mediæval Rome could account for our failure to interpret the discontents around us. After all, the edifice of our political philosophy during the last half-century had rested on two pillars ; the idea of " representative democracy " and the idea of " nationality." It is a commonplace that no satisfactory definition of nationality has ever been drawn up—that it eludes argument no less than the doctrines of the revolutionaries. It is perhaps not so commonly realised to what extent the theory of representative democracy is a legal fiction to the mind of the average man. Historically, representative institutions both in Britain and America grew up in a state of society where it was possible and usual for a local community to send as its representative to Parliament or Congress a man, who, in the strictest sense, was a " member " of that community, a representative type of it because actually a part of it and a sharer in its life. This idea still survives in the United States, where residence is a necessary qualification for political candidacy, but even this rule no longer suffices under modern conditions to ensure the old kind of representation. Increasingly in every democratic country at the present day, a member of Parliament, a Deputy or a Congressman tends of necessity to be a carpet-bagger. He bears the same relation to the old type of representative as the family solicitor bears to a member of the family whose affairs he conducts. The one outstanding characteristic of modern politics is an intense popular dissatisfaction with the

representative system. The agitation for proportional representation, the controversy between *scrutin d'arrondissement* and *scrutin de liste*, the experiments in "direct legislation," the initiative, referendum and "recall" are only surface indications of the most moderate form of this dissatisfaction. Beneath this surface there are depths of sullen distrust and eddies of violent indignation which academic political science has too comfortably ignored. Curiously enough, this ignorance has been shared by many who a few years ago figured, and in some cases still figure, as revolutionary leaders. It was an inherited confidence in such uncriticised assumptions that vitiated the whole socialist case in face of the assaults of syndicalism and anarchism. Mr. Snowden, for instance, writing just before the war, thought he had completely demonstrated the absurdity of any "fear of the tyranny of the State under Socialism" when he had pointed out, in a series of well-worn Victorian phrases, that "the government and organisation will be democratic," that "socialism postulates an intelligent democracy," and that "socialism will be democratic; the people will rule." Such words as these, assuming the solution of the very problem which all men feel to be the most insoluble of modern politics, might well serve as an epitaph on orthodox socialism as a living doctrine of progress. Neither in England nor in America had pre-war socialism any real contribution to make to the realisation of the most immediate popular aspirations. American socialism in the

years immediately preceding the war was offered a great opportunity for political leadership. It failed to take advantage of this opportunity, largely because the issue which then shook the whole system of American politics to its foundations was a passionate attempt to reform the machinery of popular representation. It was the consciousness of misrepresentation far more than the pressure of economic evils that gave birth to the radicalism of the Progressive campaign in 1912. American socialism never seemed to realise this fact and offered no remedy for the evils so keenly present to the popular mind. The failure of socialism has been even more evident in the application of the doctrine of representation to industrial problems. The revolt against trade union leadership is but an indication of the prevailing disillusionment which makes so much of the modern talk about "industrial democracy" or "self-government in industry" illusory and unsatisfying to the average working man. More and more the experience of every democratic country has seemed to prove that true representation is to be found only at the point where the rainbow touches the ground. The professions of political candidates or elected ministers sound daily more like an echo of that ancient aspiration, that ancient fiction, as old as the Hildebrandine Popes—the claim made by political power, at first honestly, later as an official formality, and finally, with almost conscious hypocrisy, to be "the servant of the servants of God."

In spite of its lack of intellectual definition, or perhaps rather because of it, the principle of nationality is probably a much more living force to-day than the principle of representation. It is not so exclusively a political doctrine—in fact, national movements have tended to remain sterile so long as they aimed solely at political independence. They have almost invariably grown powerful through cultural propaganda; the influence of language has been infinitely stronger than that of race or historical tradition. Again, the sins of nationality—and they have been many—have been commonly attributed to other factors; the crimes of Magyar ascendancy have been perpetrated by a corrupt oligarchy and German ambition has been cloaked by the divine right of kings. The world has talked much of German Kultur, but has slipped into the mistake of regarding it as a mere fiction invented by German propagandists or by William of Hohenzollern. It has been forgotten that only the existence of a real German culture has made Prussianism possible, and popular belief in the national principle has greatly benefited by this mistake. Nevertheless, signs were not wanting before the war to indicate how weak an agent of social regeneration was the principle of nationality. European labour had for many years been growing to suspect it, and even to regard it as profoundly irrelevant to the problems of the hour. Now that it has finally been put to the test by the Peace Conference, millions who had paid lip service to it in theory are turning back from it as from a mirage.

It is, then, on these two tottering pillars that much of our old confidence in "democratic progress" was based, and it is on them that we have now built a peace. Our strongest answer to the critics of the Peace of Versailles is that these acknowledged props of democracy, and not any "capitalist imperialism," are the true basis of our structure. And the answer comes back, vague and unreasoning, but surely not incomprehensible: "Do you really mean to tell us that this is the best that organised society and the political wisdom of the ages can do; that solutions so sordid are a sufficient reward for the sacrifices you have exacted from the flower of the human race?"

This is the spirit which threatens the whole state system of Europe, root and branch, on the morning of peace. This is the question to which the family of nations, individually and collectively, has to supply an answer. Its leaders cannot expect, either from the rebels or from that much larger body of average opinion, average disappointment and average idealism which we may call the seekers, an ordered presentation of their case or an itemised statement of grievances. Rather, they have to encounter a sweeping attack on the whole range of their orthodox postulates. They will be pilloried for what they have left undone, rather than for what they have achieved. They will not be called on to consider a radical programme for a comprehensive reconstruction of an outworn economic system, but rather to listen to a clamour of deadly weariness against

what they have been trained to regard as the most progressive and radical principles of reform—an echo of the old Pauline outburst, “who shall deliver us from the body of this death?”

The seekers are a varied and straggling army, but their numbers, even in our own dull country, were infinitely larger before the war than perhaps the orthodox ever realised. Their ranks included every class and every shade of opinion and tradition, from the irreconcilables of the Welsh coal-fields to the young University man, emerging from his education and his college debates, sick of the old political parties and preferring syndicalism to the Labour Party and Connolly to Mr. Redmond. Their discontent was fed above all things by the curious combination of self-assurance and rank opportunism, which we have tried to indicate already as the characteristics of recent democratic politics. They were sick of stereotyped political arguments and wise debates—sick of weighing one view against another, conscious that either side of the question could be presented with equal force by those who made such advocacy their business. They were weary of the spectacle of a Parliament in England indulging in miscellaneous social reform with apparently no other guide than the philanthropy of the moment; they were bewildered by the multitudinous strivings of forty-nine legislatures in the United States, representing much which made America admirable, fired for the most part with a real sense of their duties and their

responsibilities, but all engaged in "sniping" fitfully at isolated abuses, in remedying this or that grievance, in denouncing this or that form of oppression, without sense of order or guiding principle. They could not find their footing in all this; they could not live beneath the rule of whims, however noble. They wanted a standard, a touchstone. They looked not for *a* reform or *a* system, but for *the* reform and *the* system. Above all, they looked for the guidance of law. Every scrap of teaching they had received had bidden them discern the rule of definite law in the physical world and in the world of thought; how could they be satisfied in the political world by the uncritical assumptions of the "reformers"? "Can you," they asked of their teachers and leaders, "predict with any certainty the immediate, let alone the ultimate, effect of any single measure you propose? Are your counsels of expediency, your yearly choice of new programmes of legislation to catch the imagination of the voters, anything more than a confession that you have lost your way—that you are blind children scribbling on the Sibylline leaves which the next breath of some strange wind shall carry you know not whither?"

The intellectual weight of this vague movement was not perhaps important; it was only as the spirit of the seekers was soured into the temper of the rebels that serious intellectual expression began to be given to it. That, too, is characteristic of revolutionary eras, and gives rise to many of the worst misjudgments of

history; the vague fervours of the fifteenth century, the wild German pilgrimages to Wilsnack and Niklashausen, the dreams of Lollardy, find poor expression in the satires of Erasmus or the invectives of Luther. Before the war, we still lived in the earlier phase of the revolt. In every Babylon from Chicago to Essen people were asking questions which neither the writers nor the politicians had ever seriously put to themselves. They were asking: "Where are you going, you who have governed us for so long? What are your objects? What are the ends of government, the promises made to the fathers?" There was not a platform or a pulpit in the land with an answer to these questions, until the rebels began to oust from their accustomed tribunes the older hierarchs of reform.

The more modern of these hierarchs had, however, already prepared the way for the more moderate of the rebels. Socialism, the rebel of an earlier era, after shading gradually into respectable Fabianism and coalescing in various forms with collectivist liberalism and Tory democracy, had given birth to guild socialism and a mixed progeny of social reconstructionism. These reconstructionists aspired to lead the seekers to the goal of their desires, but usually with very little understanding of the feelings they professed to satisfy. They tried, indeed, to supply an answer to questionings till then ignored as dreams, but the answer was often petty enough. Miss Addams, in "The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets," tells of the

Russian girl in Chicago who committed suicide because she felt that Americans were not "held together by any historic bonds nor great mutual hopes." And to this idealism the reconstructionists could only offer an economic system and write above the graves of the martyrs: "Sufficiency of food, clothing, shelter and leisure for all men." Outside economics they could only repeat the old formulæ of nationality and representative democracy. They could not realise that, while the dumb millions on whom our social structure was built naturally desired happiness, comfort, prosperity, they desired something so much more than that, and desired it dimly, it may be, but so much more ardently, that they were ready to accept a life of self-sacrifice and grinding toil if only an end were shown them—an end not for themselves alone, but for the world—to which with certainty they might look forward from afar. "But we do not," cried the reconstructionists, "rule out such æsthetic ideals; we only offer the indispensable material basis for their attainment." They were blind to the dreariness of that doctrine; they had not perhaps read history honestly enough to understand that they were bidding us hope, from a reform of work and wages, the transformation which religious revival and the growth of political liberty had already failed to effect in the hearts of men. This was not what the seekers wanted; they asked rather for Garibaldi's "battles and death"—for corporate work fired by the assurance of a common hope. They wanted, with

Mr. Wells' hero in the "New Machiavelli," "a gale out of heaven, a great wind from the sea," but they could not follow Mr. Wells into bathos when his hero attempted to raise that wind by the foundation of a political group and a weekly review. They were tired of playing with these toy bellows while they felt the wind of heaven sigh about their windows and knock at their barred doors.

The gale and the great wind have come, but not as we asked or thought. On a world too dull to discern the purposes of peace, too weak for common vigils, too sceptical to see in the daily commerce of humanity the "armies of unalterable law," with faces set towards an assured city of God, there came the stormy call to a more obvious sacrifice in a cause defined clearly to the eyes of all. The prayer of Ajax was heard, and, for a space at least, the face of the battle was made plain. It was not an interruption but a revelation, and as such the seekers knew it. If our leaders and teachers in our own country had not known, as in Milton's day, what nation it was whereof they were and whereof they were the governors, they had no excuse thereafter for misconceiving the "quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit" which they had fed with easy sops for so long. If we as a people had missed the life stirring beneath the deadly uniformity of poor streets and blank factory walls; if we had based our social policy on the charitable but perverted theory that in such surroundings no faith, self-sacrifice or public spirit could survive the

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pressure of adverse material conditions—if such had been our attitude of mind, we could no longer miss our error. For, indeed, the “disinherited” had become in some sort themselves our leaders and teachers. They responded to the appeal of causes in Europe of which they have never heard, not merely in defence of their country, but because society meant something more to them than to us, and in their way they understood better what “historic bonds” and “mutual hopes” really are than did orthodox historians and political thinkers. Their temper showed itself especially in this, that against the whole trend of sophisticated thought they insisted on associating morals and religion with politics. Mr. Chesterton never voiced more accurately the instinctive rebellion of the average man than when, just before the war, he denounced the “great talk of trend and tide and wisdom and destiny.” The orthodox political thinkers might try to break the links which, in all ages, from the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas to the “Obedience of a Christian Man,” from the Solemn League and Covenant to the Declaration of Independence, had bound politics to the simplicities of faith and morals; our new Machiavellis might prefer another and more modern bondage, and might seek their premises in Darwin rather than in the Bible; the House of Commons might taboo quotations from scripture as bad form; but the people whom the thinkers aspired to teach and the House of Commons to represent, were always

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ready to enforce their claims upon society by an appeal to the Golden Rule. It was to this morality that statesmen made their confident appeal on the morning of the war, and the response was surely a condemnation of the meaner leadership of the past.

It was the note struck by Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3rd, 1914, the unassuming sense of the moral nature of international relations, the simple knowledge that a law had been violated and the ordinary ties of human honour and duty broken, that stirred the people of England, "took them like trumpets," and sent the seekers forth to the ends of the earth. The trenches of Flanders and Gallipoli, the sands of Egypt and Mesopotamia took them in their time, but their mantle fell upon a whole people intensely conscious into what manner of heritage they had entered. Unhappily, our leaders and thinkers had not the vision or the courage to sound the same note steadily or to understand the true nature of the hopes they had aroused. They relapsed into the old political phrases. Largely, it is to be feared, in response to American criticism, moved by the demand from the other side of the Atlantic for statements suited to the comprehension of the American press and the political leaders of the Atlantic seaboard, and influenced by that exclusively political idealism to which we have referred in a previous chapter as the characteristic tone of American thought, they had recourse to the easy catchwords of orthodox democracy. They did not realise

until too late the logical consequences of such doctrines. They waxed eloquent over the rights of small nations, but hung back from preaching a war of nationalist revolution. Committed in the eyes of those who understood Europe to a championship of Bohemian and Southern Slav nationalism, they slid into an indefensible treaty with Italian Cæsarism and, until the last days of the war, toyed with the phantom of a separate peace with Austria. They were unable to reconcile their lip service to the principle of self-determination with the exigencies of their military policy or with the problem of Ireland. They could not explain the Defence of the Realm Act or the passport system in terms of their own democratic formulæ. They found themselves less and less able to demonstrate the difference between Prussian "militarism" and the measures to which democracy is driven in times of danger. Their actual policy, mistaken though it often was, did not lack solid justification even where it appeared most difficult to explain; but no such justification can be found for their verbal professions, based as these were on general principles which they knew themselves to be powerless to translate into action.

The same mistakes in varying degrees were made in every belligerent country in Europe, and not least in Russia where, if leaders did not talk in terms of Western democracy, they yet made themselves the mouthpiece of many of the hopes of Russian liberals. The result was inevitable. Disillusionment spread and the

rebels, who had lost the greater part of their influence in the early enthusiasm of the war, began to build up their schools again, aided by those small groups of Girondins and Pharisees who had never felt and could never understand the spirit of the seekers, but who made it their title to intellectual leadership that they were always ready to prove their love for humanity by hating their immediate neighbours. It was at this moment, in the middle of the war, that President Wilson's state papers gained a rapid popularity. The rebels and the Pharisees saw in them, indeed, little but an opportune stick with which to beat their own governments; but their moral flavour, their apparent attempt to bring back allied policy out of the sloughs of military expediency to its original starting point, appealed genuinely to the spirit of the seekers. They did not see, and, not knowing America, could not be expected to see, that the moral element in these addresses was traditional rather than original, representing, not an instinctive effort on the lines of Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3rd to deduce policy from morals, but rather an attempt, honest enough but intellectual and laboured, to cast over a purely political idealism the mantle of moral sentiments. Above all, Bolshevism did not enter into Mr. Wilson's calculations at all. It did not fit into any of his moral categories. In a quite peculiar degree American democracy had failed to take the social revolution into account, yet from the moment that America entered the war the

Russian revolution dominated the international situation, and Mr. Wilson's loss of moral prestige began with his failure to apply his philosophy to it. That was probably more his misfortune than his fault. His real fault was precisely the same as that of other allied preachers of democracy. He moved in the same world of political maxims as they, and the seekers, who thought for one brief moment that he had recaptured the lost chord of morality with which the war began, have sunk back into a disillusionment all the more bitter for the momentary hopes he had aroused.

The Treaty of Versailles marks the culminating point in this disillusionment, but those who attack and those who defend it alike miss the essence of its sin. It fails, not because it embodies economic selfishness, but because it gives almost pedantic expression to the old confidence in nationalism and representative democracy. It is the last step in our misinterpretation of Germany. Germany sinned, as a matter of fact, precisely by a similar pedantic allegiance to modern principles. Bismarck's real achievement was to prove that universal state education, advanced social reform, universal suffrage, and, finally, universal military service, the standing democratic principle of the continent, though not of Britain or the United States, are the most perfect engines of political power. If we had been perfectly unselfish, a few dark spots on the Treaty would have been eliminated; but if we had realised that a really dangerous and soulless imperialism

always has its roots, not in the caprice of monarchs, but in the democratic nationalism of Fichte, we might have reached a radically different settlement, tolerant, just, and secure.

Of course, this interpretation of the moral history of the war is very different from the popular explanation which casts the blame for present disillusionment on secret diplomatists and jingo bitter-enders. These also bear their grave responsibility, but the greater sin lies at the door of those who have continued to put their trust in a political philosophy rather than in plain moralities—in that righteousness which, we are told, the people of the world shall learn when the judgments of the Lord are in the earth. This point is all-important to an understanding of the issues of to-day. Social revolution can never come as a revolt against reactionary rule. The answer to reaction has been given many times in history : it may be violent and bloody, but it does not lead to the dissolution of the ties of society ; it is content to vindicate individual liberty and to open the way for new voluntary forms of combination between free men. The revolt of to-day is one directed, not against the power of autocrats, but against the bankruptcy of reformers. Nowhere is this more true than in Russia, where the apostles of the social revolution have been nauseated in exile by what they regard as the hypocrisies of Western democracy. It is no policy of emancipation that is behind the movement but a yearning for knowledge and law. The passion

of destruction which inspires the rebels is in proportion to the earnestness with which the seekers have waited for some transcendent message of unity, of order, and of hope. Only those who seek for the law "whose seat is in the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world," can be tempted by disappointment to take up the cry of Zarathustra: "How weary am I of my good and of my evil." Only in those who know that man does not live by bread alone does the desire arise to fall down and worship any power that can promise them the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them for the vague purposes which they half discern.

We have written mainly in terms of English opinion, but what has been said is true in varying degrees of every country in Europe, and also of America, in so far as the New World has been touched by the influences of the Old. It is this that explains the universal sympathy awakened by the allied cause in all socialist and liberal circles in neutral countries. We have been proud of this, and many might point to it to-day to disprove the strictures passed on allied statesmen and thinkers. But, in reality, it is this fact that constitutes Europe's worst danger. The dissatisfaction of the seekers, the revolt of the rebels, is as much against Branting as against the Council of Four at Paris. Nowhere is confusion of thought in regard to the growingschism between nationalism and social revolution more common than among orthodox socialists. In the debate on the

draft treaty with Austria in the Parliament at Vienna, on June 7th last, the leader of the Social Democratic Union urged the entry of Austria into the German Federation, "so that, when the unity of the German proletariat has been promptly re-established, the complete unity of the German *cadre* of the international revolutionary proletarian army may be established by union with Germany." No such mixture of nationalism with the social revolution is in the mind of the rebels, nor will it carry conviction to the seekers. Over the whole European and American field it is difficult to sketch the transition from the seekers to the rebels, nor is that transition yet completed. It still lies within our power, within the power of a League of Nations rightly conceived and faithfully constructed, to arrest disillusionment and to turn the aspirations of the seekers into new channels. It is still within the power of those other influences, of which we shall attempt to speak at the close of this essay, to offer satisfaction and fulfilment where governments and leagues of governments can only preach labour and patience. But in this task we cannot put our trust in any of those political formulæ by which we succeeded in capturing "democratic" feeling in all countries during the war. We must realise that, in the later stages of the war and in the making of peace, we lost that leadership, not so much because we became unfaithful to our professions, as because the seekers came to recognise them as inadequate, if not positively barren. To-day, in so far as

we are able to present our peace treaties and our peace policy—and even their harshest features, including the reparation provisions, are capable of being so presented—to the judgment of the world in terms of plain morality, however primitive, however elementary, the seekers will understand our language and respect our motives ; but they have long ceased to understand or respond to the phraseology of political doctrines.

Probably the immediate dangers with which national governments are contending at this moment are only the first waves of the inundation. Strong government and united action may suffice to dam them for the moment. It has already been sufficiently proved that adequate food supplies will check the movement of revolt for a time, and many observers have inferred that Bolshevism is but an incidental disease caused by natural shortage and the blockade. But the last two years in Russia have revealed in practice what the diagnosis in these pages would have led us to expect in theory—that there is in a half-accomplished social revolution, however wild its policy may seem, and however intolerable the conditions of its rule, a vitality which is only too apt to cheat the confident calculations of the orthodox. The separate policy of national governments, each within its own frontiers, however advanced and however enlightened, can never, taken singly, extinguish or even damp the flame that smoulders throughout Christendom. Mere social reform, even though it were sponsored

by the League itself, can only postpone the issue. If we do not want, in Mrs. Browning's words, a "popular passion to arise and crush," we must create "a popular conscience which may *covenant for what it knows.*"

III.—THE LEAGUE

“Growing unto composition and agreement amongst themselves.”—*Hooker*.

CHAPTER V

THE POLICY OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES

“ Since, therefore, our former oppressions and not-yet-ended troubles have been occasioned either by want of frequent . . . meetings in council, or by the undue or unequal constitution thereof, or by rendering those meetings ineffective, we are fully agreed and resolved, God willing, to provide, that hereafter our Representatives be neither left to an uncertainty for times nor be unequally constituted, nor made useless to the ends for which they are intended.”—*The Agreement of the People*, 1649.

THE last two chapters have been occupied by a survey such as millions of men and women have been making during the last few months. The Treaty of Peace satisfies no one. Even those who have neither special knowledge nor a special axe to grind, who have no particular charge to bring against the settlement and no party end to gain by discrediting it, are vaguely disappointed and disillusioned. We have seen to what extent this instinct is justified. If this was a war for national security and a stable balance of power, it has failed, for it has impoverished Western Europe and disintegrated Central and Eastern Europe and Western Asia. If it was a war to make the world safe for democracy, it has failed, for the old ideas of

constitutional democracy were never further from satisfying the desires of the peoples. If, finally, it was a war to end war, it has left the future of the world more uncertain and more contentious than at any period since the Reformation.

In the course of our survey we have, however, seen some reason to regard these tests of success or failure as misleading. We need to free ourselves from some of the easy assumptions current during the war, and to revise our whole conception of the times in which we live. Especially, perhaps, the "Armageddon" idea has vitiated our outlook. The eruption that overwhelmed the old Europe five years ago was not fortuitous, the sinister work of a few junkers, emperors, soldiers, and diplomatists. Our world was not, to any but the most superficial eye, in "wantonness o'erthrown." Our civilisation must have suffered from deep-rooted evils, must have been tainted by secret vices, must in fundamental ways have been misdirected and wrong. Had we any right to assume that we could round off this half-decade into a separate era of time, or expect that the labour and sufferings concentrated in it would receive an immediate compensation, would achieve an immediate and final transformation in the destinies of the race? What superstition prompted us to conjure up out of the collapse of European civilisation the image of a crowning victory for liberty and right? And has there not been an almost barbaric flavour in many of the most emotional appeals that have been made since 1914 to popular

enthusiasm and idealism? Could any worse wrong be done to those who have given their lives for their country than to imagine that the sins of civilisation can be expiated by a heathen belief in the magic efficacy of blood? Our leaders and teachers have, perhaps, only their own words to thank if critics complain that the Peace Conference showed a spirit too little worthy of the fallen; but in such criticism is there not a nightmare echo of savage clamour against the medicine-man whose "sacrifices" have failed to bring rain or good hunting? Could we expect more from the Conference at Paris than the first faltering steps to relay the foundations of a European order; could we expect that order to emerge from chaos strong, complete, obviously just, and purged from all taint of self-seeking?

The plain truth is that the sacrifices of war were only the first stage in an era of sacrifice. War of itself accomplishes nothing. Lincoln understood this fifty years ago when he offered his hearers no comfortable assurance that the dead of Gettysburg had not died in vain, but bade them, instead, "highly resolve" that this should not be so. There is no rest for the generation that won the war: a vista of toil and self-abnegation lies before it. The fruit of the war lies not within the paper covers of the Peace Treaty, but in the present life of the nations. It is for us to develop that life. It will only be after many years that we can look back and judge whether a worthy monument has been built to the fallen.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was born of some such insight as this among a few of the leaders at Paris. There were two alternatives before them—either to create a half-legalist, half-militarist system of compulsory arbitration and international police armament, or to perpetuate, in new soil and so far as possible in a new atmosphere, the natural growth of international co-operation and consultation as represented in the Paris Conference itself. The first alternative was probably far the most popular and the most widely advertised, but its rejection was the greatest, perhaps the only great, stroke of statesmanship achieved by British and American influence at Paris. Such a scheme would have been both a political blunder and a moral crime. Politically it would have been artificial and rigid. The German draft constitution of the League was cast in this mould, and a study of it shows clearly that such a scheme could only be worked out in practice at the cost of endless interference in the domestic affairs of the members of the League, and by the multiplication of separate authorities, each responsible for some different task of arbitration, mediation, conciliation, or execution, and each working in its own water-tight compartment without co-ordinating centre or common life. The political experience of all ages teaches that such machine-made systems of government merely stop up the safety-valves of life and progress; they may prevent war, but they provoke revolution. And, morally, any such attempt would have but perpetuated the delusions and superstitions which

perverted so much of our war propaganda. It would have been a sham monument to a victory not yet won, built to please those who demanded a peace served to them ready-made. It was not the business of the Conference to enshrine perpetual peace in a temple of super-national government ; it was their business to make the new Europe, stumbling half formed out of the ruins of a corrupt civilisation, with its novel frontiers, its sudden fissures in the accustomed life of the continent, its inherited animosities and its burdens of poverty and debt, a workable system, a peaceable family of states, a progressive society. Its dominant need was cohesion, co-operation, reasonable deliberation, and recognised opportunities for agreed action. We are bound, indeed, to remember the deeper needs and aspirations which clamour for satisfaction, but while with David we pray for the peace of Jerusalem, we can recognise with him, if only as an elementary lesson in political wisdom, that it is not for us yet to build a temple "exceeding magnificent," and that perhaps the most we can do is to gather silver and gold and shittim wood for the service of our sons. For the moment at least the question for us is not whether we can constitute the parliament of man and the federation of the world, but whether we can steer the nations of the new Europe, with all their inexperience and their youthful ambitions and rivalries, through the shoals of jealousy and competition on which the old Europe, despite its accumulated inheritance of political wisdom

and organising power, suffered so dismal a shipwreck.

The choice thus made has been often justified by pointing out that the nations are not yet ready for for any far-reaching delegation of their sovereignty to an international council, that Great Powers like Italy are still wedded to old ideas of competitive statecraft, that small states like Rumania still resent any interference with the treatment they accord to national minorities within their frontiers, and, above all, that the peoples themselves are still far from ready to confide their lives and interests to the keeping of an international authority in which their own government might have only a minority voice. All this is true, but it is not so often realised that any highly-developed international system, with a carefully elaborated constitution, would, if established at this moment, collide with radical aspirations no less violently than with conservative prejudices. An international parliament could only be set up by stretching still further the already overstrained principle of "representative" democracy. An international judiciary could only increase the supremacy of "judge-made law" against which popular revolt has long been growing, especially in America. We have indeed been witnessing recently the curious spectacle of extreme radicalism demanding the full and complete translation to the international sphere of constitutional principles already half discredited with advanced thought in the sphere of national government. Caution counsels us not to shock conservative sentiment

by doing violence to national sovereignty and national patriotism ; but wisdom demands even more urgently that we should not block the progress of the future with the battered and crumbling institutions of the past.

The first step in the salvation of the new Europe lay perforce in accustoming the nations to co-operation in fields where the need for joint action is already recognised. " International co-operation " was designedly put first in the preamble of the Covenant as the principal purpose of the League. The policy of joint responsibilities had already gained wide currency in the quarter of a century preceding the war, but for two reasons it had failed hitherto to be recognised as the central fact in international relations. In the first place, the very factors which made that policy necessary made it difficult to realise it in practice. Ever since the industrial revolution, two divergent tendencies had been visible in the family of nations. On the one hand nations had become to an enormous extent economically interdependent. On the other hand new economic problems had forced each government to enlarge its sphere of control over national life, and had thus intensified the self-consciousness and independence of each separate state. Divergent industrial and social legislation thus created, on the one hand, a growing need for new international adjustments, for a common clearing house of non-contentious business ; while, on the other hand, such legislation tended constantly to outstrip the working of any such clearing house. The

Social Democratic parties, with all their desire for international action, were continually pressing for national legislation, which tended to make such action more difficult. They could only work out their theories in immediate practice through the instrumentality of the national state, and every step in the direction of national socialism strengthened the tendency towards international individualism. In the second place the nations had no sufficient regular machinery for doing business with each other. They might reach agreements, but, broadly speaking, the only means they had for carrying them out was an old diplomatic system dating back in its origin to the sixteenth century, to the new developments in international relations following on the Reformation. This point is of extraordinary importance, and requires to be examined at some length.

Diplomacy is the method of adjusting relations between political communities acting, and desiring to act, independently of each other. Between such communities there is no bond of duty or recognised obligation. In Christendom the rules of morality and fair dealing have indeed always applied to diplomatic relations in a far greater degree than is popularly supposed. International diplomacy has never meant moral anarchy, but in the days when the diplomatic system grew up there was a complete absence of law or continuity in the intercourse between states. Even treaties were rare, and were concluded only for the purpose of dealing with temporary emergencies. The whole work

of diplomacy consisted in watching the development of foreign states, maintaining friendly relations with their rulers, and steering their policy by conversations, appeals to reason and self-interest, cajolery, threats or bargains of mutual advantage. By the end of the eighteenth century this loose system of relations was already hardening on clearer and more definite lines, and the nineteenth century has enormously accentuated this process. International intercourse has now become almost as much a matter of business administration as the relations between municipalities or commercial firms. Yet, in spite of this, the old diplomatic machinery has remained almost unchanged. It was regulated and endowed with a sort of red-tape recognition by the Congress of Vienna, which lifted it out of the free-lance stage of development into a more stable and recognised position as the universal medium of international intercourse. The telegraph modified its work considerably. The creation in democratic states of civil service systems and in autocratic states of more highly specialised bureaucracies greatly improved its efficiency, until, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was perhaps progressing towards something like the same standard as other government services. But in its essence it remained unchanged. Its mere mechanical defects were enormous. Diplomatic staffs were small; they were still the "official family" of the ambassador rather than his business organisation; clerical assistance, office accommodation and libraries of reference were

alike lacking. But to these mechanical defects were added a traditional atmosphere of etiquette which, even in supposedly "democratic" countries such as the United States, introduced the maximum of difficulty and artificiality into international relations. It was not, as is often supposed, that social etiquette forced diplomats to waste their time at Court functions; it was rather that official tradition put the diplomatist in the position of an honoured guest who must not appear too interested in his host's family life or business activities. He had no regular and recognised means of access to proper sources of information; for him to declare himself frankly an investigator of the burning questions of the day was to invite suspicion and friction; he was driven to gather his facts piecemeal in the highways and by-ways of international life. Indeed, nothing could have served better to obscure the true nature of international relations and to throw obstacles in the way of the solution of international problems than the accepted rule that diplomatists must take no part in the internal affairs of the country in which they resided. Foreign policy is only the sum and product of the internal conditions of each country, and no one unacquainted with those conditions or debarred by his professional status from investigating them closely can be in any sense an expert on foreign policy. There have indeed been ambassadors who have occupied a great position in international affairs, but they have done so by disregarding this diplomatic canon, by being the intimate friends of public men

of all parties, and by exerting a friendly influence on the tendencies of their domestic policy. They were exceptional, for only men of powerful personality were able thus to disregard the law of their profession.

On diplomatic services thus ill-equipped for the requirements of modern business were thrown, moreover, additional duties and responsibilities in the original sphere of diplomacy proper. In the earlier days of diplomacy, the days, for the most part, of almost autocratic rulers and old-fashioned statecraft, diplomatists had played, in the last resort, a subordinate part in the most important matters of "high policy." It was not through ambassadors, but through personal meetings of heads of States, that Frederick the Great arranged the partition of Poland. It was not through ambassadors that Europe was settled at Vienna in 1815, at Paris in 1856, and at Berlin in 1878. It was not through ambassadors that Napoleon III dealt with Cavour at Plombières. So far, indeed, from being connected with any outworn tradition of autocracy, the importance assumed by diplomatic machinery in the years immediately before the outbreak of the Great War was probably due in large measure to the development of democracies on the English model of cabinet government and to the inclusion in the family of nations of remote states like Japan. Political responsibility thus tended to be less concentrated in one or two commanding personalities in each country, and it became impossible to gather the representatives of all civilised States for

personal meetings. Thus, between 1878 and 1914, Europe sank more and more into the habit of dealing with the vastest and most urgent questions of international relations through permanent representatives at foreign capitals, necessarily unacquainted either with the full mind of their governments at home or with the full scope of the problem with which they were dealing. There were of course some exceptions to this rule, not always of very happy augury, such as King Edward's visits to France and Germany, Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin, and M. Isvolsky's conversations at Paris and London in 1908. But when Europe met in conference to settle the burning problem of Morocco at Algeiras it did so in the persons of diplomatists, and it was not until the upheaval of the Balkan wars that the responsible statesmen of the nations themselves were convened in London in a last attempt to safeguard the peace of the world.

But meanwhile, as we have already seen, these matters of high policy—this sphere of international intercourse in which nations preserved and desired to preserve their full freedom of action—was becoming in an ever-greater degree merely one department of the world's business. A complicated treaty system had grown up, limiting the individual freedom of action of nations at all points, and there was constant pressure to expand this system. Diplomacy began more and more to be responsible for the interpretation and enforcement of recognised international obligations. This

was a work for which the whole diplomatic machinery was utterly unsuited. Its insufficiency was all the more pronounced in the large and growing field of technical business—labour legislation, tariffs, plant and animal quarantine, shipping regulation, and so forth. The business of diplomacy was now to watch the detailed operation of great administrative systems like the American Bureau of Immigration, to ascertain the development of French economic policy on the Ivory Coast, to secure the observance of complicated commercial treaties, to devise means for the preservation of salmon in the Columbia river and the maintenance of water levels on the Great Lakes. For all this the diplomatic services, even of the greatest Powers, had no machinery at all. As a matter of fact, the existence of this whole range of business problems between nations has been recognised in a rudimentary way from the earliest times. Side by side with diplomatic machinery, the commercial nations had built up a consular system to protect the economic interests of their citizens. The chaos in the machinery of international intercourse before the war was perhaps due to a failure to develop this consular system quite as much as to neglect of the better known machinery of diplomacy.

It is perhaps unnecessary to enter here into any detailed description of the rudimentary attempts made by the family of nations before the war to supplement the defects of diplomacy by more regular methods of handling

international business. Lists of standing international commissions and bureaux have frequently been published in recent years, from the Universal Postal Union down to the International Statistical Institute, and students are familiar with the idea, embodied in article 24 of the Covenant, that these commissions should now be systematised under the direction of the League. The extension of such organised action during the war has also been frequently traced, from the establishment of the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement in August, 1914, down to the Supreme Economic Council at Paris during the Conference. It is beginning to be realised how strongly this line of thought has influenced the organisation of the League of Nations, how central a position in that organisation is occupied by the international Secretariat, and how much depends upon the ability of this permanent body to develop the work of the League by grouping round itself the various existing organs of joint discussion and action. What is not realised, however, is the full extent of the possibilities thus opened out. The world has undeniably been much disappointed by the form of the Covenant. Instead of a new era, critics tell us, the peoples have been offered a new bureaucracy. They desired a parliament of the nations and they have been given a close caucus of officials. What relation can devices so humdrum bear to the passionate desire of the nations for disarmament, the pacific settlement of disputes, and a final end to national self-seeking and the wars it breeds? It is

important to answer this question and to answer it right. It is quite easy to give some sort of an answer. The world is not ready, it may be said, for more ambitious schemes; it proved impossible to secure agreement at Paris on any general and drastic scheme for disarmament; the unpopularity of article 10 in the United States shows how reluctant the peoples are to accept any far-reaching obligations at the present moment; the discussions which have raged round the "disputes" articles of the Covenant have dispelled all hope that the nations would acquiesce in the principle of obligatory arbitration or would definitely renounce, in all eventualities, the right of "private" war. Much of this is true, but it is not the right answer. Officials will not regenerate us; bureaux will not give us a new spirit; even efficient international labour legislation will not bring peace to the world. Nevertheless the international Secretariat is not a *pis aller*, the last resort of statesmen who, unable to achieve anything better, have tried to hide their failure under a few fragments of internationalism. It is on the contrary the first and fundamental requisite to peace, and it is in itself, if properly developed, nothing less than a revolution in international relations.

The policy of joint responsibilities means, quite simply, that nations shall in future approach world problems from the point of view, not of self-interest, but of the general welfare. That is nothing but the elementary principle on which all moral conduct and all

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community life is based, but elementary as it is it has always defied philosophic analysis. A thousand systems have been invented to explain and enforce it, but all of them have broken down. The Greek philosophy of the State as the organic embodiment of the general welfare in which alone the individual can realise the "good life" passes through Hegel's logic to Treitschke's blasphemy and is whirled away in the smoke of the guns; the Manchester attempt to deduce harmony from the pursuit of enlightened self-interest proves itself patently false in practice. But the simple instinct of the general welfare remains. It moulds all human action and does as a matter of fact make itself felt in every international negotiation. Socialists may talk of the international proletariat; conservatives may insist on the supreme claims of patriotism and the national State; but when British working men and British diplomatists actually meet their foreign colleagues of the Internationale or the chancelleries they are alike guided by much the same rule-of-thumb instinct to reconcile national interests with international fairness and harmony. Plenty of constructive international work was being done before the war by a dozen international bodies, from the International Association for Labour Legislation at Berne to the Pan-American Conferences of the Western hemisphere. The necessity of common action between all members of the family of nations had been most fully recognised. If anyone desires to gain a skeleton idea of the extent of the treaty system built

up before the war, let him glance at the list of general treaties to which Germany is a party, revived in whole or in part by articles 282-289 and article 295 of the Treaty of Peace. Few realise how much labour had to be expended at Paris on this question of revival, or how many vital national interests were affected by this chapter of the Treaty. If the really widespread effort towards joint action, evidenced by this treaty system, did not attain greater dimensions before the war; if the spirit of common action was dampened and suppressed; the fault lay not so much in a lack of good-will as in a lack of the means to give practical effect to it. Many hard things have been said about diplomatists, and in so far as these criticisms take the form of personal attacks they are almost invariably wide of the mark; but it is true that the inadequacy of diplomatic machinery was perhaps the chief cause of international anarchy. Frustrated instincts fade or become perverted and international good-will was in fact unable to find an outlet for its energies.

The lack of sufficient machinery for international consultation reacted on national psychology in a variety of ways; but perhaps its worst effect was to cut off the civil services of the various nations from contact with each other. This may seem a startling and obscurantist statement to many believers in parliamentary democracy, but it is almost a platitude that the initiation of all legislation, of all far-reaching reforms, rests to-day increasingly with the

"bureaucracies." This is perhaps less true of the United States than of other countries, but even at Washington, and in a less degree at the State capitals, the executive departments are daily more and more taking the responsibility for formulating policy out of the hands of the legislature. This tendency is doubtless dangerous, and indeed one of the most urgent problems of the present day is the re-establishment of effective parliamentary control over the executive; but nevertheless the complexity of modern government must of necessity throw an ever increasing burden, and confer ever greater power, on the "expert" and the "efficiocrat." Without them parliaments and cabinets wander uncertainly, and in Britain at the present day the lack of clear-cut programmes, the blurred outlines of government policy, may perhaps be traced chiefly to Mr. Lloyd George's characteristic weakness in handling a large permanent civil service.

Now, hitherto, except in a few international agencies like the Postal Union, the national civil services have been almost wholly cut off from the field of international relations. The slowness of the family of nations in the past to confer about even the most technical and non-contentious matters of common interest has been quite extraordinary. There is an International Statistical Institute and an international Bureau for the publication of Customs Tariffs, yet up to now there has been so little statistical co-ordination between the governments that the German customs statistics continue

to be published in a form which makes it almost impossible to collate them with those of other nations. It is almost inconceivable that a disaster like that of the "Titanic" was needed to force a world so closely bound together by the development of international navigation to convene a conference on safety of life at sea. For many years before the war the most ordinary activities of international commerce were hampered by conflicting legislation or national practice, yet such elementary reforms as the establishment of a uniform system of bills of exchange continued to be agitated at unofficial international meetings of Chambers of Commerce and the like without visibly promoting satisfactory action by the governments concerned. No proposal for international action excites more suspicion and hostility amongst anxious defenders of national sovereignty to-day than the idea of any positive international regulation of trade practices, yet this attitude, so common among politicians, is not shared by the business men whom they desire to protect. The Sixth International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, held at Paris in June, 1919, actually proposed the establishment at Berne of an international "service for the suppression of unfair competition," and only lack of touch between the national Ministries of Commerce prevented some such proposal from maturing many years earlier. More serious still, this lack of contact between national officials has plunged every government in continual uncertainty as to its own policy, and has prompted it to assume

a guarded attitude in any "diplomatic" conversations with its neighbours. The worst negotiator, the greatest obstacle to agreement, is the man who is conscious of ignorance, be his sentiments never so liberal. The expert is the greatest steadying factor in modern government; accurate knowledge and scientifically ascertained facts constantly tend to narrow the field of debate and reduce the chances of disagreement. In the international field this factor is almost wholly lacking. Each government has its opinion, but it is nearly always a little doubtful about it. Knowing that it can do nothing without affecting its neighbours, knowing that their action might throw out its own calculations, it hesitates, conjuring up imaginary dangers and jealously anxious to preserve its freedom of action in order to meet all possible contingencies. It was on the rock of this uncertainty that the Conference at Paris split when it dealt with President Wilson's "points" of "freedom of transit" and "equality of trade conditions." No general conventions were concluded on these subjects mainly because, while the statesmen were vaguely influenced by past tariff discussions in their own countries and uncertain of the future development of such discussions, there had been no sufficient prior consultation between the experts and no mature study of facts and projects. The expert views of the British Board of Trade and the American Tariff Commission were, as a matter of fact, substantially identical, but they had never been elaborated in common.

Lack of contact between national experts has thus not merely resulted in failure to solve technical problems, but has reacted powerfully on the whole tendency of "high policy." We have already noticed in our survey of the new Europe how fatally mere defects of organisation, a mere lack of accurate information and perspective, vitiated much of the statesmanship of the Council of Four at Paris. This is but an instance of a long standing weakness. High policy has been conducted in a rarefied atmosphere, not as a residuum of unsettled problems emerging out of the current business of established administrative departments and referred by them for solution to the heads of governments—the leaders of peoples—but as a specialised department of government, surrounded with much parade of inner knowledge, but in reality conducted in an amateur and unscientific spirit quite foreign to the conditions of the modern world.

This probably, not less than the peculiar vices of autocratic government in Central and Eastern Europe, is the true explanation of the non-moral or immoral attitude towards inter-state relations which brought about the late war. The members of the family of nations will try to get the better of each other in handling any particular problem so long as the conditions of that problem and the facts out of which it arises are not dispassionately investigated and clearly presented. It may be surmised that there existed among German officials, whose life work was devoted to the regulation of

social problems such as workman's insurance and labour exchanges, and to the development of efficient municipal administration, as great a reluctance to plunge their country into war for "reasons of State" and as great a sense of the frivolity of such a policy in relation to the true economic interests of Germany as existed among the peoples of Great Britain or France. There certainly existed among British diplomatists a regret, verging on despair, that it was impossible to link their labours with the policy of their government as a whole. International politics had, in fact, been removed from the sphere of interest of the great bulk of statesmen and officials responsible for the welfare of each nation. It had become almost impossible to bring to bear upon them the administrative knowledge and talents of the national civil services. Foreign policy was, indeed, not even a department of government; it remained the speciality of individual statesmen—a hobby, a mania, or a crushing responsibility according to the temperament of each. Just as it needed a civil war in England to bring the Tudor and Stuart system of bureaucratic taxation into the field of interest of the average citizen, so it has taken a universal war to awaken nations to a sense of the logical connection between their normal unconsidered business activities—the system of government under which they live, the administration they obey, the laws for which they vote—and the obscure labours of the diplomatic chancelleries.

It is to remedy these conditions that the

proper organisation of the Secretariat of the League is the most pressing task before practical statesmen to-day. In order to realise a policy of joint responsibilities for which the family of nations has in reality long been ready, we have to provide extensive and varied machinery for dealing continuously with the standing common interests of nations; we have to establish special, but equally recognised and regular, methods of dealing with matters of difficulty or danger—that is with “high policy”—which the ordinary business machinery may fail to settle; and we have to bring these two branches of international affairs into organic relation with each other, making the heads of States, who can alone solve the problems of “high policy,” responsible also through a permanent central Secretariat for the current non-contentious work of international adjustment, and utilising, in return, the educated public opinion, the accrued good-will, born of normal international labours, to elucidate, soften and solve dangerous problems emerging for special consideration. It is by organisation on these lines that bodies like the Allied Maritime Transport Council have marked out the lines of future international action. This Council has worked well, because it was staffed, not by diplomatists, but by officials drawn from the appropriate administrative services of each of the countries concerned. Officials of the British Ministry of Shipping have, in this way, been in daily touch with the most delicate and important international questions, and they have solved

those questions by applying to them, not the vague and general good-will by which diplomats commonly arrive at a compromise, but the actual technical knowledge which the administrative services of all nations have in common, and from which the officials of those services, no matter what their nationality, are accustomed by their daily work to draw certain inevitable conclusions. And these bodies, created during the war, are not merely instances of the reference to technical experts of difficult international problems; they are also examples of the way in which such technical work can be, and must be, brought into organic relation with the solution of the problems of high policy. The work of the International Secretariat of the Allied Maritime Transport Council constantly threw up a residuum of difficult problems of high policy, which it was itself unable to solve; but this Secretariat was under the authority and direction of a Council composed of the responsible Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy and personal representatives of the responsible Cabinet officers of the United States. These men kept a constant eye on the work of the Secretariat and they held periodical personal meetings in London, Paris or Rome, at which they discussed the solution of the residual problems of high policy. The solution of these residual problems was found to be easy, thanks no doubt largely to the urgent pressure of the dangers of war, but thanks also in great degree to the fact that any problems presented to the Council for

solution had already behind them as precedents a series of minor decisions based on imperative technical considerations which indicated, if they did not actually determine, the decisions of the Council. The Council was, in short, called upon, not to arrive at theoretic rulings on rival national claims, in the manner of the old diplomacy, but to do what was necessary to enable a piece of machinery to run on smoothly and efficiently.

This is indeed a type of the whole play of international relations. Fundamentally the residuum of unsettled problems which the nations have to solve by special methods of conference between states in order to forestall disputes or prevent disputes growing into war, is of the same nature, and has the same origin, as the vast bulk of non-contentious international business which the League will be discharging on behalf of the peoples of the world day by day and month by month. Conflicts of policy are either the product of frivolous or misconceived ambitions, in which case mere discussion will expose and mere exposure solve them, or they arise out of divergent conceptions of human welfare and government, divergent readings of economic or social science, divergent geographic, climatic or racial conditions, already necessarily expressed in divergent legislation and administration. All men agree that conflicts of laws between states bound by close economic ties require scientific adjustment, and in the long run to solve the conflict of laws is to solve the conflict of policy. It is because this

connection between law and policy has never, as it were, been embodied in any permanent constitutional machinery, because international policy has been removed by convention from the sphere of interest of the average citizen who spends his whole life in making, criticising and obeying national laws, that not only the average citizen, but the official, who is only the average citizen in disguise, has failed to grasp the connection between his own activities, his own social and political conditions, his own ideals of state education and social reform, and the great problems of foreign policy dealt with by his government. This is the fundamental cause of our calamities and only clear understanding is needed for its reform.

The attitude of the United States towards the Turkish problem may be cited as a concrete instance. Simultaneously with the birth of the Monroe Doctrine the United States refused to recognise the belligerency of Greece in its rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. This refusal was not given thoughtlessly but after long deliberation and difference of opinion among President Monroe's advisers. But the refusal once given determined not only the official attitude of the United States Government in Eastern Europe but also the attitude of American public opinion. The intervention of the United States in Balkan or Asiatic politics was, five years ago, inconceivable to any citizen of the United States. It was assumed that "America had no responsibilities in Europe."

Yet five years ago the American people

had nevertheless deeply committed themselves in the affairs of the Near East. Americans had founded Robert College at Constantinople and that college had given education and training in political ideas to most of the statesmen of Bulgaria. It has indeed been said that the first Principal of Robert College was the maker of modern Bulgaria. American missionaries had performed much the same work of educational leadership in Syria through the American college at Beirut. Moreover, American influence had permeated the Balkans through the unnoticed and unconsidered flow of Balkan migration to and from the United States, and Americans were proud of this fact in so far as they understood it. The city set upon the hill of American democracy could not, they said, be hid; American enlightenment was inevitably the property of the world. The future historian alone will be able to disentangle the threads of Balkan development and judge how far this American influence has been responsible for the developments which have shaken Europe to its foundations, but it is not difficult to detect the fallacy of an attitude which could deny the collective responsibility of the American people, as expressed in its government, for the welfare of the Balkan peoples, while applauding the activities of American educationalists and missionaries and boasting of the power of American democratic propaganda.

Now, any permanent machinery for adjusting common problems could hardly have failed

to expose this fallacy. Immigration, for example, is one of the problems of first class importance to humanity at large which have increasingly been dealt with by individual states without any adequate machinery of common consultation. The most acute phase of this problem is, of course, that of Oriental immigration into Canada, the United States and Australia, and it is the fear of throwing this particular phase into the arena of regular international discussion—the just desire of each Western state to reserve to itself complete freedom of action to protect its people from dangerous racial and social complications—that has in great measure prevented the establishment of international machinery to study other aspects of the problem. It has been largely forgotten that, quite apart from the question of Oriental immigration, the whole question of popular migrations is one that increasingly needs scientific treatment and international adjustment. The working of the American immigration laws is a striking example of the unscientific way in which great international problems have been necessarily treated in the past. The rejection of immigrants after arrival, in spite of all the earnest efforts of the American authorities to mitigate individual hardships, has inevitably inflicted untold sufferings on thousands of friendless families. The imposition on foreign steamship companies of the responsibility of selecting immigrants, on pain of having to retransport them to Europe, encouraged the establishment of an

elaborate system of "control stations" which was worked by German shipping lines for their own commercial ends. It would be almost true to say that the most acute of all the social problems of Central and Eastern Europe was thus delivered over to the power of private corporations who had no responsibility for or control over the social conditions which created the problem and whose only business was to collect the largest possible number of immigrants who could be got past the inspectors at Ellis Island. One of the most urgent needs of the world to-day—a need already acutely realised within the British Commonwealth—is a central bureau, exercising, indeed, no administrative functions and no powers of interference with the sovereignty of individual states, but charged with the whole study of the movements of peoples, their nature, their causes and their effects. It may be surmised that any such bureau would have done much to bring to light before the war facts well known to everyone acquainted with Balkan countries—the regular return of temporary emigrants to their homes and the effects produced upon them by American education and American industrial conditions. Here again, what is needed is to bring into contact with foreign affairs, not only the public opinion of the various nations, but also their administrative officials. It is the United States Commissioner of Immigration who should know and deal with Europe; it is the European officials responsible for internal social conditions

in their countries who should know and deal with the United States; these vital matters cannot be left to chance correspondence through diplomatic post offices.

Perhaps the connection between these facts and the problem of the Near East may seem remote. It is easier to recognise the effects which might have been produced by the existence of international organs on more direct American educational propaganda. Education has in civilised States passed increasingly under control of the governments. Some realisation of the conflict of educational systems and ideas in civilised States and their effect on the less developed regions of the world has led in recent years, largely under American inspiration, to a movement for co-operation between missionary and similar educational institutions working in remote countries. The establishment of joint boards of Protestant missions both in England and the United States and the summoning of the Missionary Conference at Edinburgh four years before the war were signs of this movement. It has never been sufficiently recognised that this movement was not solely, or perhaps, under modern conditions, even chiefly, concerned with religious teaching, but closely affected the whole reaction of civilised systems of education on backward peoples. Unfortunately the governments have hitherto taken little part in this movement, in spite of their responsibility for education, though recently international conferences of an official character have been set on foot in

regard to other matters falling within the sphere of the educational authorities, such, especially, as child welfare and hygiene; yet the need for inter-government conferences on educational standards and methods is daily becoming more evident. No permanent settlement of the African problem or of the very different problem of the Middle East—no settlement, indeed, of the conflict of national ideas and social conceptions between civilised peoples—can be hoped for unless the civilised governments of the world, who are responsible for the education of their citizens, establish common machinery for adjusting in some measure their educational systems, for considering even such matters as school curricula and textbooks, and, above all, for co-ordinating the effect of these systems upon more backward peoples. If any such machinery had been in continuous operation before the war, it could not have failed to have brought home to civilised nations their actual responsibility in such matters, and would surely have facilitated a consideration of Eastern problems from a fresh point of view. It would have thrown into strong light the ineffectiveness and the dangers of “cultural competition”—the efforts of Germany to gain control of Jewish schools in Palestine, the jealous pride of France in the very real contributions made by her to education in certain regions of the Levant, the aspiration of American missionaries to introduce newer and saner ideas of education into the sectarian and racial confusion of these lost lands of ancient

Christendom—and might have done much to replace this competition by a new sense of common responsibility.

Such, perhaps, might have been the effect on the Turkish problem of the very ordinary business machinery which should centre round the Secretariat of the League. But the services which such machinery can render to the peace of the world can be far more clearly seen in connection with the German problem before the war. The Germany we know to-day, the Germany which has plunged the world into chaos, was the product not of obscure constitutional evils so much as of a whole social system based upon the power of the State, which was thus able to mould the whole social outlook of its people. The forces which made Germany what she is were embodied in economic and social legislation and in the working of a comprehensive system of industry, trade and finance, assisted and regulated at all points by the State. German industrial conditions and German trade methods were the great factors in international life before the war, but the only machinery which existed for dealing with their effects upon the outside world were the international Socialist and Trade Union movements on the one hand, and the activities of international combines of employers and producers on the other. German policy was revealed and recognised in the meetings of the Socialist Internationale and of German, English and French business men in such organisations as the Transatlantic Passenger Conferences, far more than

in negotiations between diplomatists. Fundamentally European and even American domestic social policy and trade activities were being profoundly disturbed and influenced by the existence in the midst of Europe of a State system far more scientifically designed and worked out to its logical conclusion than any developed in other civilised countries. Although German agrarian, industrial and commercial legislation and administration were the subject of innumerable investigations and weighty reports by private individuals and public officials in all other European countries, yet fundamentally, nevertheless, the whole German system worked as it were in a vacuum, and was never brought into close and continuous relation with the corresponding activities of other States. Since the outbreak of war the public discussion in Germany of the idea of Mittel-Europa has brought into the full glare of publicity the frivolity of the whole Bagdad railway policy in relation to German economic needs. The existence of common organs of discussion, deliberation and study in regard to industrial and economic legislation could hardly have failed to hasten this revelation many years before the war, and German strategists would then have lost much of that vague and muddle-headed support which has found expression since the war in the works of such men as Friedrich Naumann.

It is in some such way that the nations must in future deal with their recognised common interests if they are to be able, when occasion

arises, to deal with their differences and disputes; it is in some such way that they must be brought to recognise the inevitable reaction upon other countries of their laws, their forms of government, and their social systems; and it is some such way that the citizens of the civilised world must be made to understand that their responsibilities as trustees for less developed peoples follow their trade and educational propaganda as inevitably as the British and American peoples now recognise that British and American ideas of government and principles of justice must follow the British and American flags.

Such were the conditions of the old Europe, and such must inevitably be the conditions of the new. It is the chief virtue of the Treaty of Peace that it recognises this. In a sense, the strength of the Treaty lies in its weakest parts—in those provisions which are the least workable in practice. No settlement between Poland, Germany, Lithuania, and the Baltic Provinces could be satisfactory; any attempt to round off frontiers and distribute populations with an equal eye to national claims, economic needs, and geographical symmetry in these, the ancient debatable lands of Eastern Christendom, could only have resulted in the perpetuation of grievances and the creation of new irredenta. By the severance of East Prussia from the body of Germany, by the establishment of the Free State of Danzig, and by the provision for a plebiscite of certain populations on the right bank of the Lower Vistula, the Conference has

produced a settlement equally distasteful to Poles and Germans. In order that neither State might enjoy undue advantages, each is subjected to undue disadvantages. Much the same is true of Memel, held in pledge by the Allies for the benefit of the Lithuanian people, whose future is uncertain. But these apparent blunders have this great virtue, that, while future frictions and dangerous problems could not be avoided, the Conference, unlike so many international Congresses in the past, has not loftily decreed that they no longer exist, bidding the nations ignore them, and leaving them vaguely in the void, poisoning the international atmosphere. Instead, it has concentrated them in certain definite administrative tasks, confided to the League of Nations: the task of governing the Free City of Danzig, the task, under article 98, of guaranteeing freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia on the one hand, and between Poland and Danzig on the other by definite treaty obligations, and the task, which must assuredly fall to the League, though not actually entrusted to it by article 99, of disposing of Memel under similar safeguards and limitations.

This same method of focusing big international problems in concrete administrative tasks of limited scope has been followed in many other cases where the settlement created by the Treaty is obviously weak and dangerous. We have already touched on the defects of the "national" principle. We have seen that,

apart from the deliberate crimes against that principle in the Tyrol and elsewhere, it has proved impossible to avoid the creation of composite states. Where this evil is greatest, the Conference has recognised it, and has, as it were, pegged it down by treaty provisions which form terms of reference for the administrative action of the League. Thus, in the treaties with Germany, Poland and Austria certain rights are guaranteed to national minorities, not as in the Treaty of Berlin, in general terms, but specifically. The field is, on the whole, narrowed, but it is more clearly defined. The same policy should be followed in drafting the terms of the colonial mandates. The League should not fall into the errors of the Berlin and Brussels Acts by drawing up general declarations of the high aims of civilised nations in their colonial dependencies. Expert administrative study is impossible in an atmosphere of cant. The obligations assumed towards the League by small states of mixed nationality or by mandatories in the Near East or in Africa should be of such a nature that their violation or observance will be susceptible of exact verification by the Commission on Mandates, or by any commission established to safeguard the rights of minorities in Europe. They must not be such as to facilitate or justify constant interference with the sovereignty of individual states on so-called "broad grounds of policy." "Policy" in such cases is too often the diplomatic cant for theoretic opinions formed in a vacuum where facts are lacking and expert

study is impossible. The League must also resist the temptation to convert any of these obligations into "general principles," and must be bold enough to ignore those logicians who urge that it is unjust to limit the action of Poland in regard to the Jews, while we leave unfettered the action of Belgium in regard to the Flemings. Certainly, the action of the Conference in such matters has often been unfair and determined by considerations of power rather than of just necessity. It is probably quite as necessary to limit Italian freedom of action in the German Tyrol as to limit Rumanian freedom of action in Transylvania or Polish freedom of action in regard to her German population. But it is much more important to give the League definite functions in a narrow sphere, to furnish a new grist of facts to the diplomatic mill, than to enunciate general principles applicable to all nations but applied to none.

Above all, the blunders of the Conference have been turned, almost unintentionally, to virtues in certain parts of the economic sphere. The final reply of the Allies to the German delegation at Versailles did much to redeem the economic clauses of the Treaty and the clauses dealing with ports and waterways from the condemnation they had seemed to deserve. These clauses, as originally drafted, already contained the germ of new policies; the discriminatory disabilities under which Germany was placed were, in most cases, avowedly temporary; after five years their continuation was

to be subject to the judgment of the Council of the League ; a general convention on freedom of transit was explicitly foreshadowed by articles 338 and 379, while under articles 376-378 the League was granted large powers of revision over the administrative régime of waterways set up by the Treaty. The Allies' reply brought these promises into the forefront of the Treaty. Article 23 of the Covenant, with its forecast of agreements to secure equitable trade conditions and freedom of transit, is declared emphatically to embody the active policy of the League ; Germany's accession to the League is to be the signal for the reconsideration and modification of these clauses of the Treaty ; and the whole commercial problem is thus brought into something like the same organic relation with the League as is the labour problem by Chapter XIII of the Treaty. To a great extent, the League will stand or fall by its ability to exploit the opportunity thus given it. If it merely allows Germany to regain her freedom of action after five years it will have failed, in one great essential at least, to bring into being a policy of joint responsibilities. If, on the other hand, it is able to convert some of the obligations now imposed on Germany into general obligations freely entered into by all its members, it will have taken a long step towards the practical realisation of such a policy. Article 164 of the Treaty, coupled with article 8 of the Covenant, gives the League a similar opportunity in regard to armaments ; while article 289 brings it into direct touch with the

whole question of the revival of international treaties, the reconstruction of the "conventional system" under which the family of nations has lived in the past. In all these matters its success depends, not on the ability of statesmen to excogitate policy, nor even on the pressure of popular demands upon those statesmen, but mainly on the extent to which the expert organs of the League, such as the Military Commission established by article 9 of the Covenant, and the Transit Commission set up to elaborate the general convention and to co-ordinate the work of the various waterways commissions established by the Treaty, can collect facts, survey the actual interests of the various members of the family of nations, and submit detailed recommendations based on study and experience.

If there is any force in the line of reasoning followed in these rough notes, it throws the very gravest responsibility on Britain and the United States. We in Britain have been so proud of our civil service that we tend to forget its youth. Americans are so accustomed to look on it with envious eyes and strive to imitate it, that they have come to regard it as a peculiar British creation. But, though the British civil service is hardly more than half a century old, and though the United States, and, still more, the Dominions, have as yet nothing to compare with it as an established institution, the traditions and national characteristics that have created it have a long and brilliant history, and are the equal heritage

of the two great branches of the English-speaking race. The instinct for the public service is common to both, and it marks them out from all other nations. The French and Italian administrative services are notoriously weak. Apart from undue political influences and jobbery, French methods of education tend to develop the faculty of thesis-writing and to discourage laborious accuracy in the ascertainment of facts. Logic, clarity, and brilliance are obtained at the expense of detailed knowledge. Policies flourish but administration lacks decision and continuity. The German service, on the other hand, with all its efficiency, and in spite of the fact that it has, perhaps, a longer record of continuous organised existence than the British, has been too much an expert caste, aloof from the play of public opinion and desires, intent on the public weal but serving, not the public, but an imperial government. It is only the British service that, in some degree, though all too imperfectly, combines a professional devotion to facts and the solemn sense of responsibility which such devotion brings, with a sympathy and a sense of proportion born of the consciousness that life is after all more important than scientific facts and human nature than anatomy. The United States, on its part, will do well not to follow any British model too exactly, for the very absence of a highly-organised American civil service during the last twenty years, when political thought and investigation have been developing so rapidly, has, perhaps, given her

an opportunity to make her own original contribution towards the solution of administrative problems. The war revealed how large a fund of varied and expert administrative knowledge was at the disposal of the United States in her universities and her commercial community. The lack of any strong nucleus of civil servants led, indeed, to serious confusion and waste of time at Washington in 1917, but during the last year of the war and during the armistice period her administrative action has, in many respects, been fresher, more energetic, and more expert than our own. And, in spite of grave blunders and some suspicion of corruption in one or two instances, the heterogeneous administration which she built up has been inspired and steadied by the same peculiar instinct for the public service, the same sense of responsibility, and the same sense of proportion.

It rests, then, especially with Britain and America to guide the development of the new international bureaucracy, to safeguard it alike from narrowness and pedantry and from that superficial policy-mongering which has been the besetting sin of diplomacy in the past. They can only do this by maintaining and developing the high standard of their own administration, for they can give the world nothing that they themselves do not possess within their own frontiers. For us in Britain the whole reasoning of this chapter leads to one main conclusion: that in this era of reconstruction we must devote attention, almost before all other things, to the

machinery of our administration. We are faced by this grave fact, that never, perhaps, has Britain been less ready to give a sure and decided lead to the world in the administrative field. Our administration has, of necessity, been swollen and diluted during the war, till it has lost much of its distinctive spirit, but even before 1914 the rapid expansion of government action in the sphere of social reform had outstripped the organised development of our civil service. There has long been a growing impatience in England with the slow movement and humdrum outlook of permanent officials, and we have for many years lacked the administrative statesmanship which might have given proper expression to this impatience by a detailed and progressive reform of the machinery of government. To-day this impatience has grown to formidable dimensions. It is not only that, in time of war, administration comes to occupy almost the whole stage of government, so that the efficiency of the public services comes to be the main political question of the hour. This accounts, indeed, for the extent to which public attention and criticism have been concentrated during the last five years on the administrative services rather than on the policy of the Cabinet; it explains the process by which "Dilly" and "Dally" have come to be national figures. But to this is now added the fact that the civil service has become the emblem of an acute political controversy. "Nationalisation" has brought it into the foreground of political debate. The Fabians

are obliged to base their whole case, if not on its present, at least on its potential efficiency; while the opponents of nationalisation tend, absurdly enough, to regard it with suspicion as the weapon of the Webbs and the darling of Mr. Smillie. So long as we in Britain have no clear idea how and within what limits to apply administrative talent to our own domestic problems, we can never guide the nations in its application to international affairs.

Indeed, in this as in all other matters, the success of the League depends in a quite extraordinary degree on British internal policy. An example of this may be found in the wide range of economic problems which the depletion of the world's resources in production, means of transport and machinery of exchange has forced upon our attention. About the time of the armistice the bulk of expert opinion in England favoured a continuance of government action over the whole of this field, and many schemes of international action were sketched out for this purpose. A number of these schemes were surveyed by Mr. Garvin in his "Economic Foundations of Peace," and that book deserves close study as representing, in many respects, the extreme view of those who, at that time, believed in the possibility of solving the world's economic problems by careful administrative control. We have already seen how these schemes were side-tracked by American opposition and British negligence until the economic condition of Europe forced

the Allies to establish the Supreme Economic Council. While few people would now go as far as Mr. Garvin in advocating international government control, the gradual reaction of British opinion under the pressure of high prices has recently brought such schemes again to the front, and a growing realisation of the impossible position of the international exchanges is even to some extent softening American opposition to them ; but our statesmen are still anxiously watching the trend of public sentiment, torn as it is between the desire for strong government action and the hatred of government interference, and the policy upon which depends not only the prosperity of our own consumers and traders, but the welfare of Europe and the functions of the League, remains in suspense.

It is not by stumblings such as these that the policy of joint responsibilities can ever be realised by the League. There is nothing more fatal to the *moral* of an administrative service than uncertainty, chops and changes in policy, concessions to hasty press criticism, alternating with despairing attempts to keep at least a finger on the levers of government control. If it be true, as Bagehot remarked of Lord Lawrence, that "the prosperity of an Empire depends more upon the general spirit of its services than on the capacity of a few individuals in prominent places," it will be tenfold more true of the League. A League composed of wavering governments will be an even greater danger than the old diplomatic anarchy,

as the restlessness of impotent responsibility is worse than the restlessness of mere disorder. Definition, limitation, and secure continuity of work are the life-blood of administration and we must realise these conditions in Britain if we are to realise them in the League.

One further word of special warning must be added at this moment. Administrative incoherence is not only maiming our action in comparatively non-contentious international matters; it is also producing its inevitable reaction on "high policy." No steps are being taken to strengthen our diplomatic service and to bring it into organic relation with the machinery of the League. The weakness of our intelligence organisation, which so seriously affected our action at Paris, remains unremedied. In the vacuum thus produced by absence of ascertained facts and neglect of close study, a new crop of "policies" is growing up—flashy designs for "supporting Germany against Bolshevism," hanging the balance of power on the new Polish peg, creating new combinations to maintain a precarious stability. All this is policy-mongering of the most vicious kind—honest enough, no doubt, but having no firmer basis than individual sympathies, personal predilections and brilliant political guesses. Unless we understand the League aright as a definite recognition that foreign policy is an affair of exact knowledge, to be worked out by organised study of a thousand complicated factors, each touching the concrete interests

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of large populations, it can only end in lamentable failure. We shall invite a final disaster if we allow it to become the means of giving an appearance of universal sanction to a new political impressionism.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOCTRINE OF COMMONWEALTH AND UNION

“The questions that have troubled the country have been about the authority of the magistracy and the liberty of the people. It is you who have called us to this office ; but, being thus called, we have our authority from God ; it is the ordinance of God and it hath the image of God stamped upon it ; and the contempt of it has been vindicated by God with terrible examples of his vengeance. I entreat you to consider that, when you chuse magistrates, you take them from among yourselves, ‘men subject unto like passions with yourselves.’ If you see our infirmities, reflect on your own, and you will not be so severe censurers of ours. We count him a good servant who breaks not his covenant ; the covenant between us and you is the oath you have taken of us, which is to this purpose, ‘that we shall govern you, and judge your causes, according to God’s laws, and our own, according to our best skill.’ As for our skill, you must run the hazard of it ; and if there be an error, not in the will, but only in the skill, it becomes you to bear it. Nor would I have you to mistake in the point of your own liberty. There is a liberty of corrupt nature, which is affected both by men and beasts, to do what they list ; and this liberty is inconsistent with authority, impatient of all restraint ; . . . ’tis the grand enemy of truth and peace and all the ordinances of God are bent against it. But there is a civil, a moral, a federal liberty, which is the proper end and object of authority ; . . . for this liberty you are to stand with the hazard of your very lives ; and whatsoever crosses it is not authority, but a distemper thereof.’ ”—*Winthrop*.

THE argument of the last chapter has been that a family of nations groping its way out of war towards restoration and reconstruction must of necessity realise its joint responsibilities first through organised study of facts and carefully devised administrative action. We have seen some reason to believe, moreover, that such study and such action are the appropriate remedies for that fever of policy-mongering which has been too often the atmosphere of international relations in the past. But while the permanent Secretariat of the League, directed and controlled by the Council, can thus do much, it cannot touch some of the deepest ills of modern international society. Its labours will appeal strongly to statesmen, solving many of their most anxious preoccupations and perhaps satisfying many of the pressing material needs of the industrial and labouring classes whose success and livelihood depend on adjustments between the legislation and economic policy of different states, the development of common standards of life and labour, the adjustment of international demand and supply and the organisation of production, transport and marketing. The administrative task of creating a machinery of international relations which will "work," will, in short, be an inestimable boon to the new Europe; but it is in great measure irrelevant to those deeper discontents which we have roughly classed under the title of the "seekers and the rebels." So long as men have minds and imaginations they will think and dream about government as an ideal

in itself, apart from the concrete functions which it may perform, and if the old Europe, as an international society, was disturbed by competing policies, spun not from facts, but from theories of "national interest," it was also, as a group of individual national societies, compressed to the verge of explosion by a dead weight of utilitarian opportunism. Politics in each country had become more and more an affair of scientific investigation into the processes of community life and the functions of government in relation thereto. Regarding all the fundamental constitutional problems of just government as finally solved, armed from head to heel in the accepted orthodoxies of representative democracy and human progress, the leaders and thinkers of each nation had absorbed themselves wholly in statistical calculations and bureaucratic adjustments. They analysed labour and forgot the labourer; they investigated standards of living and lost sight of life; they anatomised social relations till they were no longer conscious of society. We had an increasing number of government departments, but no government.

In fact, the old question which appeals so strongly to the experienced statesman or official, the question round which so many political debates still rage, the question "will it work," hardly touches the feelings of the average man. Politicians who argue trenchantly on these lines in the House of Commons never dream of doing so on the platform. They know from everyday experience in their

constituencies that that question will rarely turn a vote ; but they do not often draw the grave conclusion that it will not stop a revolution. Mr. Chesterton has very truly remarked that when the Fabians renounced the " mere emotional attack on the cruelty of capitalism," and devoted themselves to proving that capitalism " does not work," their campaign, " while it won the educated classes, lost the populace for ever." And, while this popular temper certainly encourages an infinite amount of political dishonesty, yet in a sense it is right. It is not that the " populace " want catchwords. In the long run fine phrases sway them as little as the detailed arguments of the practical man ; the spite of the Pharisee, the hates of the rebel, the glowing promises of the mere opportunist orator, may earn their applause and their votes, but will never stir them to sustained constitutional action or to the blinder enthusiasm of revolt. The mistake of the Fabians has been, not that they eschewed rant, but that they ostentatiously disclaimed philosophy. They despised the only quality that could have given them real leadership, the quality possessed by Marx and Mazzini, and even such lesser figures as Bentham and Cobden, in their day and by Lenin in ours—the power, despite all blunders and fallacies, to focus society as a whole, to give an intelligible account of its meaning and purpose and to drive home its absolute claim upon the hearts of men. The League of Nations can win no great success unless its creators avoid a similar mistake.

It is here, in fact, that the greatest difficulties of the League arise. The Fabians have been typical of their generation. Since the political controversies of the mid-Victorian era an increasing intellectual inertia has settled down over Europe. Its full extent has been revealed by the war. It is not only statesmanship that has been barren. Among all the books, pamphlets and press articles inspired by the "pentecost of calamity," hardly one has shaken itself free from the obsessions of nineteenth century tradition. The failures of that century, the extravagance of its hopes and the fallacies of its thought were indeed obvious enough even before the war. Italy had celebrated the jubilee of her independence by the attack on Tripoli. In place of the confidence of the "Songs before Sunrise" the world had realised, with Ruskin, that there was thunder on the horizon as well as dawn. But few had the courage or the energy to re-examine the foundations of their political beliefs. The development of the idea of the League of Nations has been no exception to this rule. In the whole of the very considerable literature that has grown up round it one may look in vain for any striking originality of thought or political invention. The Covenant owes extraordinarily little to this literature. In all that is most solid and progressive in the League as now established, the debt of the statesman to the essayist is exceptionally small. The weakness of the Covenant, the weakness of the generation that gave it birth, is written in

its preamble where, except for the two words, "international co-operation," the simplest of all its eighty-three words, there is hardly a phrase that might not have been written by Grotius three hundred years ago, and certainly none that can guide the feet of men into any new way of peace.

This weakness enfeebles the Assembly and Council of the League from their birth. No one who has had practical experience of government will be inclined to attach undue importance to abstract theories as guides to statesmanship. Yet, at their weakest, doctrines of politics can give tone and temper to the rough expedients of the hour, and at their strongest they beget continuity and coherence. Some of the worst failures of policy in our own day have been due to a lack of coherent principle more than to any lack of accurate knowledge. We are familiar with the attacks made on the inadequacy of British propaganda during the war. These attacks have been fairly well justified, but the critics have largely missed the point. In nearly every case where propaganda has been inefficient, it has been because we had no policy to propagate. From the first moment of the war we have hung the allied cause on any peg that appeared convenient. Our war aims have shifted like a kaleidoscope. It is this incoherence that vitiated and still vitiates America's attitude towards Europe and British policy in Ireland. Early in the war the ascertained justice of the allied cause provided no argument for American intervention in the absence of any adequate

theory of international obligations; in 1918 the Irish Convention could hammer out no solution from the hard facts of Irish life so long as it ignored the real underlying conflict of opinion as to the sovereignty of the British Government. But the worst consequences of this incoherence have been seen in allied policy towards Bolshevism. Throughout it has allowed a logical chain of events to appear as a chapter of accidents. At nearly every point the Allies have been right and Lenin and Bela Kun have been wrong; but Lenin, with a clear purpose springing from a complete theory of society, has always had infinitely the best of the argument. His propaganda, while it has failed to undermine the patriotism of the Western peoples, has very successfully undermined the policy of their governments, for he has been able constantly to instil into Western public opinion just that drop of doubt and dissatisfaction which weakens decision and destroys continuity of action. What he has been able to do with the Allies he will be able to do with the League. The League, after it has been provided with the machinery of investigation and administration necessary to the determination of joint responsibilities, will still fail unless it is guided by some clear conception of the law of its being, the limits of its activities and the purpose of its work. From the circumstances of its origin it is peculiarly liable to be undermined by doubts on these points, as may be seen from a consideration of one of the central features of its constitution.

The poverty of European and American thought has never been more strikingly shown than in the failure of all the advocates of the League during the last few years to face the doctrine of the "equality of states." International law as it grew up after the Reformation evolved this doctrine, and publicists down to our own days have been almost content to repeat on this point the teaching of the oldest authorities. In fact, the doctrine, originally based on *a priori* reasoning, was greatly strengthened and endowed with new and passionate meaning by the nineteenth century idea of nationality. The abstract individuals of the family of nations, equal in the absence of any judge with authority to classify them or determine their worth, became in Mazzini's hands the company of God's children, each with "one line of his thought" written on its "cradle," each with "special interests, special aptitudes, and, before all, special functions, a special mission to fulfil, a special work to be done in the cause of the advancement of humanity." The dry bones of law were clothed with hopes and claims drawn from the realm of a religious faith. In such a company, who should judge between nation and nation; were there not many first that might be last and the last first?

What had the advocates of the League to set against this doctrine? Evidently, it clashed with some of the most universally accepted theories of representative democracy. To admit the equality of nations was to deny the equality of individuals—to give seven million

Belgians equal weight with one hundred million Americans in the counsels of the League. Such a *reductio ad absurdum* would be excellently calculated, in Lenin's astute hands, to discredit the League with the working classes of the world. But the advocates of the League made little attempt to face these fundamental questions. From first to last they did no more than urge considerations of expediency; pointing out the impossibility of leaving the whole direction of the League and the settlement of international disputes to a large and unwieldy body like the Assembly and demonstrating the claims of the Great Powers to a permanent seat in the inner Council, "because on them the responsibility must mainly fall in peace and war," "because their mutual confidence is the strongest guarantee of enduring co-operation," and because "large nations touch the world at many points, the smaller ones at less; thus England, France and the United States have a broader outlook than Rumania or Bolivia, which see a comparatively narrow part of the interests of mankind and have a more local vision." This is Professor Lowell's justification of article 4 of the Covenant, which he rightly calls "an ingenious compromise," and there is no fault to be found with his arguments. The constitution and powers of the Council have been fully and frankly accepted by leaders of small nations like M. Venizelos, and on the whole they have been approved by the public opinion of the world. Talk about a "new Holy Alliance" has died down. But while the

smaller nations have acquiesced in the Covenant, they have protested vehemently against the actual procedure of the Conference at Paris, the main lines of which, apart from certain gross faults of tact, the League will be forced to follow. The Council of the League will, indeed be a broader body than the Council of Four; it will have a definite sanction which the latter lacked; and it can avoid many of the errors of method into which the "Big Four" fell through lack of organisation and shortness of temper. But recent events have shown clearly that the claim to equality remains unabated, in practice as well as in theory, and the Council cannot merely bury it under "ingenious compromises" or adjourn it by tact. At every turn it lies across the path of the League. The Covenant itself bears marks of it in two places where its influence too often escapes detection. It is perhaps the chief obstacle to the establishment of an international parliament, because proportional representation of states on a basis of population is necessarily repugnant to it; and it is likewise largely responsible for the form of article 10 and for the opposition it has awakened in the United States. The real object of that article is to protect the weaker members of the family of nations, but the statement of that object would have struck a severe blow at the doctrine of equality; hence, the article appears in a form which can be construed by American critics as a pledge to defend the frontiers of India. Again, when the Polish and Austrian

treaties brought the question of national minorities into the foreground of the Conference, the smaller states rebelled against limitations of their sovereignty from which the Great Powers remained free. The doctrine of equality must forbid any assumption that certain members of the League are less well versed in the problems of just government, less expert or less liberal, than others. Similarly, in drawing up proposals for a Permanent Court of International Justice, the Council will have to face difficulties not unlike those encountered by the second Hague Conference, and it will encounter even greater obstacles when it comes to discuss plans for disarmament. The doctrine of equality will require that any such plan shall be uniform and universal, without discriminations and without consideration of the special circumstances of particular states. The special considerations recognised in the second paragraph of article 8 will thus tend to fix a minimum standard of armament instead of a maximum. Instances might be multiplied, but these may be sufficient to show that for many years to come the League will have to steer a difficult course between the Scylla of obstruction by the smaller states, backed by no mean jealousy, but by a commanding philosophy for which nations have shed their blood many times in the last century, and the Charybdis of arbitrary action by the Great Powers, backed by no philosophy at all, but simply by the urgent practical desire to "get things done." Indeed, it is only Scylla that is charted; we have no coherent doctrine

by which we can locate Charybdis with certainty and so define the true channel of progress.

Such a doctrine can only be built up by a frank reconsideration of our commonest tenets. The charge of having learnt nothing from the war is just now being freely bandied about between all parties in every state, but it is especially true of the intellectual side of politics. Even where there has been a real change of heart, the change has not mounted to the brain. The challenge of the future has worked most powerfully upon the simple and ignorant ; its influence has been weakest among the rationalists and advanced thinkers. We have, as a first step towards the success of the League, to confess that our hopes were mistaken, that the political idols we worshipped were no gods, that we are not emerging from Armageddon to lay the coping stone on the edifice of liberty, but are rather overwhelmed in the ruins of a house built upon the sands.

In fact, Europe during the nineteenth century was in a condition of disintegration now finally completed, and, partly as a cause, partly as a consequence, of that condition, it came increasingly to rely upon a philosophy of emancipation rather than upon a philosophy of government. That philosophy had its roots, indeed, in an earlier era, in the religious revolt of the later Middle Ages and the Reformation period, and in the constitutional struggles common to all European countries. The American Revolution marked the culmination of those struggles, but the French Revolution, beginning

on the same model, ended in inaugurating a new phase of emancipation, the national movement of the nineteenth century. It is in this phase that the philosophy of emancipation has grown to full strength and has clearly manifested its tendencies. In its turn it has now given birth to the idea of the social revolution. Throughout this long process this philosophy has undermined in turn every government it has created. That which the religious revolution set up, the political or the national revolution has thrown down, only to be threatened in its turn by the social revolution. Each succeeding upheaval is more violent than the last, partly no doubt owing to the mere force of accumulated disappointment, but partly also because the philosophy of emancipation, originally little more than a collection of controversial arguments directed against arbitrary power, tends to harden illogically into a creed of absolute beliefs. This illogical taint runs through all the phraseology of modern politics. The "rights of man" were formulated as negative limitations on the powers of governments; they have come to be regarded as positive guides to individual duty. The "right of every man to worship God in his own manner" was first asserted as an argument against artificial uniformity and religious persecution; to-day it is quoted as indicating that Congregationalism is the perfect form of Church organisation. The claim that "governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed" was urged by the American colonies as an argument against

the enforcement of unpopular laws ; but it was expressed by intellectuals like Jefferson in a form reminiscent of the theory of the "social contract," and it developed insensibly into the principle that the governed must by fixed constitutions delimit the powers of the government beforehand. The American Constitution itself did not, as a matter of fact, spring from any such idea, but from the necessities of a federal system, in much the same way as the earlier constitutions of the separate Colonies had sprung from the necessity of delimiting the authority of the colonial governments in relation to the supreme power of the Crown in Parliament. But this fact has been misunderstood not only by Europe but by Americans themselves who, misreading the precedents, have created on these models state constitutions designed to protect the citizen against the acts of his government. By a similar development the European idea of self-determination has grown from an opportunist denial of the rights of an alien government into a general assertion of the capacity of any group of men, however situated, to devise a government for themselves and to secede from any union in which they may find themselves at any given moment.

It is becoming increasingly evident that no government, created by revolution and acting upon the philosophy of emancipation as the law of its being, can evoke loyalty or attain stability. It is, in fact, founded upon a philosophy of disunion, and such unity and stability as it achieves are reached through dishonest manipulations of

that philosophy. Self-determination finds its issue first in plebiscites such as that by which in 1861 Naples accepted Italian unity under Victor Emmanuel—plebiscites admitting of only one answer—and later in electoral wire-pulling and the arts of the gerrymander. The swords of the revolution are twisted into the ploughshares of government, and politicians pay lip service day by day to doctrines which deny their right to the power they hold. It only needs one touch of passionate logic, however perverted, from the lips of Lenin to tumble this card house of subterfuges about the ears of Europe.

Such sweeping generalisations may seem exaggerated, but no student of European affairs can miss the apparently essential weakness of many of the continental governments. France has, in a very fundamental sense, never recovered from the Revolution. As strong as ever in "high policy," in science and in literature, she is extraordinarily weak in the unifying and consolidating action of her government, and in what may roughly be called social vitality. Wealth is evenly distributed, but living conditions remain stationary; social reform is conspicuous by its absence; medical science is highly developed, but medical practice is unorganised and powerless in face of the declining health of the people. Italy is potentially much stronger, but her administrative and political leadership is even weaker, lacking as it does the traditions which still support France. Such smaller states as Serbia, Greece and Rumania all exhibit similar defects. The progress of

national emancipation is, indeed, increasingly transferring the government of Europe to those who have grown up in the shades of opposition, trained in all the arts and inspired by all the beliefs that weaken government and promote division. To a dangerous extent the energies of Europe have been so absorbed in the effort of emancipation that she has little strength to devote to the task of government.

The doctrine of the equality of states is, in its present form, the clearest international expression of this development, but we cannot deal with it as an international doctrine until we have dealt with the philosophy behind it. We cannot construct a doctrine of the League until we have constructed a tenable doctrine of the State. It is internal weakness, the consciousness that they lack any certain and reasoned basis for their authority within their own frontiers, that renders the European states so suspicious of the authority of the League. On the whole, Britain and America are much more ready than their continental associates to pool some of their independent rights and powers, for they have a firmer grip of their own resources, a security of tenure and a consciousness of power, enabling them to judge how wide a range of sovereign functions they can exercise in co-operation with their fellow-members of the family of nations without lessening their independence or detracting from their freedom of action. Germany is perhaps the only continental nation in a similar position, and she is for that reason quite genuinely the only one that

appreciates the idea of the League. Among all the charges that may justly be levelled against Bismarck, one thing should be remembered in his favour. He was wrong, irretrievably wrong, in his conflict with the Prussian Diet, but on the whole he was right in his opposition to the Parliament at Frankfurt. The liberals who led that body could not, he felt, construct an enduring union out of the spirit of emancipation. With all his crimes, he was the only European statesman of the nineteenth century who realised a political union in fact as well as in name—the only one who did not fall, as the uninspired disciples of Mazzini and Kossuth have fallen, into a mere pit of geography, making a map and calling it a nation. Herein lies the great source of Germany's strength as revealed by the war. Her propaganda has been effective because she always had a clear policy springing from a real, if perverted, political life. She has had a coherent philosophy in which her people passionately believed, and the debate between her representatives and Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk really stands to-day as the only lucid answer made by any government to Bolshevik arguments. These qualities may well enable Germany to dominate the League, as they have enabled her hitherto to escape internal chaos, if Britain and America remain aloof; but it is Britain and America who are best fitted by their history and constitution to set a new example and give a new doctrine to Europe, putting the philosophy of emancipation in its due perspective as only a fragment of a wider philosophy of government.

Unfortunately, the tendency of the nineteenth century has been to over-Europeanise British political thought and the war has done much to accentuate this tendency. The influence of the Italian Risorgimento on men like Gladstone and Russell was seen in their curious misjudgment of the American Civil War. While English Tories favoured the South largely from aristocratic prejudice, Gladstone, confusing Davis with Cavour and perhaps even Lincoln with King Bomba, hailed it as a new "nation," and probably never entirely realised to the day of his death how alien was that word to every American conception of political society—so alien that, though it is sometimes used in oratory, as in Lincoln's second inaugural, the American Episcopal Church, as Lord Bryce has pointed out, recently hesitated to apply it to the United States as a whole. Yet American ignorance of this particular phrase was inherited from England. The Englishman, long accustomed to the idea of an Irish nation and having recently heard the name applied to Scotland and Wales, has never quite grasped its meaning and remains congenitally incapable of regarding himself in the same light. Indeed, both Scotch and Welsh nationality, in their present form, are little more than shadowy imitations of Europe. The Union with Ireland and, to a less degree, the separation of Upper and Lower Ontario were, down to the time of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony constitutions, the only instances where England had consciously given political recognition to nationality, and it does not to-day play any real

part in the Englishman's attitude towards political problems. The Dominions have only recently, partly perhaps under Dutch South African influence, begun to speak of themselves as independent "nations," and the phrase does not yet come easily to their tongue. For, before all other things, the English mind, like the Roman, has been absorbed in the effort to *govern*. It has been mainly impressed by the simple and abiding difficulty of inducing men to live soberly and peaceably side by side, of holding them together in a united community, under an appropriate system of laws. This attitude of mind has been the supreme contribution which Britain has made to political progress throughout the world. While Burke, the conservative Whig, was its most brilliant exponent, it marked also the thought and methods of the distinctively English radicals like Bentham and Cobbett. It has, indeed, always been strongest in the strata just below the "governing classes" of the day—stronger in Cromwell than in Vane, in the City which Chatham chose to lead than in the Pelhams or the Temples, in Burke than in Fox, in Bentham than in Canning, in the average "ten-pound householder" than in Palmerston or Gladstone, and to-day in the ranks of labour than in the educated classes. It is indeed in its way narrow and, if you please, unenlightened; it has tended to ignore education and is more at home in the adjustment of material interests, the remedying of material grievances; it is always on the verge of a dangerous self-complacency, as for instance in

the case of the government of India. But in some of these respects it has been modified and improved by transplantation to the New World. During the nineteenth century it was in America that the characteristic British conception of government was best realised and developed. The United States remained untouched by European influences; with all her faults, she supplemented British deficiencies in some directions, notably in regard to education; and above all she gave, through the mouth of Abraham Lincoln, the clearest interpretation since Burke of the ideals she had inherited from Britain. The underlying instinct for the commonwealth that has guided Britain became in America the centre of her constitutional system, the doctrine of Union.

The territorial expansion of the British Commonwealth and the American Union has played a great part in determining these ideals. In Canada, in South Africa and in India, Britain has had to work out the problems of government on a stage too vast for mere nationalism. She has gained a vision of community life transcending the comparatively narrow bounds of race, and as she has seen her conceptions of government follow her flag into the far corners of the earth she has come to regard her own constitution, not as a private possession to be manipulated and modified at will, but as a solemn trust confided to her keeping, as the source of streams which have fertilised and still water a hundred kindred commonwealths. America, too, has served her apprenticeship in government on her

western plains, and it was here that the great controversy between North and South came to its crucial issue. The Civil War was not brought on by the efforts of the Emancipationists to abolish slavery in the South, but by the resistance of the West to the expansion of slavery beyond the limits of the Southern States. It was the practical problems of Kansas, not the mass meetings of Boston, which forced on Lincoln the conviction that the Union could not continue "half slave and half free."

The figure of Lincoln has acquired a new meaning for us in England since 1914. We have realised the value, and felt the lack, of a leadership such as his. Yet it is remarkable that the Douglas debates, in which he first made his name, have rarely if ever been quoted in connection with the problems of Europe, and that their moral has not been applied to the controversies of our day. The whole doctrine of self-determination is here, in Douglas' thesis of "popular sovereignty." It seemed modest and unanswerable, a claim that the Southern people had a right to maintain the institutions with which they had freely entered the Union, both within their own state frontiers and in any district of the new West where they might settle as colonists. Lincoln, step by step, in the simplest language, exposed its real meaning as an imperialist claim to expansion and increase of power; as an assertion of group right as against community right and, in the last resort, as an attempt to limit the rights of popular government by the selfish interests of the individual.

His definition of popular sovereignty as a claim that, if one man chose to enslave another no third man had a right to interfere, sums up the instinct of all just men when confronted by the extreme doctrine of self-determination. Lincoln never put his case too high ; he never, like Burke, appealed in lofty language to the ultimate ideal of the state ; rather, he used good-humoured banter to demonstrate the childishness of " secession " and was content, in his first inaugural, to remain strictly on the defensive, claiming to do no more than discharge the ordinary administrative duties confided to the Union by the Constitution and requiring from his " dissatisfied fellow-countrymen " no higher test of loyalty than recognition of the custom house officer and the postman. But behind his speeches there loomed always, half expressed, the two guiding principles which distinguish the doctrine of commonwealth and union from the narrower idea of emancipation and freedom of choice—a belief in the indestructibility of government and a sense of the standards to which it should conform. Sovereignty must reside in a fixed local habitation ; the popular will must be embodied in definite organs of government, however varied, however decentralised ; and, once so embodied, it is to that Jerusalem that the people must go up. Thereafter, the popular will cannot express itself in arbitrary high places, on every high hill and under every green tree. It is better that justice should be attained and right done through the slow labour of generations at the centre of the commonwealth,

that the popular will should be gradually wrought into form and tempered by such common labour, than that a fragment of one generation should seize for itself in one day possessions which, if they have any value, should be the common heritage of all. Sometimes indeed this centre of the commonwealth may become corrupt, embodying no longer in any true sense the popular will but sectional interests or mere soulless majority rule, and minorities may then be forced to sever their connection with it. But—and here comes in the second principle—such secession can never rightly be a mere assertion of a claim to independence and freedom of choice, but must spring from a definite conflict between right and wrong, justice and injustice. Lincoln very rarely discussed the ethics of slavery but he knew clearly that, in the last resort, the doctrine of popular sovereignty must be judged by the ends at which it aims, that the right of secession must be determined by the rightness of the seceders. Once or twice, therefore, he put the conflict between North and South in its historical perspective as a moral issue between liberty and oppression and once, in a peroration so quiet that its weight is almost lost in print, he appealed even from the people of the United States, whose supreme authority he recognised, to the ultimate standards to which their decisions must conform and by which they must be judged. "Be ye perfect even as My Father in Heaven is perfect" was the last test he proposed to an audience of electors, the test before

which all assertions of freedom of choice and the supremacy of the popular will must fade into comparative insignificance.

Lincoln's teaching has had a powerful influence on American thought and has recently been reinforced by the conditions of American political life. As we have already seen, immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe has accustomed Americans to regard nationality as a disturbing element in true progress. The social reform movement has at the same time discredited the whole theory of fixed constitutions with their "eighteenth century system of checks and balances . . . the legal, political and philosophical charters called bills of right by which our fathers sought to confine courts and legislatures and sovereign peoples for all time within the straight and narrow course of individualist natural law." If the restricted Zionist policy of a "national home" is accepted without afterthought by any section of Jewry, it is by American Jews like Judge Brandeis who are keenly impressed by the evils arising out of European attempts to convert nationality from a cultural conception into a political dogma. And the strength of this American thought, like the strength of Lincoln's speeches, lies in the fact that its tone is not controversial but practical; it makes no frontal attack, like Lord Acton's, on the theory of nationalism as repugnant to the highest ideals of religion, morals or political philosophy, but tends to counteract its exaggerations by emphasising the more permanent and everyday needs of human society. Indeed,

the doctrine of commonweath and union is not far removed from Mazzini's own teaching, balanced as that teaching was by a fervid idea of patriotism and devotion to an organic national society. What it does contradict is the later glosses placed upon that teaching by its uninspired disciples—the constant emphasis on the rights of groups, the avowed selfishness of Sinn Fein, the reasoning which has made the idea of independence a general rule of society instead of the last refuge of the oppressed. It does, however, go further than either Mazzini's national patriotism or the Prussian conception of loyalty to an infallible State, and in the advance it makes upon these lies its chief significance for us at the present day.

Mazzini and Hegel were alike concerned with the subordination of the individual to the nation or the state. They only reinterpreted the old Tory doctrine of loyalty and patriotism and even their reinterpretation did little more than revive the still older philosophy of the Greek city state. Britain and America, however, have for generations been absorbed in the larger task of subordinating communities, and even states and nations themselves, to the commonweath and the union. They have worked out the discovery that organised groups, no less than individuals, can only realise full freedom by restricting their own liberty of action. The imperfect machinery of the representative system, the distribution of powers between local and central, state and federal governments, are, whatever their historical

processes of growth, but so many formal limitations on the self-determination of local communities, many of which are themselves so highly organised and possess such distinct and important interests as apparently to justify a claim to decide their own policy and to live unto themselves alone. These limitations may indeed often seem to operate at a given moment against good sense and progress, but such defects are accepted as the price paid for the far greater benefits of continuity and union. In any given constituency or municipality the electoral machinery or the local administration may go wrong, but it remains superior to the loose freedom of a soviet ; even the bosses who gain power by long training in the manipulation of an intricate system of suffrage are sounder guides than commissaries selected by haphazard acclamation. Temperance legislation may be difficult, but local option is only a fraudulent short cut to it. Britain has not yet applied to this problem the federal solution by which the American union lives, but the process in her case has been fundamentally the same. This process has to be applied to-day not only to local communities but to occupations and class interests. Britain's success in dealing with her industrial problem depends upon her ability to handle it on these lines, avoiding both the anarchy of self-determination by direct action and the autocracy of State ownership.

The strength of this British-American tendency lies in the fact that it corresponds with

popular interests and inclinations. There is no widespread desire among men to-day to absorb themselves in the life of small communities and to assert the rights of those communities against outside interference. On the contrary, their impulse is to find a wider scope for their efforts and to look further afield for the satisfaction of their needs. Nationalism throughout Europe to-day is revealing itself, as Southern particularism revealed itself in Lincoln's day, as a camping ground on the march towards imperialism. The fundamental difference between British and Polish or Italian claims to territory at the Peace Conference was, generally speaking, that, while they may have been equally selfish, Britain rested her case on her capacity for absorbing new communities in the British Commonwealth to the mutual benefit of all concerned, while Poland and Italy insisted that the coveted lands were theirs by inheritance and absolute right. Britain, with all her ambition, can compromise her claims and can combine imperialism with toleration. But nationalism, recognising only one kind of citizenship, has only one way of proving a claim to expansion. Its claims thus become irreducible irredenta and its actual expansion tends to uniformity and subjugation. Britain and America alone can offer to smaller communities membership in place of absorption, for the limitations and restrictions which their sovereignty imposes on Samoa or Hayti are in their essence the same as those by which alone Wales or Virginia is able to realise its freedom

and express its will in a wider commonwealth and union.

But, to complete the doctrine, one thing must be added. The wider community by which group liberties are restricted in order that they may be reconciled and realised, must be an organic society. In it all smaller groups must be really conscious of a common life and therefore of a common allegiance. It must not only be a community but a communion. No haphazard agglomeration of people, no artificial league of governments, can thus take precedence of the individual and the group. The standard by which commonwealth and union must be measured is not less than that proposed by the thinkers of the Greek city state—that really and actually, in it and through it, its members, individual and corporate, can realise the “good life” as they cannot do in any smaller group or looser association. Only, on the other hand, we must be on our guard in this matter against superstition or sentimentalism. The common life must not be a mere “social myth” as it tends to be in nationalist theory. It does not spring automatically into being out of the mere fact of a common race or even of a common history and culture. If it did so politics would become an endless clash of conflicting claims. Any man might at any moment propose some other theory of the law of its birth, asserting, for instance, as many loose thinkers have asserted, that the common humanity of mankind is its true source. Any group might at any moment break away from one state in the belief

that it might find a nearer affinity in another. It is no such metaphysical abstraction as this. It is a thing painfully and slowly attained by experiment and practice. A fusion of wills is the product of actual self-sacrifice in work undertaken for the common benefit. The final argument against secession is this, not that it involves the severance of a group from some body to which it naturally belongs and on which its health depends, but that it cuts the thread of continuous effort by which alone men can discipline themselves to liberty and amounts, moreover, to a denial of man's practical duty to his neighbour—an assertion that he is actually justified in living unto himself alone.

This doctrine applied to the League of Nations clearly rules out first of all any encroachment upon the sovereignty of its members. The claim of the State against any group of its citizens is a claim also against any outside body, however great, however commanding. Any tendency on the part of the League to substitute its own authority for that of the constitutional centres in each state would in fact amount to a vindication of sectionalism and group rights and must result in anarchy. The League has no long history of common effort behind it; it cannot for generations to come command any real allegiance as embodying the general will; it cannot symbolise to men the daily obligations of self-sacrifice. And hence it should proceed with the greatest caution in its protection of national minorities.

Special rights for Jews in Poland, special autonomies for the Ruthenian province of Czechoslovakia, or for East Galicia under Polish rule are not methods by which the new Europe seeks to preserve certain groups in a state of suspended animation, in trust for some future claimant. They are fundamentally different from the idea of mandatory government as a step towards independence. They are to be regarded rather as signposts directing the steps of new states away from the policy of assimilation, absorption or subjugation towards the policy of commonwealth and union. It would be fatal to convert them into a general system applicable to all states, for this would be at best to fall into the old error of fixed constitutions rooted in the citizen's distrust of his own government. It will even prove fatal to maintain them for all time. The League cannot force the new states into the right road, and whether they take the right road or the wrong one, the signpost will become useless in time. Moreover, these special rights should also be regarded as warnings to the minorities themselves that their future lies, not in selfish independence, but in union. They receive protection in the stage of transition in order that they may enter their commonwealth as free men.

But while this doctrine affirms the sovereignty of states in their relation to the League, it does not affirm their equality. While it prescribes unanimity as the general rule of all international action, it does not entitle every state to claim either a voice in all international business or

exactly the same treatment as its neighbours. No commonwealth can be more than the sum of its parts; no general will can weigh more than the individual wills fused in it. We have emerged from the region of metaphysical abstractions; we see around us peoples engaged in the slow labour of realising a common life, not a number of mysterious corporate creatures pulsating with a natural life of their own. We must indeed refuse to weigh them against each other by a mere standard of power or a mere counting of noses, forgetting less tangible values; but the smaller members of the family of nations will be well advised not to reject even such measurements as these for many practical purposes. The League cannot protect the weak or assist the inexperienced if it is enjoined to ignore all differences between them, and, whether or not the American Senate eventually attaches reservations to its confirmation of the Covenant in respect of article 10, it is absolutely certain that neither the British nor the American people will in the long run accept unlimited responsibilities for the protection alike of weak and strong. The Covenant as a matter of fact makes an enormous advance upon the old diplomacy in giving weight to smaller states. They are indeed now obliged to recognise formally by their signature to a definite international constitution the subordination in which they were before merely driven to acquiesce by force of circumstances, but the Covenant takes them from the ante-room of the Great Powers, where diplomacy

has kept them for generations, into the inner counsels of the family of nations. The League has no more important task than to make this admission a reality, not merely a form. But the theory of equality is a legal fiction which will hinder this task rather than help it, and the smaller states will be well advised to forget it.

There are other lessons of caution that the League should learn from the doctrine of commonwealth and union. The constitution-mongers who have played so large a part in Europe since the French Revolution are anxious to provide the League at once with a full panoply of representative institutions, to elaborate each of its organs according to a perfect pattern, and to win respect for its authority by the imposing symmetry of its organisation. But true constitutional machinery is not evolved by any such methods. The search for the perfect constitution in Europe during the nineteenth century has been largely responsible for the popular discredit into which the representative system has fallen. That system has been elevated into an almost sacred principle, and as such, as a matter of *a priori* argument, its superiority to a soviet system is not evident to the popular mind. But in commonwealth and union its justification is clear because its purpose is practical. It exists for the restriction of individual and group freedom of choice, and it provides a vehicle for the expression of personal and sectional wills in the attainment of a larger liberty. The authority of the League to restrict the action of its members is very small ;

unanimity is rightly made the law of its whole procedure. It can, as yet at any rate, offer no prospect of more far-reaching liberties than those secured to their citizens by commonwealth and union. Its advocates too often forget that the failures of the Conference at Paris, while partly due to lack of wisdom and to defective organisation, did also indicate an inherent tendency in international action to delay and compromise. This tendency must persist in the League. It is the price paid by the more enlightened nations for peaceful progress; but that price must not be enhanced by any forcing of international consultation into stiff constitutional forms. The League will, for the present, accomplish more by what may be called the civil service organisation sketched in the last chapter—practical but flexible and almost informal—than by any ambitious elaboration of constitutional bodies. True, bureaucracy must not be left uncontrolled, and this organisation must be closely supervised by the Council, but the popular check upon it and upon the Council must rest for many years to come in the hands, not of some nicely devised international Convention, but of the national parliaments. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this point. The League is the instrument of national "self-governing" sovereignties, and it is the popular will concentrated at the centre of each commonwealth that must therefore direct it. The Council must not be a body of ambassadors, however distinguished in the political life of

their countries ; Englishmen have to resist the temptation to entrust their representation to brilliant independent figures like Lord Robert Cecil or Lord Reading. The Council must be composed of the chief Cabinet Ministers of the nations ; the policy of the League must be an essential part of the responsibilities they assume in taking office. Only thus can foreign policy be brought home to the mind of every citizen and become a recognised part of everyday government.

And these considerations lead us to the main conclusion of our argument. The success of the League depends comparatively little on any rules adopted by it to regulate its own activities. The future of the new Europe lies far more in the development of government in the members of the League. It rests with them to prove against the claims of Bolshevism that men can realise in commonwealth and union a fuller liberty and develop a greater power for good than by unlimited self-determination and the ambitions of the class war. The true function of the League is to create among its members a consciousness of their common responsibility in this task—a realisation that by their acts, each in its own national sphere, the doctrine of commonwealth and union will be judged by the peoples of the Western world, by the seekers and the rebels, who will compare its fruits with those promised by the social revolution. There are few enough signs among the members of the League at present of any such sense of responsibility. Poland, for instance, does not realise that her

own domestic policy, not a common frontier with Rumania, is the only real barrier against Bolshevism. The teaching and the example can only come from Britain and America. Again, the success of the League depends almost wholly on the development of domestic politics in these two countries.

In Britain we seem indeed at present far enough from the calmness of mind and clarity of thought necessary to teach such lessons or set an example in them. Our dangers and our weaknesses are so present to our mind at this moment that it is needless to enlarge upon them, but our national life suffers from one special defect which is too often ignored and which has a peculiar importance in this connection. It has already been said that the feebleness of our propaganda during the war was largely due to the absence of any coherent policy in our government, but it was also due in large measure to the fact that the British press is perhaps a weaker instrument of publicity than the press of any other great country. We are accustomed to laugh at the feverishness of the American press, yet, in spite of flamboyant headlines and apparent sensationalism, American newspapers are far superior to ours in their power of conveying a definite sense of the state of the nation, of the issues before it, and the tendencies of its policy. The tendency of the British press on the other hand is to reproduce, and often to initiate, spasmodic campaigns on certain burning questions of the hour, and it lacks that highly developed system of collecting

information which enables the American press to frame such momentary campaigns in their true setting of continuous national life and activity. The British newspaper is indeed at its weakest in conveying news. This weakness arises very largely from defects of organisation. We have failed to develop the high class of political correspondent who in America gives tone and direction to his paper by his reports on political affairs, and to whom is due the fact that, even in the heat of a Presidential campaign, the partisanship of an American first-class newspaper rarely slops over from its editorial into its news columns. It is, in short, peculiarly difficult for a British Government to "get its policy across" to the public even when that policy is definitely formed. In our days the fusion of wills in commonwealth and union depends to an extraordinary degree on the power of publicity, and publicity becomes even more essential when it is a question of conveying the mind and the example of one country to its fellow members in the family of nations. The task of the League, and above all things the task of Britain in the League, is that of healing and settling, and it behoves us to beware lest we add to the unrest and the doubts of the new Europe the fevers and fluctuations of our own political life.

CHAPTER VII

THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTENDOM

“Let us therefore be more considerate builders, more wise in spiritual architecture, when great reformation is expected.”—*Milton*.

“A partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection.”—*Burke*.

It is easy to guess how disappointing to many ardent advocates of the League must be any such line of reasoning as that sketched in the last two chapters. We have seen the League as an essential instrument for the safeguarding of common interests and the development of common prosperity in the new Europe, but the tasks which lie before it here are comparatively humble and obscure. It seems little more than the centre of numerous joint committees; it does not appear as a commanding authority among the nations. We have seen it again as the focus of a common doctrine of government and of the common responsibility arising from that doctrine, but that doctrine is a doctrine of national, not of international, government, and the responsibility for applying it falls necessarily upon the members of the League separately and individually. It confirms their sovereignty and enhances their prestige. The

League can only influence their action by bringing together their statesmen, their jurists, their civil servants, their technical experts, and, in time, representatives of their people; it can only provide a forum where each may learn from the practical experience of the others, and may come to realise in what manner and to what extent its failures affect the safety and the health of all. All this might satisfy, and does satisfy, the most ardent "Covenanters" as a first step, but how is any further step to be taken? The doctrine of commonwealth and union has, indeed, the effect of marking still more clearly the gap between common citizenship and mere co-operation. How is that gap to be bridged? If the popular tendency to-day is really, as has been suggested above, to press constantly towards a wider field of effort, by what road, however long, however gradual, can national sovereignties become the instruments of a wider union?

That question must in some way be answered, for it goes very deep. It represents hopes which have sustained the peoples through five years of war, and are now plunging them into disappointment, impatience and the first stirrings of revolt. It is by this standard that the peace is really judged by millions who can give no articulate account of the grounds of their discontent. This has been the origin alike of the enthusiasm for a "war to end war," and of the unrest which threatens our peace. Like all deep aspirations, it contradicts, apparently at least, many demands which are much more

strongly urged because they lie much nearer the surface of men's minds. In England, at any rate, the vast majority who feel the need of a wider association would absolutely refuse to be bound by any wider authority than the government of Britain itself. Universal brotherhood is a potent ideal, but universal law would find few to obey it. Yet this fact, though it justifies unanswerably the moderation of the Covenant and the caution of its authors, does not dispose of the problem. The deeper aspiration persists, not only as a piece of intangible idealism, but as a very real revolutionary force. Law and authority are remote ideas to men who inherit and instinctively accept a national life created by the process of generations; they have no conception of the agonies through which a society must pass before it can create a government, and if they have read of such things in history they dismiss them from their mind as the barbarities of unenlightened ages. But even when, as in the case of Russia to-day, they are presented forcibly with a picture of these agonies, the lesson impresses them little. To many it seems a price almost worth paying. "At the birth of a child or a star there is pain," and it is not only in Russia that thousands are found willing to "give another year of famine for the Revolution."

True, we can point out, on the basis of the argument in the last chapter, that Bolshevism, no less than nationalism, is proving the invariable tendency of all "self-determination" towards a selfish imperialism. But it is

precisely imperialism that tempts men who are groping blindly for wider fields of activity, and it is really a "moral equivalent" for imperialism that we are seeking in the interests of world peace. From this point of view the popular instinct is right. We can hardly hope to satisfy it; the answer to its questionings cannot be completely supplied by political treatises and calculations. But some notes may be made upon it, and at least it must be recognised and considered by all to whom the idea of the League is something more than an amiable experiment in philanthropy.

If, as Mr. Wells has suggested in one of his short sketches, the Recording Angel is both a humorist and a literary artist, one of his most interesting tasks must be to trace the part played by human historians in encouraging among their contemporaries the sins they denounce in their fathers. There have perhaps been no more powerful propagators of the heresy that might is right than the liberal and enlightened historians of the nineteenth century. Starting from the unquestioned postulate of "progress," they have depicted every defeat as the downfall of stupidity and reaction, every victory as the triumph of right and freedom. Success is the only key to the heart of the biographer. No one cares to spend time or study on the work of the political failures of the last hundred years—the Gagerns, the Speranskis and the de Serres—whose very names are now almost forgotten. The life of Napoleon is never written as a tragedy, but as a chapter in

the history of the "regeneration" of Europe. And this tendency is nowhere more remarkable than in dealing with the great revolutions. The historian's sympathies have been so wholly with the rebels that he has usually ignored the fact that it has in every case been the fallen system itself that generated the forces of revolt and nourished the germs of progress. It is this attitude that has built up between the modern and the mediæval worlds the historical barrier of the Reformation and has darkened to our eyes the whole European society to which the reformers owed their training and from which they drew their inspiration. Like Milton's contemporaries, though in a different sense, "we have looked so long upon the blaze that Zwinglius and Calvin have beacons up to us that we are stark blind."

This tendency has been natural enough, for the conflict of the Reformation has continued down to our own day. The claim of religious authority to temporal power, the claim of the priest to the throne, has persisted in various forms, and the whole movement of emancipation has centred round the denial of that claim. It was this criterion that determined alike Voltaire's attitude towards the wars of Frederick the Great and the sympathies of our fathers for Italian unity. But there have been two great exceptions to this general interpretation of the modern history of Europe. While the French Revolution itself had deep roots in the religious conflict, that conflict had little or nothing to do with the Napoleonic wars, and in our own

day the very neutrality of Rome has pointed to the same fact in regard to the war from which we have just emerged. These two great upheavals have been wilder and more universal than any that followed upon the religious schism of Europe; they have been wars of freedom in the strict sense, rather than wars of liberation. Political power, freed from all religious control, has come into its own and is seeking an outlet for its untrammelled energies. In this hour, as we survey the wreckage wrought by this freedom, we may well look back beyond the struggle of emancipation which we have left behind us and measure the progress we have made since that struggle began.

This idea will not of course be accepted by many believers in current orthodoxies. Was not this war rather the final stage of emancipation, the vindication of democracy against the divine right of kings? Does not Mr. J. A. Hobson still see in the Anglican clergy the gravest menace to democracy? To the first of these questions it must be replied that the conflict between democracy and the divine right of kings is a very ambiguous one, and has many and varied implications, but by no stretch of imagination can it be identified with the historic struggle for political emancipation. The king at the altar is not the priest upon the throne, and the Papacy from which the Reformers revolted finds no comfortable refuge in the Germany of the Kulturkampf. Democracy and monarchy may be in the most violent opposition to each other, or again, they may be

almost at the point where extremes meet, but only confusion of thought can obscure the fact that they are both means for the assertion of State sovereignty and for the concentration of political power. The example of Germany indeed shows the concurrent development of both autocratic and democratic principles for this purpose. As for the reactionary influence of any section of the Christian Church in modern politics, that influence certainly cannot be denied in many countries; but it is equally certainly no longer a determining factor in political life. No outside influence threatens the independence of political institutions; no theocratic claims are concerned in the conflict between those institutions as now established and the aspirations of the social revolutionaries for a yet more comprehensive organisation of political power. Now for the first time Macchiavelli has come fully into his own and statecraft has become the sole arbiter of the destinies of civilisation.

That neither statesmen nor peoples are satisfied with this consummation is proved by the aspirations we are discussing. It is demonstrated by the establishment of the League. Emancipation has, in fact, been bought at a price greater than the Reformers had ever meant to pay. They planned the overthrow of Rome, but not the destruction of Christendom—a schism of religious allegiance but not of civilisation—and while the mediæval Rome against which they rebelled has no modern defenders, the Christendom they divided lives

in the memory as a state of society to which many to-day would fain return. There is indeed nothing easier or more misleading than to idealise the Middle Ages. The romance of chivalry has long faded at the touch of the historian, and not much remains to-day of the credulity which, in the early years of the co-operative and socialist movements, constructed a picture of harmony and brotherly kindness out of the bitter feuds and tyrannies of the guild system. Yet if Europe and America have to-day any seeds of union and common life in them, those seeds were planted in the days before the schism of civilisation when Europe had not only a common faith, but a common science, a common philosophy, and a common culture. The authority of Rome may have hindered political development, the teaching of the schoolmen may have forced thought into blind alleys, but the organisation they built up provided channels for the new learning of the Renaissance and the universities of Italy became the source whence the influence of humanism spread into every corner of Europe. It would be difficult to say how deeply this cultural unity penetrated into the lower strata of European society, but we know that scholarship and art were within the reach of poverty as they have perhaps never been since the Reformation, and, even apart from definite learning, the Church was the vehicle of a community of spirit, intangible perhaps, but real and potent. Without the community of learning the international forces which made the Reformation could never have

combined in a common revolt ; without the community of spirit the Reformers could have accomplished little more than local secessions and temporary heresies.

Among all the records of signal failure which have been left untouched by modern historians, the greatest is perhaps the abortive Catholic Reformation of the early sixteenth century. It runs from the spiritual revival wrought by men like Gaetano da Thiene, through the story of the Oratory of Divine Love, the narrower reforming energy of Pole and Caraffa and the hopes and labours of Contarini, to the failure of the Conference of Regensburg, the arrival of Loyola in Rome, and the conversion of the surviving reformers to the policy of the Inquisition. A writer will perhaps arise who will tell this story as it ought to be told, as the last attempt to preserve, not any mere uniformity of doctrine or Church government, but that social unity of civilisation which could alone guarantee the peace of the world. Such a writer may perhaps compare the wars that have convulsed Europe since the days of Luther with the constant feuds and barbarities of the Middle Ages, and he may find it hard to resist the conclusion that we are infinitely further from the hope of peace to-day than was the Christendom of the thirteenth century. Mediæval Christendom was torn by the lawless ambitions of ignorance, but it has remained for an emancipated Europe to exhibit the deliberate rivalries of knowledge.

This aspect of history is worth considering, because it is perhaps the gravest question of the

present day what part in the anarchy of the family of nations has been played by the nationalisation of education in the past hundred years. The Reformation split the stream of European culture, in Northern and Central Europe at any rate, into divergent channels. Culture became national long before formal state education was dreamt of, but that policy has put the finishing touches to the process. The contrast appears at its strongest in history with the political emergence of Russia, the product of a far more ancient schism. Here the control of Church by State may in a sense be said to have demonstrated, at a comparatively early date and in an extreme form, some of the dangers to which state education, founded on national aims and political ideals, must always be liable. But this example is perhaps too far fetched and too much complicated by other factors to convey any clear warning. A far more striking instance may be seen, at the other end of the political scale, in the United States, where education, divorced, absolutely and as a matter of principle, from every religious influence, has been deliberately based on the cult of the flag—and necessarily so in face of the gigantic task of assimilation and national union imposed on a new, rapidly expanding and, in a sense, loosely organised society, tinged by every variety of racial tradition. But Germany will always remain the classic example and warning of these dangers. What obstacles are thus being built against the unifying action of the League? Can the state,

the almost universal guardian of education to-day, teach anything else but a state philosophy, or turn men's eyes to any wider obligations than those of citizenship?

Many find a ready answer to this question in the influence of modern science. There is indeed a community of scientific research between all nations, and it does make itself felt to a certain extent in a growing uniformity of teaching and outlook amongst civilised peoples. In some branches, especially perhaps in medicine, it had created before the war real international centres of learning. But it has become sufficiently evident that between this and popular education there is a great gulf fixed. The international position of Heidelberg as a centre of medical teaching brought no breath of air from the outside world into the system of education by which the German people were moulded into national self-sufficiency. Science, indeed, bids fair to fail of its effect through enlistment in the service of politics. Not only does "applied science" occupy a larger and larger place in education, but the "application" tends increasingly to be made to the study of political societies. Sociology, economics, law and political science are modern structures into which every scientific discovery is industriously built by searchers after a "new social synthesis," and increasing emphasis is put on those branches of science, such as psychology, most easily handled for this purpose. Political science, which at Oxford is tucked away in a corner of history, where the student, after close

examination of the ninepin of the "social contract," knocks it down with Maine's "Ancient Law," becomes in the University of Wisconsin a somewhat tumultuous study of the problems of the modern state, covering any field of science or policy, from forestry to the history of labour unionism, from constitutional law to the Mendelian theory, which the lecturer or the student may feel called upon to explore. The modest nineteenth century experiment in the comparison of "Physics and Politics" has grown into monumental treatises such as those of the American school led by the late Professor Lester Ward, and scraps of the science of heredity are hurriedly embodied in laws for the sterilisation of criminals and "defectives." The founders of the School of Economics of the University of London are not far from asserting it as that University's proudest claim to recognition that it aims at making all knowledge the handmaid of the state.

The results of this tendency are twofold. In the first place, the greater the volume of knowledge and the greater the effort to concentrate it in the "noblest study of mankind," the more necessary and the more elaborate does the task of education become. In the second place, the last step in applied science is the application of sociology itself. The student eagerly seeks a field for experiment, the professor for demonstration. The only possible agent alike of education and application is the state, and it is to the state that this course of inquiry and teaching inevitably turns men's eyes. Moreover, while

the scientist strictly so-called is often the most modest of mortals, the sociological heirs of his discoveries are at present in a stage of dogmatism, which leads them to insist on authority and uniformity in education hardly less strongly than the disciples of St. Thomas Aquinas. Such a mood cannot be satisfied by any system of education based merely on state endowment, even if that system could be forced on the modern taxpayer. It demands state control and demands it in a form dangerously reminiscent of the German precedent. That precedent is often alluded to with horror, but it is seldom analysed. It is true that the British and American character is little likely to produce any such conscious teaching of state supremacy as enabled German rulers to mould their people to their ambitions, but that is only half the German system. The stifling of originality and initiative, the creation of blind sides to the whole national character, which marks modern Germany, is the product of uniformity, quite apart from the direction which that uniformity may take, and it is difficult to see how any state education can avoid the same danger.

The only country where this problem is being raised in an acute form at the present moment is the United States, because there alone state education, having been established at a particularly early date in the life of the nation, has not only, as in all countries, lagged behind modern thought, but has come into more or less direct opposition to it at various points.

Moreover, even where state control is absent, the private control of founders has tended in many cases to be close and obscurantist. Hence has arisen something like an insurrection in the universities against State Departments of Education and private boards of trustees. In Europe the elements of such a revolt are, in great degree, absent, and modern thought tends rather to enforce its own pontifical claims through the agency of the state.

The Cobdenites were at first sight more reasonable when they put their trust in the free play of commerce as the agent of international friendship and good-will. They were far-sighted enough to see, as socialism failed to see, that the extension of the functions of the state and the increase of its power must be a barrier to community of thought and feeling across its frontiers, but they made the mistake of attempting to limit the state at just those points where, in the last resort, its responsibilities are the greatest and the most elementary. The slowness of other nations to follow England's free trade policy, the growth of socialist thought and the conversion of Cobden's followers to every form of interference in the processes of industry and commerce, save only in the matter of tariffs, all combine to show that no political society can divest itself of responsibility for the livelihood and living conditions of its people. At the same time, Cobdenite teaching did enormous service in directing attention to the international character of commerce and in

allowing time for the development of trade relations to a point where their effective control by any single state is clearly seen to be impossible. If, indeed, there are to-day any ethical standards of any kind, good or bad, common to all Christendom, they are those that regulate commercial competition. It is the fashion with "advanced" thought to assume that these standards are low, if not positively corrupt, but certain provisions of the peace treaties, such as the conversion of mark debts into sterling, would probably have been modified considerably if they had been submitted to commercial instead of to political judgment. Already before the war these standards tended to be embodied in rudimentary forms of international organisations. It was perhaps one of the least foreseen consequences of a free trade doctrine which tended to regard competition as a thing desirable in itself that, wherever industry and commerce have been left free, they have been forced into combinations of one kind or another for the regulation of competition, for the restriction of production and, in effect, to use the ancient phrase, for restraint of trade. The war broke up many of the international organisations thus brought into being, substituting for cartels, rings and year-to-year understandings a direct state guidance of production and direct inter-government arrangements for the exchange of commodities. Such war measures are necessarily temporary, but the question is now being raised, even by some of the strongest

opponents of state socialism, state trading and state interference whether the habit of inter-government conferences on trade relations thus engendered should be allowed to die, whether the League of Nations has no functions to perform in surveying from time to time the field of international industry and commerce, not only, as in the organisation created by Chapter XIII of the Peace Treaty, from the point of view of labour standards, but also from that of supply and demand. Other voices insist on the older question, already a burning one before the war, what should be the relation of governments to the trade of their citizens with undeveloped states and backward races. That question is raised by the colonial mandates and by the revival of the scheme for an international loan to China.

Whatever answer may eventually be given to such questions, there is one fact which Englishmen and Americans especially, in their prevailing eagerness to rid themselves of government controls over trade, will do well to remember—that the clearest expression of a common spirit in the Christendom of to-day has come through the relief and reconstruction work undertaken or planned under the authority of the Supreme Economic Council. If during the coming twelve months or two years of continued shortage, high prices and maladjustment between supply and demand the system of inter-government deliberation, embodied in that Council, is abolished or falls, as it has almost fallen at this moment, into an “innocuous

desuetude," its passing will be regarded by many of the weaker nations as the extinction of the last spark of active international sympathy and conscious international responsibility. Moreover, the citizens of the Great Powers, as they come at last to realise what so many of their statesmen seem as yet incapable of grasping, that national governments, attempting each alone to cope with profiteering and high prices, cannot touch the producer or the primary distributor and can only fall upon the retailer, may well come to regard the League with contempt or distrust if it fails to make any attempt to embody some measure of international economic co-operation. But, whatever may be the policy of the League itself in this respect, international industry and commerce will remain the greatest power for good or evil during the first years of the League. In the very first stages of peace, the reconstruction of the devastated areas can be used, as it is already too often being used, to cloak competitive designs of national commercial expansion or, without demanding any impossible alliance between altruism and business, it may be made the opportunity for a measured exhibition of international good-will.

But neither reason nor historical analogy encourages us to build any extravagant hopes on this foundation. International commerce will supply a powerful instrument to a League conscious of joint responsibilities, but a true spirit of Christendom can hardly take its rise so near the mainsprings of self-interest, so

close to the centre of the struggle for existence. In national life the vanity of syndicalism and guild socialism as agents for peace and prosperity is being clearly enough demonstrated to-day, and in international life nations are inevitably influenced by motives of self-interest even stronger and more justifiable than those which animate craft unions or professional associations. In the period of recovery from the wastage of war this self-interest tends to operate on national policy almost with the intensity of panic. The same is true of all other schemes of international co-operation. In so far as such schemes are practical they fall within the scope of the policy of joint responsibilities, to be worked out in detail by appropriate organs of the League. If they are not practical, if they do not represent an immediate and universal need, the history of Anglo-German relations before the war sufficiently shows how frivolous are parades of international amity in relation to the political tendencies of nations. The only lesson which in this sphere the League should learn is to avoid undue formalism or officialism in working out the policy of joint responsibilities or in drawing up proposals for new international institutions. The recognition accorded by the Covenant to the International Red Cross is a precedent that should be followed in encouraging the formation of voluntary international associations and in enlisting their services. Not only will the co-operation thus achieved prove in many cases much more vital and far-reaching than direct

inter-government conference, but, further, the League may well find in such voluntary bodies the germs of a better international parliament than could be constructed by the mere application of orthodox representative principles.

But all such expedients lag far behind the hopes we are discussing. It is not thus that we can recapture the spirit of a united Christendom. The root of the problem lies in education itself and in the agency by which education is directed. No one now questions the duty of the state, under present conditions, to provide for the mental development of its citizens and few will deny that to-day this is its most urgent and difficult responsibility. But, for this very reason, it behoves us no longer to shirk the question of the direction in which such education may lead and to subject our established ideas of the form it should take to the gravest re-examination. In a very real sense, indeed, all social health depends upon a certain severance between government and culture, and especially so in days like ours when government is becoming more and more a continual effort to provide practical means for the attainment of concrete ends. There is much cant in the virtuous revolt in all allied countries during the war against Treitschke's doctrine of the State as Power, just as there was much hypocrisy before the war in the orthodox rejection of Austin's naked theory of force as the basis of government. Sometimes, usually in the youth of nations, at such moments as the Elizabethan era in England or the days of Pericles at Athens,

men's eyes may turn for a few brief years to their government, not as an agent of policy or reform, but simply as a centre of life. At such times the state stimulates the heart and brain of its citizens, just because it does not seek to enlist them in definite services. It exists for no special or immediate end, but as an end in itself, the realisation of a common life. Its citizens go forth to their labour until the evening; lesser associations are formed for the satisfaction of material needs, the attainment of concrete ambitions, and, the labour done, the aims secured, the state remains as a wider communion in which the mind, wearied by achievement, may be reabsorbed and refreshed. But these are not our days. The modern state is no serene constellation which, though it "nothing does but shine, moves all the labouring surges of the world." It is, in hard practical fact, the application of power to the organisation and regulation of society. It is inevitably guided by considerations, not of what should rightly be done, but of what can justly be enforced. As the scope of its compulsion grows, liberty of thought comes increasingly to depend on the existence of independent bodies of opinion to which minorities can in the last resort appeal, not to support them in resistance or secession, but to justify them in dissent. So far from attempting to engross all education in its own hands, the state should do its utmost to encourage and countenance independent effort among its citizens, both in schools and universities, and

the League may perhaps find opportunities for encouraging private international co-operation in the same direction.

It is here that we meet, in frontal attack, the idea of the international revolution. The international community which the revolutionary hungers after is a universal state on the modern plan, a comprehensive agency for the enforcement of radical reforms. Its results could not be the revival of a common spirit; it must on the contrary extinguish the last hope of a common culture, making political effort for immediate and definite ends the be-all and end-all of human existence. From this point of view the maintenance of separate state sovereignties, the doctrine of commonwealth and union, becomes the last safeguard of a free spirit in Christendom; and it is perhaps from this point of view that the work of education should chiefly be approached. For states are not historically the initiators of this work nor are they free agents in it. They are joint heirs of a wider community of thought and morals, and through it of ideas and standards of life which, though buried deep under the accumulated structure of our science and our philosophy, "are yet the fountain light of all our day." The preservation of this heritage and its development once more in the direction of a wider communion are perhaps in a very real sense the only titles to state authority in education and the only hope for an enduring League of Nations.

There is, however, a special way in which

the state itself can build a bridge from national sovereignty to international obligations. At the end of the last chapter reference was made to the essential functions of each national parliament in controlling and directing the League through the responsible Cabinet Ministers representing it on the Council. The League cannot, indeed, secure any measure of success or contribute anything to the maintenance of peace unless, through the operation of the Council, foreign policy and international obligations come to play a far larger part in the programmes of parties and governments than they have ever done, at least in Britain and America, in the past. The first step in this direction is to place "policy" in foreign affairs in its correct perspective as a thing absolutely and wholly dependent on domestic policy, as a matter not of "attitudes" but of concrete duties and efforts. Here again our vision is apt to be clouded by our reluctance to confess that the State is, in a very real sense, Power. The second chapter of this essay consisted of an attempt to show that British failures in foreign policy in the past and the ineffectiveness of the Peace Conference have been due not so much to the indecisions of our statesmen in foreign policy as to their decisions in home policy—decisions of economy, demobilisation and so forth which accurately represented the overwhelming desires of the British people. Reforms in our diplomatic service can never avail to create a "democratic" diplomacy, for that phrase means a diplomacy in which

the people, through their constitutional organs, take an active interest and a deliberate part. In the past this issue has been confused by controversies as to "imperialism," but to-day much of the "anti-imperialist" sentiment in Britain is revealing itself as a definite reluctance to recognise in practice the claims of one nation upon another for assistance and protection. Such assistance and protection must always be a heavy and unwelcome burden, and it is vain to seek to escape from such burdens by conjuring up an "international police force" from nowhere in particular, or by verbal sympathy and demands for a different "tone" in diplomatic conversations. The State is Power, but power given for the help of others. The surest path to the spirit of Christendom is indicated in the words of a diplomatist written at the beginning of the war: "The British citizen who thinks diplomacy a mystery beyond him and the American citizen who thinks it a mummery beneath him are only right in so far as they themselves have made it so. International politics will suffer as much through being cut off from the common sense and conscience of citizens and committed entirely to professionals as do municipal politics. '*Humant nil a me alienum puto*' should be translated by every intelligent citizen as 'I will treat nothing of human import as a foreign question.' "

And behind this lies another need of the age, the need in all affairs of government of that appeal to ultimate standards of judgment which

we have seen as the final background of Lincoln's doctrine of union. As political science increasingly turns the eyes of the educated away from *a priori* moralities, as the intensification of political institutions involves all problems of government in a more and more tangled web of debate and intricate argument, the popular instinct swings more and more passionately towards simpler tests of thought and action. By misunderstanding that instinct our statesmen lost their leadership in the war; only by responding to it can they regain their leadership in peace. In recognising it, commonwealth and union affirm an authority greater than their own and the members of the family of nations may find that, in establishing their national rule on foundations firmer than reasons of state or reasonings of philosophy, they have erected also a common standard of political action and have gone far to revive in Western civilisation a common spirit.

IV.—PEACE

“Expectans expectavi.”

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM RESTATED

“ And is this all that was to be ?
Where is the gloriously decisive change,
Metamorphosis the immeasurable
Of human clay to divine gold, we looked
Should, in some poor sort, justify its price ? ’

—*Browning.*

A REASONED study of the peace and of the League of Nations can only lead to modest conclusions. Such conclusions will, indeed, be judged very differently by those few who have actually moved in the tangled growth of modern international relations and by those, the general mass of mankind, who have tasted only its bitter fruits in the ruin and miseries of war. To the former the imperfections and errors of the peace are seen as part of that fruit itself, born, no less than the war, of the impoverished thought and perverted action of nineteenth century Europe; while the League of Nations appears as the first essential step towards correcting some of these accrued evils, repairing some of the ruin they have caused, holding together the changed and weakened members of the family of nations in some degree of mutual understanding and tranquillity,

and regularising the methods by which they transact their necessary business with each other. To the latter, long buoyed up in their sufferings by the idea of "a war to end war," the peace appears merely as the betrayal of a trust, the League as the child of timidity and lack of imagination. The League is, indeed, strongest on its humdrum practical side; weakest as an agent for fundamental reform. Given peace, even such an imperfect peace as has now been established, we have here the means of organising it and making it efficient, and thereby we may certainly remove many of the commonest incentives to war; but the peace we now enjoy was not attained by this means, but by war and victory, and we have not found in the League the germ of any new principle or any new authority that can change its nature or convert it into a reign of accepted law.

Indeed, the sword that has won peace, so far from being turned into a ploughshare, is consecrated anew by the League in its service. This essay has not dealt with the provisions of the Covenant for the enforcement of peace, except incidentally; but while they are far from being the essence of the League, they are in the last resort the unmistakable mark of its character. It is not merely that the Covenant does not pretend to avert "private war" in every instance. Its moderation in this respect may very possibly prove more apparent than real, for the history of the last few years shows clearly the increasing difficulty of isolating war,

and the consequent reluctance of nations to resort to it save in the cause, either of national existence, or of ambitions so universal as to justify the supreme gamble of a world conflict. There is good reason to anticipate that the League will be successful in averting minor explosions, and that any general upheaval will take the form, not of a "private war" conducted outside the obligations of the League, but of a deliberate breach of the Covenant by a section of its members. But it is the sanction of force given by the Covenant to the authority of the League itself which marks its real character. The sword, whether of commercial blockade and boycott or of actual armament, is recognised as the ultimate guarantor of our peace, and to any individual state that means, not a diminution, but an increase of its possible liabilities. Britain has added Bohemia, Poland and China to Belgium as nations for whose integrity her people must in the last resort face the perils and sufferings of war. And this liability is not merely the counterpart of that which, in every civilised country, falls on each citizen as towards his state. Force may be the first foundation of the state and its last recourse, but the structure of a more enduring union has been built upon that foundation, enforced service has passed into voluntary allegiance, and law has become tempered into the habit of a common life. It is at this point that the League breaks down. We have found in it none of the deep alchemy of union, for it has rather been called into being

as an essential business link by nations whose individuality is being ever intensified by the acquisition of new corporate powers and the socialisation of all the activities of their citizens. The liabilities of the Covenant are the signs, not of social union, but of continued anarchy.

Those who, like the writer, regard the League as the creation of a high order of statesmanship and the way to many much needed reforms, have a special duty to measure the distance between it and the passionate hopes that had centred round the Congress of Christendom at Paris—hopes nursed in the mud of the trenches, by fireless hearths, through winters of threatened famine and the piled agony of succeeding summers. “It must never happen again”—“once for all”—“this must be the last time”—it was to meet resolves such as these that the idea of the League was conceived and preached. There was to be a regeneration of the whole political world, a change which should extend from the simplest citizen to the whole machinery of government. The League as accomplished is no answer to these hopes, and those, and they are many, who still offer it as such, who still attribute its defects to the folly of statesmen and still tender their own amendments or substitutes in full satisfaction of popular claims, are either blind to its inevitable limitations or too dull to perceive the true nature of the idealism they profess to share. Their teaching usually springs from what can only be called an idolatry of internationalism, and such

idolatry can have but one result. We have already indicated why we believe the League to be infinitely superior to the more alluring idea of a universal state reached through international revolution—the grounds on which, indeed, we regard the one as definitely right and the other as definitely wrong. But if the aim of a just and enduring peace, secure for all time, can be attained by any internationalisation of the powers and authority now possessed by national states, then the international revolution is assuredly the only bold and honest policy. If we do not believe that men's political allegiance is due to the state, to commonwealth and union, to the exclusion both of sectional rights and ambitions of wider activity, then let us seek in the revolutionary self-determination of groups the way to the universal state. If the sword can win peace for all humanity, let us not only combine the swords of the nations in one League, but let us rather take them from the hands of the nations and give them into the keeping of one general authority, to be wielded no longer in the making of war but in the administration of universal justice.

In truth, however, this idolatry of internationalism falls wider of the mark than does our modest and practical League. It affronts the very core of the sentiment it seeks to satisfy, for it jars the harmony between peace and patriotism, humanity and home, which made that sentiment a bond of union and gave it its sustaining power. The passionate sense of the beauty of England and the value of English

life was not merely felt by a few soldier-poets of the public schools and universities, nor even shared with them only by men of the same class and education ; it was perhaps strongest among the least articulate and among those who had enjoyed the least part in their country's heritage. " It must never happen again " did not stand alone in the mind of the men or women of any nation ; it was filled out by the words " to England," " to France." It was indeed an " England " and a " France " very remote from the politics of parliaments and the regulations of executive departments, tinged pretty deeply in fact with dislike and distrust of them ; but on the other hand it was, especially to the dweller in towns, something infinitely more than a locality, a Grantchester or a " Gloucester lane." Its memories and meaning centred in a state of society in reality inseparable from the frame of laws within which it had grown up, and sharply distinguished from other influences and institutions, however good, recognised as alien and uncongenial to it. Distrust of government, impatience with its methods, disbelief in its efficiency—all these feelings, instinctive to most Englishmen, confirmed by the hardships of war and expressed in every variety of tone, from grumbling banter of " brass-hats " to cursing of politicians and defacement of ballot papers, apply with triple intensity to any kind of foreign authority. Contempt for politics might lead such men for a moment into " direct action," but when they realised what such action had destroyed and what it was designed to

create, they would assuredly turn and rend their leaders.

The real strength of the idea of the social revolution, however, is one that it shares with ultra-nationalism and militarism. War discredits compromise and the League, if not entirely a compromise, is at least that first cousin to it, a practical expedient, valid only over a restricted field. It is easier to exaggerate its possibilities than to explain its justification in principle. If honestly put in its true light public opinion, when it fully understands its nature, may well tend to split on either side of it. If the harmony spoken of above cannot be expressed in action, better either a return to a system of national alliances or a bolder bid for a new world—either Roosevelt or Lenin.

There is an historical answer to this dilemma. It is one which, after many years of oblivion, men were already before the war beginning to remember and investigate as a half-forgotten theory. The war, with its rejection of compromise, has perhaps tended to focus it more clearly. Remote as it has long been from the calculations of politics, it can no longer be ignored at this hour when politics itself is on its trial before the tribunal of human desires, disappointed by failure and sharpened by suffering. And there is a special reason why any study of the League, such as has been attempted in these pages, must conclude with a consideration of it. During recent months there have been no stronger supporters of the Covenant, in Britain and America at any rate, than the clergy of the

Christian Church, and many who are not themselves members of that Church have enforced their advocacy of the League by appeals to Christian teaching and Christian morality. It is, indeed, from this quarter that many of the most extravagant conceptions of the League's functions and possibilities have been derived and fostered. But history indicates that the Church claims to have its own answer to such expectations—an answer on which much of the structure of Western civilisation is founded. Is that answer to be left in abeyance or abandoned in favour of hopes which, as we have seen, if they lead anywhere, lead, aside from and beyond the League, to social revolution and the international state?

During the nineteenth century the consciousness that the Church, in so many ways the centre and moulding influence of European society from the dark ages to our own days, claimed to represent, not only an ideal towards which it spurred men's efforts, but a definite law of corporate human development, faded more and more into oblivion. The shock of the French Revolution and the social earthquakes that succeeded it concentrated men's minds on the task of saving society from immediate evils and dangers, and the attention of the Church swung in the same direction. Protestant England and Catholic France shared this tendency, especially during the years immediately preceding the revolutions of 1848, when Chartism was giving birth to Christian Socialism and the Gallican revival, under Lacordaire and his

associates, was striving vainly to cope with the volcano of destruction which was to break loose at last on Paris in the "days of July." The attitude of Kingsley's Scotsman, "I will hear the parsons anent God when they hear me anent God's people," was spreading through all classes and all sections of the Church, and Ruskin set the standard for a whole generation in his appeal to "modern Christian religion" to "give up its carburetted hydrogen ghost in one healthy expiration and look after Lazarus on the doorstep."

There was in this a very real religious revival, and its extravagances, such as they were, were a necessary reaction from respectability, from a Church too closely identified with the rich and ruling classes. As such, it had its counterpart in more than one earlier movement, notably on the eve and during the early period of the Reformation. There was then the same violent reaction against the "preachers" who bade "poor folk in great number to pay all with patience that their landlords demand, for they, for their sufferance in such oppression, are promised reward in the resurrection"; the same warning in Latimer's sermon before the King, "you have for your possessions yearly too much"; the same protest from the Scots poet-clerk, "your profit daily does increase, your godly works less and less." But the movement in our own days went much further, at least in Britain and the United States where, in this sphere also, aloofness from the currents of European thought and history made room for compromises hardly

conceivable in continental countries. While France plunged deeper and deeper into the fight against clericalism, radical thought in Britain and America extended a friendly patronage to the Church as an important agent of social welfare. The United States came into the movement rather later and, so far as its non-Catholic population was concerned, carried it to much greater extremes. A few random quotations from American books and periodicals immediately before the war may serve to illustrate how completely the reformers had come to regard the Church solely from the point of view of a potential political auxiliary.

“The spiritual force of Christianity should be turned against the materialism and mammonism of our industrial and social order.”

“The preacher’s function is to touch the heart and imagination, and most of all to inspire conscience with zeal for that service which consists mainly in promoting social welfare.”

“The whole industrial situation is veiled in a mysterious darkness. We have little means of knowing the real proportion or disproportion between dividend and wage, between selfishness and human sacrifice. It is time for the Church to say to the State in the name of her Master, ‘There is nothing covered that shall not be revealed and nothing hidden that shall not be made manifest.’”

Now, the earlier movement of the pre-Reformation period had a rather remarkable result, already touched upon in a previous chapter.

Notwithstanding the zeal for the poor showed by some Anglican reformers like Latimer, the Reformation was in a certain aspect a reaction from such preoccupations. It did not indeed deny their justice, but it left them on one side. The bettering of the condition of the poor, though a nobler aim than the defence of the rich, was felt to be itself only the obverse side of the worldliness which had overtaken Roman Christianity ; it was a sound policy for a Church laying claim to temporal rule, but the very fact that it was necessary to urge it forced the merits of that claim into the forefront of men's minds. By the eye of faith the Church was seen as an organism of almost unimaginable power, drawn from the very well-springs of eternal life ; in actual fact and experience its strength was immense ; if a civilisation so largely its own creation, and so completely dominated by it, exhibited such appalling and deep-rooted evils, was it not a sign that its spiritual sources must have become tainted by other streams ? In the course of inquiry stimulated by these considerations, the Reformation turned aside, to a very real extent, from preoccupations of social betterment and, down to the later nineteenth century, Roman Christianity remained in many ways more closely identified with the life of the poor than Lutheran or Anglican Protestantism.

There were signs of a similar reaction just before the war, and it found expression in quarters where, perhaps, it might have been least expected. In 1913 a young American writer, observing the Church from the outside,

merely as an interesting social phenomenon, remarked the gulf which seemed to separate its origins and constitution from its present activity. "To-day," he wrote, "traditional Christianity has weakened in the face of man's interest in the conquest of the world. The liberal and advanced Churches recognise this fact by exhibiting a great preoccupation with everyday affairs. Now, they may be doing important service—I have no wish to deny that—but when the Christian Churches turn to civics, to reformism or socialism, they are in fact announcing that the Christian dream is dead. They may continue to practise some of its moral teachings and hold to some of its creed, but the Christian impulse is for them no longer active." As, amid the doubtful struggles of politics, men began to feel a dawning dissatisfaction with their progress in the "conquest of the world," this recollection that, historically, the Church represented something more than a stimulus to philanthropy or a standard of "social justice" became more general and the war has done much to spread it even more widely.

Indeed, if there is one respect in which the press and public debate has, more than in any other, misrepresented the feelings of the mass of the younger generation, which has borne the brunt of actual fighting, it is in the demands made on the Church to lead war propaganda and preach allied war aims as a crusade. And those others, moderates or outright pacifists, who have, on the contrary, appealed to the

Church to subject the war policy of governments to moral criticism, have been equally unrepresentative. Any chaplain at the front knows that men did not expect from him either a crusade against the enemy or a crusade against the government. With the return of the armies to civil life, amid the accumulating doubts and fears of reconstruction, when the sufferings of war are being sharpened by the disappointments of peace, the experience of the chaplain is likely to be increasingly that of the Church as a whole. Contentment with compromise has yielded to a very real spirit of inquiry, and that spirit, directed upon the Church no less than upon the alternative theories of the state and the social revolution, pierces behind that easy quotation, the current coin of inaugural addresses at The Hague before the war and of well-meaning advocates of the League to-day, "peace on earth and good-will towards men." There was peace on earth already when those words were spoken—the *pax Romana* of organised political power. Is this the goal of the Church or does it offer a definite alternative to Cæsar?

This essay has been concerned throughout with political reasoning and history, but no keen inquirer, approaching this question from these standpoints alone, can have any doubt as to the answer. Even if he is content with Gibbon's ingenious doctrine of concurrent causes, he may find in it an explanation of the rise of Christianity, but not of its persistence. He will, indeed, find that the Church has often used the weapons of Cæsarism at their worst;

he may even agree with Carducci's invective that it "has made a desert and called it the reign of God," or with Dostoieffski's protrait of the Grand Inquisitor; but he cannot fail to see that those weapons were used to further a conception of human destiny, remote alike from the ambitions of tyranny and the dreams of democracy. The whole of European history is incomprehensible if we leave this conception out of account as a factor in its development. Without it Europe could have had neither the theocracy of the Middle Ages nor the revolt from it in the Reformation; and not only the divine right of kings but the divine claims of nationality would have taken a very different form. To the continental mind, however sceptical or hostile, this is obvious—obvious alike to the Belgian freethinker confronted with Cardinal Mercier and to the Czech politician who meditates a new concordat with Rome. For in Europe a united and self-organised Church is still a ubiquitous power, a formidable factor in the political life of every state, and reason, which might find a dozen ready explanations of the existence of state churches or of scattered and ephemeral sects, is forced to seek a more potent motive to account for such continuity of existence and concentration of strength. But the English mind, confronted to-day with the reassertion by the Anglican Church of its independence from the State, the American mind disturbed by the rapid growth of the Roman Church in the United States, and the Protestant mind as a whole, influenced by the

revived ideas of catholicity and reunion, must now be impressed by much the same considerations. We have here clearly no code of morality at the service of government, no mere sectarian fashions in doctrine, but a corporate consciousness persisting from century to century and based on some universal conception of corporate life and growth. The existence of such a conception once deduced, the spirit of inquiry prompts a narrower investigation into its nature.

The same course of reasoning may carry the investigator a little further. This conception must be something more than what is known as the "saving of souls." The Jesuit missionary among the Hurons might risk his life to "turn little Indians into little angels," to quote the words of one of them, by surreptitious baptism of dying infants; he might be satisfied to win a convert at the torture-stake by the promise of the "French heaven"; but, both as a matter of reasonable deduction and of historical fact, it was no such restricted policy that had created the tremendous organisation of his Order and inspired its Generals, or that gave to the New France of the seventeenth century the character that endures in the province of Quebec to-day. In our own times, the colonial administrator in Africa knows from experience that missionary teaching, even when deliberately confined to the plainest moralities and the simplest hopes of heaven, is inseparable, in the mind of the native learner, from ideas of corporate life and effort which distinguish it sharply from

Mohammedan proselytism and, in some cases, still more sharply from the official view of the proper relations between Western civilisation and backward races. Much the same facts had long been familiar to students of conditions in Asiatic Turkey before the war. In the same way, other explanations of Christian philosophy fail, on examination, to fit the facts. It is, above all, no mere "rich source of ideology" on which, as another American writer has recently put it, men may draw "to effect a redeeming transformation in a real world," to deliver them "from choice between unredeemed capitalism and revolutionary socialism." Put in the simplest terms, in the terms of the ordinary man or woman to-day, it seems clear that the Church must have something more definite and distinctive to go on, something that lurks, for the most part, in the background of its worship and its work, and the question what this is comes more and more to occupy the thoughts of many who are the least able to put them into words.

At this point all methods of deduction and comparison fail. The investigator has, indeed, at his disposal the whole literature of Christian apology, but he is easily lost in its mazes; he knows of no one recognised summary of Christian teaching, for the authority of Rome and the learning of the modern critics combine to warn him off the Bible. If he, the man in the street and at most a moderate church-goer, ever hears any comprehensive exposition of the Church's claims, it is in the doubtful heat of

debate, as an argument against the diversion of Anglican endowments to secular education or against the establishment of "sociétés cultuelles" in France. If, as is most likely in England at this moment, he turns to the freshest and warmest expressions of Christian feeling in the writings of a few chaplains at the front, he finds there a consciousness, not so much that the Church has something to offer, as that it has lost something that it ought to have.


But, baffled as he is, it is this last note of failure that perhaps attracts him most strongly. It voices exactly his own present instinct of helplessness in face of the "conquest of the world," but with this one significant difference, that it seems to strengthen rather than weaken the corporate sense of the Church and appears to be coupled with an equal confidence in the eventual recapture of the lost secret. And herein lies the special reason why anyone who has had some personal experience of the making of peace is bound to close any survey of it by an appeal to other hopes and other remedies. He has seen many who arrived in Paris with confidence, enthusiasm and well stocked armouries of reform, leave it bewildered and stunned, and among these, for one whose disappointment turns to anger with the selfishness of statesmen or contempt for inefficiencies of organisation, there are ten who have simply learnt to distrust their own abilities and the whole system of hopes and methods on which political civilisation had taught them to rely.

Such disillusionment will accept leadership from none so readily as from those who were the first to confess their weakness. But that leadership can only be based on a clearer and more comprehensive declaration of faith than any to which disillusionment has access to-day.

Here, on the threshold of the subject, we must leave the honest inquirer whom we have followed thus far because we believe him to represent a large part, perhaps the bulk, of the citizens of the new family of nations. The declaration for which he waits can only come from the Church as an organic body, through those whom he can recognise as representing it before the world. But there is no doubt to what manner of claim the Church is committed, however modestly laid by in a napkin in deference to the appeals of social service or the lure of temporal authority. It claims to represent in itself the *only* hope of peace; it claims that this hope cannot be attained by the operation of political power, whether autocratic or democratic, not even by the combined power of all nations in a League or of all civilised men in a universal state, nor yet by the power of a complete system of Christian governments, inspired with the life and blessed with the co-operation and guidance of the Church of the missionary's dream, embracing all mankind. Yet it claims also that this peace, springing from sources beyond the reach of political reform or theocratic usurpation, is nevertheless to be realised, not in any Nirvana of the soul, beyond the "gold bar of heaven," but as an actual state


of corporate human society ; that it is in a very real sense a present process and policy, not a "social myth." And the language which it has employed to describe that process and define that policy points to no mere exercise of healthy influence, no mere result of the progress of innumerable generations, for it is the language of a "new creation," not of the progressive modification of conditions by the slow education of the human will.

So much we may say ; the rest lies beyond the scope of an essay such as this. Only let it be remembered that to many men to-day these things are not the dreams of tradition but the concrete hope of the future, the only possible answer to the passionate questionings which now convulse the world. Science and criticism have touched them less than experience and reason have shaken the systems of political philosophers. And if to-day some are content to uphold the claims of commonwealth and union against the aspirations of the social revolution and to found a League of Nations directed mainly to the modest task of satisfying immediate and pressing needs, it is because they look beyond such labours to a more fundamental union and see in no remote region of the clouds another city into which the nations shall indeed bring their glory and their honour.





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The responsibilities of the
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